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(Mark 13) mines had been swept and that the channel was considered "safe for all types of craft. . . .'

64

Well before the completion of this final minesweeping task, the Chinese 52nd Army had begun embarking in United States Navy ships at the anchorage near Do Son. The first element of Transportation Squadron 24 reached this area on 26 October. On the following day, the embarkation of Chinese forces in landing craft over the beaches of Do Son began and by 30 October, 12,000 Chinese troops were on board the transports which then set sail for the north. The other two elements of the squadron arrived at the loading area on 2 November and departed two days later carrying the remaining 11,000 officers and men of the Chinese army.

65

The medical aspect of this operation was of particular concern to the crews of the American transports. According to the final report of Commander Transportation Squadron 24, the Chinese troops had marched 500 miles overland into Tonkin through areas notorious for the prevalence of malaria, cholera, and other diseases. Further, the arrival of the squadron in Indochina coincided with the "usual fall cholera epidemic," a point impressed on the medical officers of the squadron when one Chinese soldier in the first element died from this disease within seven hours of reaching an American ship. In the interest of protecting both American crews and Chinese troops, medical officers carefully screened embarkees, rejecting approximately five percent of them as too sick to make the sea voyage. Nonetheless, 35 Chinese died during the voyage north and approximately 350 more were discovered to have dysentary or cholera. Not surprisingly, Commodore Short noted that the medical problems of this mission were "unparalleled in the experience of this command." 66

Although the original destination of the Chinese troops had been Manchuria, threatened opposition by local Russian and Chinese Communists to their debarkation there resulted in the rerouting of the convoy to

COMINRON 106, reports, ser 0758 of 4 Nov. 1945 and ser 0810 of 23 Nov. 1945; CTG 74.4, report, ser 0759 of 4 Nov. 1945. Despite the minesweeping operations, General Gallagher continued to have the impression as late as January 1946 that magnetic mines in northern ports of Indochina "would continue to help keep the French from undertaking large-scale landing operations in that area"; see memo of conversation, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, of 30 Jan. 1946 in U.S., State Department, The Far East, Vol. VIII of Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1946 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 20.

COMTRANSRON 24, report, ser 042 of 25 Nov. 1945.

Ibid., pp. 3-5, encl F; COM7THPHIBFOR. report, ser 01000 of 22 Dec. 1945, encl B, p. 8; Admiral Buckmaster made similar remarks in his letter to the Director of Naval History, 11 Feb.

Chinwangtao, North China. Shortly before the landing of the Chinese at Chinwangtao, Rear Admiral Buckmaster returned to Hong Kong from Indochina. Prior to leaving Vietnam, he arranged for the transportation of the Chinese 62nd Army from the Haiphong region to Formosa. When preparations were almost complete, Chiang Kai-shek decided that this force of 20,166 officers and men could be more usefully employed in Manchuria. However, General Wedemeyer, pointing out that the units were not equipped for winter operations, persuaded the Chinese to follow the original plan. Between 15 November and 6 December, tank landing ships (LSTs), APAs, and AKAs of the Seventh Fleet, assisted by several chartered Liberty Ships, transported this force to Takao, Formosa.67

In December 1945, as the bulk of the Chinese occupational forces were withdrawn, General Wedemeyer directed General Gallagher to leave Indochina with his advisory group because of "unsettled conditions" in the area. Before the month was out, 5,700 more Chinese troops were withdrawn by sea. These troops, of the Northeastern Garrison, were transported to northern China by six American Liberty Ships and three LSTs. Soon thereafter the Chinese 93rd Army returned across the border into southern China.68

In the south, some British forces still remained to carry out their overall occupational responsibilities. However, except for control and repatriation of the Japanese, the responsibility for law and order had been delegated to the French. With the help of riverine and amphibious operations, France was increasing its degree of control at key points below the 16th parallel.

In the north, the French started negotiations which would authorize their return to Tonkin. Meanwhile, the departure of major Chinese units was providing the Viet Minh with favorable conditions for strengthening their political and military position in Tonkin.

67 COM7THPHIBFOR, report, ser 01000 of 22 Dec. 1945, encl B, pp. 47; Daniel E. Barbey, Mac Arthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations: 1943–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1969), pp. 336-41; COMNAVFORWESTPAC, "Narrative of Seventh Fleet," p. 10; msg, HQ China Theater, CM-in-1868 of 5 Nov. 1945; LST GRP 42, war diary, Nov. 1945.

68 COMNAVFOR WESTPAC, "Narrative of Seventh Fleet," p. 10; msg, HQ China Theater CM-in-1868 of 5 Nov. 1945; msg, Assistant Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, of 24 Feb. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946: Diplomatic Papers Vol. VIII, p. 28; Itrs, Gallagher to McClure, of 26 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1945, Gallagher Papers, CMH.

The Outbreak Of Hostilities
And First Phase Of The

French-Viet Minh War, 1946-1950

Starting with a major amphibious landing and riverine operations, the French would reestablish positions in Tonkin in the spring of 1946. The last of the British forces would depart and the U.S. Seventh Fleet would withdraw most of the remaining Chinese troops. A struggle between the French and the Vietnamese Communists would intensify in northern Vietnam, resulting in open hostilities as the year came to a close. This would mark the start of the French-Viet Minh War, a war which would be a forerunner of the Vietnam War of the 1960s. Experiences of French Union Forces would be similar in many respects to problems the Americans later would encounter.

In January 1946 a proposal to remove southern Vietnam from Admiral Lord Mountbatten's strategic control prompted the cautious reentry of American policy-makers into the Indochina situation. United States authorities expressed their opposition to the proposed shift, noting that the British had not completed the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese forces in accordance with occupation agreements established for the postwar period. On 27 February, as a result of American objections,' a compromise was reached by which Lord Mountbatten continued to have responsibility for disarming and evacuating Japanese troops, while the French assumed strategic control of southern Indochina.

On 28 February, the French Ambassador to China and the Chinese Foreign Minister reached agreements in several separate but interconnected accords. In one agreement the French conceded to the Chinese unhindered. use of the port of Haiphong and the Haiphong-Kwangsi railroad for trans

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porting goods into South China. They transferred to the Chinese ownership of that section of the railroad running between Kunming and Hokow, in southern China. These concessions represented the price paid by the French for a separate agreement, completed on the same day, by which the Chinese promised to withdraw all their forces from northern Indochina and relinquish control there by the end of March 1946. One French official expressed the opinion that the decision to withdraw occupational forces from northern Indochina was based also on the Chinese hope that this action would set an example for the Soviets, who continued to occupy positions in Manchuria.2

13

For months prior to the signing of the Sino-French accords, parallel negotiations had been underway in Hanoi between Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh, the latter continuing to claim the title of President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Typically, the Communists welcomed negotiations as a means toward achieving their objectives, taking "advantage of the contradictions between the French and Chiang Kai-shek forces. . . The fact that these negotiations were conducted constituted de facto recognition of Ho's revolutionary government. Such recognition bolstered Ho's claims of his regime's legitimacy and enhanced beliefs held by many people that the Viet Minh movement provided the most likely prospect for attaining independence from colonial rule.

While Sainteny attempted to gain Viet Minh concurrence to restoring at least some degree of French influence in northern Indochina, Ho sought not only to obtain Vietnam's independence but also to gain the right for his government to rule all three sections of the country. According to an American diplomat who visited Hanoi at this time, Sainteny responded to the Viet Minh demands by offering "complete independence within [the] French community." Ho, in turn, informed the United States representative of his suspicions that such a formula represented only "new language to describe usual French control . . . [of Vietnamese] affairs." "

Meanwhile, the French Navy had assembled at Saigon and other Vietnamese ports almost all of its seagoing units in the Far East in order to

* "Franco-Chinese Agreement Concerning Sino-Indochinese Relations," of 28 Feb. 1946 in Cole, Conflict in Indo-China, pp. 7–9; msg, U.S. Embassy, China, of 1 Mar. 1946 in U.S., State Department, The Far East, Vol. VIII of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 28–31.

4

Giap, People's War, People's Army, pp. 90-91.

Msg, Assistant Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, of 27 Feb. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 26-27.

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