form an amphibious force. This consisted of 3 cruisers, 7 destroyer types, a transport group of 8 ships (including aircraft carrier Béarn, which operated as a supply and troop ship), and a unit of 2 LSTS and 8 LCIs. By 28 February, embarkation of 21,700 men of the landing force and their arms, ammunition, vehicles, and equipment was essentially completed. The French amphibious force got underway for Tonkin on the following day. The 6th of March would be the last day, for two weeks, in which tides would be high enough to permit these French ships to transit the Haiphong channel.5 As usual, power and diplomacy played complementary roles. It hardly seemed coincidental that Sainteny reached an agreement with Ho the same day that the French flotilla steamed up the Haiphong channel, which had been cleared the previous fall by Rear Admiral Buckmaster's minesweepers. The Preliminary Agreement recognized "the Republic of Vietnam as a free state, having its own government, parliament, army and treasury. . . ." A proviso stipulated that the new state would be part of "the Indo-Chinese Federation and . . . the French Union." The French and Viet Minh agreed to abide by the results of a referendum of the people of Cochin China to to determine if they desired to be unified with Annam and Tonkin. The Viet Minh pledged to "accept amicably the French army when, in conformance with international agreements, it relieves the Chinese forces." However, in an annex to the basic agreement, French forces in northern Indochina were limited to a mere 15,000 men, fewer than the number already in the Haiphong area with the amphibious expedition. The annex further stipulated that, within five years, all French forces, except those charged with the defense of naval and air bases, would be relieved by the Vietnamese Army. Both parties were required to "stop hostilities immediately" and "to create the favorable climate necessary to the immediate opening of friendly and frank negotiations" on a number of matters reserved for future resolution. These matters included "the diplomatic relations of Vietnam with foreign states; the future status of Indo-China; and French economic and cultural interests in Vietnam." " Hours before Ho Chi Minh and Sainteny signed these documents in Hanoi, the French Expeditionary Force, commanded by General Leclerc, 6 Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 164-68; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 52–62. * "Franco-D.R. Vietnam Agreements," of 6 Mar. 1946 in Cole, Conflict in Indo-China, pp. 40-42. prepared to land at Haiphong. At 0840 on 6 March, as French landing craft reached a point approximately 2,000 meters east of Haiphong, a heavy volume of artillery and small-arms fire was encountered. Amazingly, this attack was launched by the Chinese-not the Viet Minh. Return fire by the French ships was withheld for more than an hour. Then, a half-hour of "very effective" bombardment followed, highlighted by a direct hit that demolished an ammunition depot. The Chinese called a truce and sent officials to destroyer Triomphant to negotiate a settlement. The intensity of the action was indicated by the 439 holes later counted in her superstructure. French losses during the engagement totaled 24 dead and about 100 wounded. Later, Chinese officials claimed that they had failed to receive orders to implement the Sino-French accords of 28 February, under which French landings were authorized. Following further Sino-French discussions on board Triomphant French forces began to land on 7 March without opposition. Not until 16 March 1946 would Chinese officials allow French troops to enter Hanoi. On 8 March 1946, in a separate Anglo-French arrangement, the French agreed to take on Mountbatten's duties. Faced with this development, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on 28 March, formally designated the French military commander in Indochina the Allied agent for Japanese repatriation. In the words of a British official historian, this decision meant that Great Britain "ceased to have any responsibility whatever in French IndoChina... The agreement expedited the withdrawal of all British forces. from Indochina, a process completed by April. On 10 April, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting with their British counterparts as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, stated through diplomatic channels that they had "no objection to the relief of Chinese troops in northern French Indo-China by French forces, since they consider that such arrangements are a matter for determination by the Governments of France and China." The Combined Chiefs added that "since the FrancoChinese agreement completes the reversion of all Indo-China to French control," the French military commander in the area should assume all "duties and responsibilities for disarmament and evacuation of Japanese in Indo-China." 10 9 10 Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 167–77; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 67–73. VIII, Msg, SECSTATE, of 10 Apr. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. p. 34-35. The first of the follow-on negotiations, agreed to on 6 March, began in mid-April when a preliminary conference of Viet Minh and French leaders convened in Dalat. It soon became evident that little progress could be made at this conference delineating the authority of the "free state" of Vietnam. Even less headway was made in scheduling the referendum in Cochin China. One of the issues complicating these negotiations was the Communist charge that the limited French military actions in Cochin China represented a breach of the truce. Against such a background of mutual hostility and distrust, the Dalat conference was concluded in May without any real success except for an agreement to reopen negotiations in France later that summer." The Chinese 60th Army was redeployed from Haiphong to Manchuria at the end of April by twenty-seven United States Navy LSTs. Even then, a few small Chinese units remained in Indochina and there were reports of scattered armed clashes between Chinese and French troops. This dangerous situation did not end until August, when the final units of Chiang Kai-shek departed.12 The Republic of Cochin China Vietnamese nationalist leaders in Cochin China-many of whom opposed union of that region with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—had been seeking to establish a separate government. On 30 May Vice Admiral d'Argenlieu recognized the Republic of Cochin China as a provisionally autonomous state. D'Argenlieu's recognition was contingent upon the referendum in the South (already agreed to in principle by both sides) and ratification by the constitutional body of the French Union. The Viet Minh claimed that this recognition violated the accords previously signed with the French.13 In Tonkin, the signing of the Preliminary Agreement on 6 March 1946 had not resulted in an amicable acceptance of the French Army in Tonkin, the complete cessation of hostilities, or the creation of a favorable climate 11 Ibid.; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 154–55; Giap, People's War, People's Army, p. 91. 12 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 33, 36–37, 42-43; COMNAVFORWESTPAC, "Narrative of Seventh Fleet," p. 11; Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 188-89; Edgar O'Ballance, The Indo-China War, 1945-54: A Study in Guerrilla Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 64. 13 Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 156–58. for further negotiations. Characterizing the accord as "making peace to go forward," the Viet Minh undertook to reduce the opposition and to consolidate their power in the north. And to that end, they would employ violent as well as non-violent means. Their stated intent, "to exterminate the reactionary colonialists and the traitors," made clear the extent to which they were willing to go to achieve their goals. It was thus not surprising that the Preliminary Agreement was followed by a period of increasing strife in the South as well as in the North, as terrorists carried out acts of assassination and "armed propaganda." When French authorities reacted to terrorism by apprehending suspects and destroying houses where terrorists sought refuge, Ho Chi Minh charged that the French were taking "political prisoners" and undermining "democratic liberties." He demanded that such actions be halted as a precondition for the resumption of more tranquil conditions in the North.14 The Viet Minh used the period after the signing of these accords to dispose of the Vietnamese armed forces of the non-Communist nationalist party known as the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang, or simply the Dai Viet, which occupied certain areas along the Chinese border and in the midland of North Vietnam. In April, the Viet Minh ambushed a road convoy bringing the crew of a French naval patrol plane from Cat Bi Airfield into Haiphong. The following two months witnessed attacks against river convoys between Haiphong and Hanoi's As they issued public statements designed to enlist sympathy for their cause in France, the United States, and other nations, the Communists sought further concessions in an extension of the Preliminary Agreement. Meanwhile, French Navy and Army units were overcoming political and military opposition in reestablishing French authority in population centers, including Hon Gay and Cam Pha, along the northern coast of Tonkin.16 14 Under these stormy conditions, the French and Viet Minh resumed 'Giap, People's War, People's Army, pp. 41E, 90-95; msgs, U. S. Consul Saigon, of 4 May 1946 and U. S. Vice Consul Hanoi, of 1 Nov. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 39-40, 62; see also O'Ballance, Indo-China War, pp. 62-68; Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 159–62. 15 The Dai Viet Party had been suppressed by the French in 1940, but was reestablished with Japanese support following the coup de force of March 1945. The Dai Viet's military wing had maintained its existence throughout World War II; see McAlister, Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution, pp. 168–78; Giap, People's War, People's Army, p. 91; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 99-100, 107-09. negotiations on 6 July 1946 at Fontainebleau, France. Once again, the principal discussions concerned the degree of independence to be accorded Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam within the French Union, and the geographic limits of its power. Ho Chi Minh and his representatives at Fontainebleau saw the French Union as restricted to making recommendations to member states. The French delegates viewed the union as a federation in which unified control would be exercised by France over the diplomatic relations and armed forces of each member state. On the issue of Cochin China's political future, neither side questioned the desirability of eventually polling the people of that area for their opinion, but no progress was made in establishing the date or circumstances under which a referendum would be held.1 In August, while discussions continued in Fontainebleau, Admiral d'Argenlieu called for a second Dalat Conference to discuss the organization of an Indochinese Federation. The admiral invited representatives from Cochin China, Cambodia, Laos, and a portion of southern Annam where there was an active separatist movement. The Viet Minh protested that their representatives were not included and voiced suspicions that the new conference was an effort to weaken politically the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. They accused d'Argenlieu of undermining the proceedings in France. 18 Within Hanoi and Haiphong, Viet Minh militia (known as the Tu Ve) undertook a variety of psychological and armed actions against the French. They erected barricades and other fortifications in key locations, a step that French forces periodically resisted. Early in August, in one of the most serious incidents of 1946, Giap's troops ambushed a French supply convoy near Hanoi, inflicting fifty-two casualties.19 A few weeks later it became evident that no further progress would be achieved in the discussions at Fontainebleau. On 14 September 1946, on the eve of his departure from France, Ho Chi Minh signed a temporary agreement with the Minister for Overseas France, pending further negotiations. It called for negotiations on a "general final treaty" to begin no later 17 Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 165–74; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 157-63. 19 Memo, Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs to Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, of 9 Aug. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 52-54; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, p. 106. |