and Lu Han refused to fly the French flag during the ceremony, even though this gesture had been requested by American officials, and reportedly, even by his Chinese superiors.

49

Lu Han took a number of other steps that increased French suspicion regarding Chinese intentions. Not until 5 October, after several weeks of repeated French and American requests, did the Chinese consent to free French soldiers and sailors formerly interned by the Japanese, and then only with the stipulation that these personnel not be rearmed. Commissioner Sainteny repeatedly asked for Chinese protection against Viet Minh harassment and terrorism aimed at the 30,000 Frenchmen living in the northern zone. In spite of the efforts of General Gallagher to persuade the Viet Minh and the Chinese to halt such actions, anti-French depredations continued. Among other charges, French officials claimed that China was plundering the north and manipulating Vietnamese currency in a manner designed to yield enormous profits for the occupation officials.50

At the same time, developments thousands of miles from Indochina were laying the basic for the withdrawal of Lu Han's forces. It was soon evident that the Chinese Communists were seeking to dominate north China and Manchuria. To counter these moves, Chiang ordered the redeployment of Chinese Nationalist troops, including some from Lu Han's command. Such an operation entailed participation of the United States Navy, since American forces in the Far East had orders to support the Chinese Nationalist occupation of strategic positions in the China Theater.31

Withdrawal of Chinese Troops from Indochina

51

On 15 September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek conveyed to General Wedemeyer his urgent request that the Chinese 52nd Army be transported from Haiphong to Dairen, Manchuria. The proposal was approved in Washington

40

Msg, OPD WD 150130Z Aug. 1945; McAlister, Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution, pp. 228-29.

Ibid., pp. 226-30; ltr, Gallagher to McClure, of 20 Sept. 1945 and "French Indochina 14 Sept. 1945-12 Dec. 1945," Gallagher Papers, CMH.

51 CINCPAC/POA, "Report of Surrender and Occupation of Japan," ser 0395 of 11 Feb. 1946, pp. 120-22; msg, OPD WD 132252 Sept. 1945.

and Wedemeyer then called upon Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet to plan and execute the operation."

52

Before the actual transportation of these forces could begin, it was necessary to take several preliminary steps. The Seventh Fleet's area of operation initially did not include any part of Indochina. Therefore, on 27 September 1945, Admiral Kinkaid requested that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Raymond A. Spruance) move the Seventh Fleet's operational boundary southward to the 16th parallel. Kinkaid noted that such a step would "place all coastal waters contiguous to the China Theater under a single naval command which is already charged with the support of that theater." Although Spruance's approval was not forthcoming until 28 October, Kinkaid proceeded to plan for the operation.53

Admiral Kinkaid ordered Rear Admiral Elliott Buckmaster, commander of the South China Force (Task Force 74), to plan and coordinate the embarkation of the Chinese in United States Navy ships. Previously, Buckmaster's forces had operated in the Yangtze River and around Hong Kong in order to "support the U.S. China Theater Forces and to control the coastal waters of South China." 5 Commander Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force (Task Force 78), Vice Admiral Barbey, was directed to provide ships for the transportation of the Chinese troops. Barbey in turn assigned this responsibility to Commander Transportation Squadron 24, Commodore Edwin T. Short, whose command comprised 28 ships (7 Liberty Ships, 15 attack transports (APA), and 6 attack cargo ships (AKA)), organized into three transportation divisions. On 14 October Commodore Short issued the operation order and detailed three liaison officers from his staff to proceed to Haiphong. These representatives were assigned to temporary duty with Admiral Buckmaster in order to develop detailed plans for the impending operation.55

Commodore Short's operation order contained an interesting estimate of the internal situation in North Vietnam. According to the intelligence officers of Transportation Squadron 24, the strong "independence move

62

Msg, CG U.S. Forces, China Theater 151032 Sept. 1945; COMNAVFORWESTPAC “Narrative of Seventh Fleet."

53

Msgs, COM7THFLT 270836 Sept., 180912 Oct., and CINCPAC 280205 Oct. 1945. Commander South China Force, OP-PLAN 1-45, ser 0001 of 2 Sept. 1945; USCGC Ingham (Buckmaster's flagship), war diary Oct. 1945.

Ltr, COMTRANSRON 24 to distribution list, ser 288 of 14 Oct. 1945, South China Force Files, FRC Mechanicsburg, Pa.; COM7THPHIBFOR, OP-PLAN A1704-45, ser 00163 of 5 Oct. 1945; COMTRANSRON 24, report, ser 042 of 25 Nov. 1945, encl A.

ment" then underway in North Vietnam was guided by the belief that this was the

one and only opportunity to cast off the French yoke.

The Communist

sentiment is also strong and the present ruler of Annam, Tongking and Cochin-China is Ho Chin [sic.] Minh, a strong Communist leader. . . . The French Government, seeing what is in the wind, has offered to make certain concessions and it is possible that . . . some form of self government [would be established].56

On 16 October 1945, following a passage from Hong Kong in his flagship, Coast Guard cutter Ingham (AGC-35), Admiral Buckmaster reached the Haiphong area. The admiral then established liaison with the representatives of Transportation Squadron 24, with Brigadier General Gallagher, with the other members of the small American advisory staff assigned to General Lu Han, and with officers of the Chinese 52nd Army. Additionally, contacts were made with the Chinese 62nd Army, which recently had received orders to deploy from Indochina in American ships."

Because the first group of American transports would not arrive until later in October, Buckmaster first devoted his attention to ascertaining the availability of ports or other possible loading sites in the Haiphong area. Prior to his departure from Hong Kong, the admiral had received a report from the former French harbor master of Haiphong, which indicated that large ships were unable to use the port due to the threat of Allied minefields. The former French official further noted that navigational lights and buoys had been destroyed and that two ships had been sunk in the main channel. For these reasons, the basic operation order for the transportation of the Chinese 52nd Army designated as the point of embarkation an anchorage off the town of Do Son. Located on a peninsula, Do Son was twenty-three miles southeast of Haiphong and connected to that city by a good road.58

As would be the case more than twenty years later, in the Vietnam War, mines had been laid in the seaward approaches to Haiphong, and

56 Ibid., encl C, pp. 3-4.

67

USCGC Ingham, war diary, Oct. 1945; ltr, Gallagher to McClure, of 26 Oct. 1945, Gallagher Papers, CMH.

58

Ltr, Marcel Hulin (former Harbor Master, Haiphong) to Chief American Mission Haiphong, of 27 Sept. 1945 in ltr, COM7THFLT to Commander South China Force, ser 686 of 12 Oct. 1945, South China Force Records, FRC Mechanicsburg, Pa.; COMTRANSRON 24, report, ser 042 of 25 Nov. 1945. encl C, p. 11.

Admiral Buckmaster ordered that minesweepers be deployed to the area in advance of Commodore Short's transports. Since Admiral Buckmaster had the general responsibility for opening ports to shipping and for clearing mines throughout his command area, he also considered minesweeping the river channel into Haiphong."

59

To undertake sweeping operations in the entire region, the admiral had operational control of Mine Squadron 106 (Task Group 74.4), commanded by Commander Strauss S. Leon, USNR, and composed of several divisions of 136-foot auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS). In addition, the admiral discovered that Japanese forces in the Haiphong area had two 70-foot, wooden-hulled trawlers available for limited mine-clearing operations.

60

According to General Gallagher, both Admiral Buckmaster and he considered the broader implications of clearing the Haiphong channel. The general noted that this step would remove a major obstacle to the restoration of French authority in northern Vietnam. Conversely, at one point, he also observed that the continued presence of obstacles in this channel "would tend to prevent French aggression." Owing to such considerations, Gallagher stated that, as late as 29 October, Admiral Buckmaster had considered limiting minesweeping activities only to the Do Son approaches.

61

It does not appear, however, that there was communication between Admiral Buckmaster and his naval superiors regarding the political implications of clearing the channel into Haiphong. On 17 October, Buckmaster forwarded to Admiral Kinkaid a technical summary detailing the condition of the river approaches to that port. Observing that twenty-three magnetic mines were still unaccounted for in this area and citing the hazards associated with navigating the shallow depths of the channel, Buckmaster stated that if clearance operations were undertaken, he preferred to use the smaller, wood-hulled Japanese trawlers already located in the area. He

50 COM7THFLT, OP-PLAN 13-45, ser 000222 of 26 Aug. 1945.

60

61

Msg, CTF 74 170330 Oct. 1945; COMINRON 106, report, ser 0810 of 23 Nov. 1945.

1 Ltr, Gallagher to McClure, of 26 Oct. 1945 and Gallagher memo for record, of 29 Oct. 1945, Gallagher Papers, CMH.

concluded his message, copies of which were sent for information to the Pacific Fleet commander and to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, by asking, "do you desire channel swept? If so will leave 1 minesweeping officer in Haiphong to direct Jap sweeping. . . .

62

The following day, Kinkaid directed Buckmaster to undertake minesweeping of the Haiphong channel with the Japanese trawlers. By the 22nd, the Japanese had begun exploratory operations in this area under the overall direction of an officer from Commander Leon's staff. On the 24th, regular sweeps were initiated. Routine descriptions of these events were included in the comprehensive daily "Presidential Summaries," describing naval operations throughout the world, that the Navy submitted to the White House on 24 and 25 October 1945. These brief statements contained no reference to the possible political significance of the operations that had been foreseen by General Gallagher."

63

On 22 and 23 October, as the Japanese-manned units began operations in the river leading to Haiphong, four American minesweepers (YMS-4, YMS-336, YMS-363, and YMS-392) from Commander Leon's Mine Squadron 106 swept the proposed transport zone off Do Son and, from 23 to 29 October, the sea lanes near the Norway Islands (Xuy Nong Chao). Active mines were located in neither of the areas. Beginning on 30 October, these forces contributed to opening a critical coastal line of communication by check-sweeping the West Hainan Strait, but again no mines were found. Early in November, upon completion of these operations, Leon committed the same craft, and additional American LCVPs to help the Japanese finish clearing the approaches to Haiphong. On 23 November, Admiral Buckmaster's minecraft commander reported that five American magnetic

62 Various message files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, held in the Operational Archives, plus records of the South China Force, held in the Federal Records Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa. were searched. Message files of the Seventh Fleet for the period do not appear to be extant. Admiral Kinkaid's "The Reminiscences of Thomas Cassin Kinkaid" (Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, 1961) makes no reference to U.S. naval operations in Indochina. After a review of this section early in 1971, Admiral Buckmaster notified the Director of Naval History (letter of 11 February 1972): "I don't believe there is anything I can add to it. I kept no diary or personal records, so I have to rely on my memory for events that happened more than 25 years ago;" msg, CTF 74 170330 Oct. 1945. 'Msg, COM7THFLT 180116 Oct. 1945; msg, CTG 74.4 221031 Oct. 1945; msgs, "Presidential Summaries," of 24 and 25 Oct. 1945; msg summaries, COM7THFLT, 22 Oct.-11 Nov. 1945.

63