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Declining Naval Power, Defense Changes, And Increasing Tension

As 1949 drew to a close, mainland China was in Communist hands. The Viet Minh would now have a sanctuary north of the border for the training and equipping of their Army. China could act as a base for the injection of supplies by land across the border, or by sea, into positions along the coast. In addition, there was the possibility that the Chinese Communists might intervene militarily.

Southeast Asia was but one of many trouble spots on the world scene. Throughout the first phase of the French-Viet Minh War, instabilities in the wake of World War II had continued elsewhere in the Far East and in the European area. Crisis situations in both regions were often caused or accompanied by Communist efforts to expand their control or influence. Cold War associated events posed increasing threats to countries bordering the Mediterranean. These threats, accompanied by a rapid decline in the British Navy, led to expanding requirements for American naval presence in that region. In the Far East, the struggle between the forces of Chiang and Mao in China, the split of Korea into two occupation zones with the Communists in control of the north, the war in Indochina, and the unsettled conditions in other parts of Southeast Asia placed continuing demands on the United States Pacific Fleet. American policy-makers devoted increased attention to steps which might be taken to prevent further Communist gains.

Reductions in overall defense funding and the increasing emphasis on capabilities for the delivery of atomic bombs had resulted in a major decline in the strength of the Navy and other conventional forces during this period. As a result of the top priority accorded to Europe, force levels in the Far East were reduced to the point where capabilities no longer matched commitments.

The period also witnessed a fundamental alteration in the United States organization for the national defense, followed shortly by other changes

which represented, in many respects, even more drastic departures from earlier assignments of responsibilities.

Decisions on the fiscal year 1947 budget (covering 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947) had not taken into account the extent of requirements to be placed on the Navy in remote waters. At the end of this fiscal year, Fleet Admiral Nimitz reported that "despite numerous difficulties the Navy has maintained its forces in Europe and the Far East, often at great sacrifice to the remainder of the Naval Establishment, but in so doing has fulfilled its primary mission in support of United States Foreign Policy."

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Efficient utilization of the limited naval forces in the Pacific was complicated by a Unified Command Plan placed in effect on 1 January 1947 whereby operational control of units of the Pacific Fleet would be divided between three unified commands. The Chief of Naval Operations would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Agent for one, and the Chief of Staff of the Army would be the agent for the other two.

The plan was an outgrowth of a proposal by the Army Chief of Staff, the purpose of which was "to attain a greater degree of unified command than now exists.” The proposal brought to a head one of the basic differences between Army and Navy operations: on land, command was usually divided, quite logically, into areas determined by political-military-geographical considerations; at sea, boundaries drawn on a map for command purposes detracted from the flexibility of Fleet operations and from the efficient utilization of naval ships. A continuous naval presence was not always required to exert naval influence or to control specific maritime regions. Highly mobile naval forces can range the vast expanse of the oceans, exercise overall command of the sea, and regroup as necessary to respond promptly to local situations.

As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Nimitz recommended that the Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet commanders should continue to operate "under the CNO in time of peace and as determined by the JCS in the event of hostilities." A major issue was the division of responsibility between General MacArthur and the Pacific Fleet commander. Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not believe that the general could adequately discharge responsibilities for far-flung operations in the Pacific, in view of General MacArthur's major responsibilities in Japan. He proposed the appointment of "an individual

1CNO, “Annual Report," FY 1947, p. 2.

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over-all commander in a delimited Central Pacific Ocean Area who will be neither General MacArthur nor the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet." 2

Nimitz finally agreed to a compromise Joint Chiefs of Staff plan which received the approval of President Truman. As a result, the world was divided into areas, each under a Unified Commander in Chief who had operational control over all the Army, Army Air Force, and Navy forces within his assigned area. In European waters, command of naval operations was exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations (the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Agent) directly through Commander United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, with logistic support provided by the Atlantic Fleet. Three unified commands were established in the Pacific; the Alaskan Sea Frontier Forces of the Navy were placed under the operational control of Commander in Chief, Alaska, an Army Air Force officer; General MacArthur was designated Commander in Chief, Far East, and a new command, Naval Forces, Far East, was established under MacArthur's operational control; and Admiral Towers became Commander in Chief, Pacific. Staff layering was minimized since Towers continued to serve as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. As directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet assigned units to the other unified commands, provided logistic support, and carried out naval command functions other than operational control.

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Normally assigned one cruiser, four destroyers, and miscellaneous logistic support ships and smaller craft, Commander Naval Forces, Far East assumed responsibilty for the patrols off Korea which had formerly been under control of the Seventh Fleet. Ships assigned to this command were frequently rotated with those under the Pacific command, so that all could gain training and experience in task force operations. While awkward and far from ideal, this measure was necessary to ensure that the deployed naval forces were in the highest possible state of readiness for fleet actions which might be required on short notice.

Under CINCPACFLT, Commander Naval Forces, Western Pacific was responsible for protecting United States interests and supporting American policy in China and in other areas not under the Commander in Chief,

2 JCS, "Decisions Leading to the Establishment of Unified Commands;" CINCPACFLT, "Semi-annual Summary of 1 October 1946-31 March 1947," 18 Apr. 1947; CNO, "Annual Report, FY 1947," pp. 15-16.

3 Ibid.

Far East. Normally comprised of one cruiser division, three destroyer divisions, a small amphibious task group, and logistic support ships, Naval Forces, Western Pacific conducted protective patrols, as in the Taiwan Strait, and periodically visited important Asiatic ports. Station ships continued to be located at Tsingtao and Shanghai.

By 1947, the Cold War in the Mediterranean had become more critical. The United States weighed the consequences if Greece or Turky came under Soviet domination. Matters were brought to a head when Britain informed the United States, on 24 February, that it could not extend financial and economic support to Greece and Turkey beyond the end of the fiscal year.* Threatened internally by a strong guerrilla force and externally by Communists who controlled countries along her northern border, Greece's government might not long survive. In the case of Turkey, there was no serious internal threat, but, in response to continuing Russian pressures, the nation had kept its armed forces fully mobilized since the end of World War II. Unaided, it was questionable if the weak financial and economic condition of Turkey could continue to support this high state of readiness.

President Truman promptly took action to fill the gap that would result from British withdrawal of assistance. He obtained $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey and gained congressional permission to send civilians and military personnel there for supervision and training. The policy statements in his message to Congress had implications far beyond those of responding to a local emergency. In what became known as the Truman doctrine of "containment," he stated:

I believe . . . it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

Visits by United States Navy ships to Greek ports increased sharply. A large portion of the United States Naval Forces, Mediterranean either operated nearby or was so positioned that other ships of the force could reach the area on short notice. At the request of the President, carrier Leyte (CV-32) and nine other ships were dispatched to Greece "as a token of our

*See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on a Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey in series Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine (80th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1973).

intention, hoping to persuade the British to stay on, at least until our aid to Greece became effective." When, in July 1947, the situation took a serious turn, with paramilitary forces crossing the border, Truman asked Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, "how large a part of our Mediterranean fleet [could be moved] to Greek ports?" Forrestal responded that a large group could be sent on short notice."

In the same month, half-way around the world, Commander Task Force 38, Rear Admiral Samuel Ginder, with carrier Antietam, cruiser Duluth (CL-87), and a destroyer division visited Manila on 4 July for the first anniversary of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines. Soon thereafter, in response to a request from the Philippine Government for ships and material and in compliance with a Presidential directive in June, the United States Naval Advisory Group, Philippines was established. As confirmed by an agreement signed on 14 March 1947, the United States retained bases at Sangley Point, Bagobantay, Subic Bay, and Baguio. Later, Sangley Point and Subic Bay provided important support of naval operations related to the Vietnam conflict.

Reorganization of American Defense

On 26 July 1947, Congress enacted a law changing the way in which the common defense had been organized for 149 years. This was but the beginning of a long series of statutory and executive changes over the next decades. As stated by Congress, the intent was: "a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States," "integrated policies and procedures," "three military departments," "authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control," "effective strategic direction of the armed forces," "their operation under unified control," and "integration into an effective team of land, naval, and air forces." A new echelon was created

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5 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 106,–09.

CNO, "Annual Report," FY 1947, p. 25; COMNAVPHIL, "A Narrative History of U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines from 1 September 1945 until 1 January 1948," 19 Feb. 1948, pp. 10-11; SECNAV, "Annual Report," FY 1948, p. 8.

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For an overview of changes in the first decade after passage of the National Security Act of 1947, see Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956). For management implications, see John C. Reis, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964).

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