RL 454/83 2 December 6, 1983 crimes and especially dangerous recidivists, fifteen years.4 The consequence of this reform was to reduce the population's fear of the state. It turned out that, without draconian criminal laws, the regime could not protect itself, so a new punitive policy was embarked upon. The creation of the new ministry was accompanied by the publication of a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Administrative Surveillance by Police Organs of Persons Released from Places of Confinement" and "The Regulations for Administrative Surveillance by Police Organs of Persons Released from Places of Confinement."5 The regulations defined the categories of people to be placed under surveillance: especially dangerous recidivists; persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom for grave crimes whose behavior while serving their sentences in places of confinement did not meet with the approval of the camp authorities; and persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom for grave crimee who, having served their sentences (or having been conditionally released), "continue to lead an antisocial life." In other words, administrative surveillance was imposed on the majority of convicted persons, including all those convicted of political crimes. The regulations revealed the nature of this administrative surveillance: a ban on leaving home at certain times; a ban on frequenting certain places in a given raion or city; a ban or limitations on leaving a given raion or city; and a requirement to report to the police between one and four times a month. To carry out administrative surveillance, police powers were sharply increased. Not only was the police given the right to impose administrative surveillance on the basis of material of its own to which the person under surveillance was not privy, but it could also extend the term of surveillance "until the expunging or removal of the record of conviction."6 Bearing in mind that it can take from three to eight years for the record of a conviction to be expunged and that the record of conviction for certain crimes is never expunged, it is easy to appreciate that 4. Article 24 of the RSFSR Criminal Code of 1960. 5. Decree No. 597 of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, No. 30, 1966). 6. Ibid. 7. See Article 57 of the RSFSR Criminal Code as amended by the decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of September 14, 1969 (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 47, the police gained the power to impose long terms of administrative surveillance, in some cases lasting to the end of a person's life. The police were obliged to keep a file on every person under surveillance. In it were gathered and stored information on the behavior of the person under surveillance received from the administration at his place of work, from organizations at his place of residence, and from individual citizens; information on the moral education talks conducted with the person by a policeman at his place of work in the presence of the administration, representatives of public organizations, or relatives; and information on the person's activities by day and night at home. To collect this information, the police was authorized to visit the person's residence at any time of day or night. The idea of introducing administrative surveillance in the Soviet state was borrowed from the arsenal of the Russian Tsars. Under the old Russian legislation, police surveillance consisted of: restriction of the freedom to choose a place of residence, or a ban on living in certain places, or a restriction on freedom of movement for a period of between two and five years or even for life. Surveillance was carried out both openly and clandestinely. The purpose of police surveillance was openly declared to be the prevention of crimes against the state. In 1895, police surveillance was extended to all "persons considered harmful to the public order. Persons under surveillance could not be in government or public service. They were forbidden to teach, to keep printshops, or to sell books. The Ministry of Internal Affairs could forbid them to receive private mail or telegraphic communications.8 All of these restrictions have been included in Soviet administrative surveillance. Since the regulations for administrative surveillance came into force in 1966, they have been amended three times, in 1970, 1981, and 1983.9 The latest of these amendments affected not only the regulations themselves but also Article 49 of the Principles of Corrective Labor Legislation, which had come into force in 1969.10 The decree incorporating these amendments was signed personally by Yurii Andropov. Like earlier amendments, they were aimed at broadening both the range of persons liable to administrative surveillance by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and also the grounds for imposing it. 8. Entsiklopedichesky slovar', Brokgauz and Efron, Vol. 20, PP. 432-34. 9. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, No. 24, 1970, Article 206; No. 10, 1981, Article 32; No. 39, 1983, Article 584. 10. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, No. 29, 1969. RL 454/83 December 6, 1983 Article 2 of the regulations of 1966 provided for administrative surveillance of three groups: especially dangerous recidivists; persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom for grave crimes whoce behavior while serving their sentences in places of confinement demonstrated a strong reluctance to embark on the path of correction and take up a life of honest labor"; persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom for grave crimes who, "after serving their sentences or being conditionally released, systematically violate public order and the rules of Socialist community living and, despite warnings from the police, continue to lead an antisocial way of life." In 1970, the range of persons to whom administrative surveillance could be applied was extended to include "persons sentenced more than twice to deprivation of freedom for any premeditated crime." In 1983, it was again extended to include persons released from places of confinement either conditionally or conditionally with the obligation to work before completion of their sentences who commit a further premeditated crime during the unserved part of their sentence or during the period of compulsory labor. The regulations of 1966 established the following grounds for imposing administrative surveillance: a) in respect of especially dangerous recidivists: a legally valid court sentence; b) in respect of persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom for grave crimes: the conclusion of the administration of a camp (or other corrective labor institution) and the supervisory commission that it was necessary. In respect of persons released without administrative surveillance being imposed, such surveillance could be imposed on the basis of material available to the police at a released person's place of residence. In 1983, the administrations of corrective labor institutions--i.e., organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were given the right to impose administrative surveillance without consulting the supervisory commission. Since October 1, 1983, the administration of a corrective labor institution has simply had to "coordinate its decision with the supervisory commission. The most substantial change in the regulations is, however, the addition to Article 16 of a rule stating that: persons under surveillance who leave their RL :: 33 5 December 6, 1983 prosecution according to the procedure laid down The nature of this new procedure is revealed by Decree No. 1334 of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which supplemented two articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Article 198-2 now allows persons under administrative surveillance to be sentenced to between one and three years deprivation of freedom for leaving their place of residence without permission to evade administrative surveillance or for failure, without valid reason, to appear at the chosen place of residence. The decree was published on September 13, 1983, although the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet proposing amendments to the legislation on administrative surveillance was only dated September 22, 1983. Thus, Mikhail Yasnov, the chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, acted even before the measure had been officially sanctioned at the all-Union level. All this demonstrates once again the way in which Andropov, Yasnov, and their like flout the constitution by issuing decrees as and when they will. The anticonstitutional nature of the legislation on administrative surveillance with all its admendments and of the institution of criminal liability for violation of the rules of administrative surveillance is particularly evident when reference is made to Article 49 of the USSR Constitution of 1936 and Articles 121 and 122 of the USSR Constitution of 1977, which state that only the Supreme Soviet is empowered to enact new laws. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet may interpret laws or, when necessary, amend them, but it is not entitled to enact new laws in the guise of amendments. • A computer cross-check resulted in the investigation of a California woman suspected of bilking the welfare department out of more than $4,000,000. Using a variety of aliases over a seven-year period she successfully filed fraudulent assistance claims for 38 nonexistent children. • The Commerce Department, concerned over illegal exports, has distributed a list of 12 "red flag" signals that may suggest an illegal transfer of goods. A 24-hour-a-day telephone hotline has been established. Persons working in hightechnology industries are encouraged to report any suspicions. • The FBI and IBM jointly run a fake consulting firm in the Silicon Valley in San Jose, California. The sting operation involves selling IBM trade secrets to Hitachi and Mitsubishi. These diverse examples are typical of recent efforts to solve a traditional problem faced by any enforcement agency: the need to locate infractions. Police in the United States traditionally have relied heavily on unsolicited information from citizens to direct their efforts (Black, 1980, Reiss, 1971. In a democratic society there is much to be said for this means of mobilization. It can offer a degree of citizen control over police discretion. This, along with other limitations on the autonomy of police to initiate investigations, is surely a necessary feature of liberty. The traditional citizen-reporting approach may work well where there are clear victims or observers who are aware that infractions have occurred and who are willing to report what they know. It is less AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 27 No. 4, March/April 423-452 1984 Sage Publications, Inc. 423 |