between the President and the departmental secretaries. A council was formed "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security." The Joint Chiefs of Staff now received directions from another official in addition to the President. Headed by a Secretary of Defense, the resultant National Military Establishment consisted of three departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Munitions Board, and a Research and Development Board.

8

During the hearings before the newly organized Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department that spring, one of the issues had been the power to be granted the Secretary of Defense. Some witnesses emphasized the need for decisions and advocated strong powers for the secretary, even to the point of giving him power to change the functions of the military services, subject to the direction of the President. Others were concerned with the secretary's power over the budget, the broad authority granted to one man, the lack of a clear definition and delineation of his powers, and the overall results if a super-ambitious man was appointed to the job. One point of view was that the secretary's proper role should be that of a policy-maker, exercising controls of a very broad nature. Under this concept, he would be a coordinator or a planner. Another point of view was that the secretary should act as a representative, or deputy, of the President rather than as a representative of the military services to the President.

Under the 1947 act, the Secretary of Defense was directed to:

(1) Establish policies and programs...;

(2) Exercise direction, authority, and control...;

(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health and research;

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates...; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; . . . and supervise . . . the budget programs. . .

For especially pertinent testimony on this and other related issues, see National Defense Establishment, pp. 30, 68, 75, 101, 113, 139, 148, 155, 200, 203, 222, 241, 325, 348, 412, 458, 522, 577; see also U.S., Congress, House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearings on the National Security Act of 1947 (80th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1947), pp. 218, 240, 265, 348, 357, 454, 580, 668, 669 (hereafter cited as National Security Act of 1947).

In addition, the Secretary of Defense was designated Chairman of the War Council, with "the power of decision." Other members of the council were the Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force. Primarily, the council was to "advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy." Limitations were placed, however, on his authority. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were to administer their organizations as "individual executive departments and retain all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense." They were authorized, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to present any report or recommendation to the President or Director of the Budget.

Still encompassing the United States Navy, including naval aviation and the Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy was ostensibly to continue much as before. The Navy was to be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea." In particular, the act specified that "the Navy shall generally be responsible for naval reconaissance, antisubmarine warfare and protection of shipping."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff became a statutory body under the direction of the Secretary of Defense as well as the President. They were to "act as the principle military advisors" to both. "The Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one" was a member. During World War II, President Roosevelt had "refused to issue a formal definition of JCS duties and functions, arguing that a written charter might hamper the Joint Chiefs of Staff in extending their activities as necessary to meet the requirements of the war." Now they were assigned specific duties, namely:

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military service logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and military plans; and

(6) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. . . .9

'National Defense Establishment. p. 13; William A. Hamilton, "The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" Naval War College Review, XXII (Apr. 1972), p. 53. For a comprehensive study of the Joint Chiefs, see Davis, "Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff."

One of the duties assigned by the bill, that of reviewing major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, would involve them in peacetime controversies.

During the hearings, Admiral Sherman stated that the purpose of some sections of the proposed bill was to make certain that neither the Secretary of National Defense nor a military chief could act as a "single military commander: and to prevent the establishment either of a large military staff or a large bureaucracy over the three military departments." He envisaged "a small executive force... to consist of 15 to 25 '$10,000-a-year-men'. . . ." Proponents of centralization predicted substantial savings through "elimination of duplication." Other witnesses were undecided whether economies would in fact result. A few predicted higher costs, as from increased overhead. In the final bill, the Secretary of Defense was authorized only three special assistants and was forbidden a military staff. The Joint Chiefs were restricted to a staff of 100.10

In addition to provisions for the National Defense Establishment, the National Security Act established a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency (under the council), and a National Security Resources Board. The council was to be composed of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Later, the National Security Council and its staff would be deeply involved in the decision to aid the French and the Associated States of Indochina, and in many subsequent decisions concerning such matters as military assistance, national strategy, and involvement of combat forces.11

11

After passage of the 1947 act, the Navy Department continued to run its affairs basically as it had in the past, with no major changes in organization or internal responsibilities. It soon became apparent, however, that complications had been added to processes of administration, management, and justification of programs and budgets. One of the impacts would be the diversion of a far greater percentage of the efforts by the Navy's leadership to external relationships. Heretofore, the two departments had dealt directly with the President and his Bureau of the Budget as they determined the levels of budget submissions, balanced the needs of the departments, and

10 National Defense Establishment. pp. 16, 155.

"For National Security Council background, see Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947,” The Journal of American History, LIX (Sept. 1972), pp. 369–88.

passed judgements on major programs. Now, before policies, programs, and budget estimates were submitted to the President, they were subject to supervision, coordination, formulation, and decision by the Secretary of Defense. The creation of a third military department, by splitting the War Department into Departments of the Army and the Air Force, meant more administrative complexities. Before 1947, the Military Affairs Committees had been the focal points of congressional matters related to the War Department and the Naval Affairs Committees for the Navy Department. Now, the functions were merged into Armed Services Committees. As a consequence of all these changes in the executive and legislative branches of the government, many more individuals and groups were involved in the review and approval of programs and budgets. Differences of professional opinion and detailed arguments in competing for resources were aired at additional levels within the national military establishment and in congressional hearings. The increasingly austere peacetime military budgets accentuated the difficulties. After a year's experience, the new Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, summarized the far-reaching effects when he reported that "the approval of the National Security Act on 26 July 1947 dominated the events of the fiscal year 1948, and there have been few activities of the Navy which have not felt its influence in some degree."

12

Soon thereafter, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations moved their offices from the Main Navy Building to the Pentagon. Prior to the move, collocation of these officials with the chiefs of the material bureaus had facilitated dialogue between responsible officials in the department and had simplified internal direction and coordination. Thus, such improvements as may have been achieved at the joint level were at the cost of the ease and efficiency of internal management of the Navy Department and its activities.

Continuing Crises

While these changes were taking place on the domestic scene, the Fleet responded to crises abroad. In Italy, a strong Communist party was making an all-out bid to gain control. Visits by United States ships were scheduled

to provide a stabilizing influence. Shortly after the Italian Peace Treaty became effective on 15 September 1947, Yugoslavia threatened the occupation of Trieste.13 That same month, the Communist parties of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Italy, and France established the Bureau of Information of the Communist and Workers' Parties (COMINFORM). Elections were held in Poland in October. Despite an agreement with the United States and Britain to hold free elections, international supervision was rejected. The Communist takeover in Poland was, after two years, essentially complete. In Rumania, the National Democratic Front, headed by the Communist party, displaced the National Peasant Party and proclaimed a "People's Republic" on 30 December. King Michael was forced to abdicate. These events had no direct impact on naval operations, but they did accentuate the importance of maintaining a United States naval presence in European waters.

In the Netherlands East Indies a rebellion had been underway since shortly after World War II. In March 1947, the Dutch recognized the Indonesian Republic under President Sukarno. They promised full independence and coequal status in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union by 1 January 1949, but fighting continued. In November 1947 Commander Naval Forces, Western Pacific, Vice Admiral Cooke, was directed to send a ship to receive, quarter, and support a United Nations Good Offices Committee which had been directed to seek a peaceful settlement. Renville (APA-227), Captain David M. Tyree commanding, arrived at Batavia, Java, on 2 December, thus providing a neutral site for the discussions. The truce agreement, signed on 17 January 1948, became known as the Renville Agreement."

14

Capabilities versus Commitments

Despite the extensive commitments abroad, the United States Navy was undergoing further reductions as part of an overall decline in conventional military capabilities. The Navy was particularly hard hit because of the need for expensive technological advances, especially in antisub

13 Forrestal Diaries, pp. 312-13.

"COMNAVFOR WESTPAC, "Semiannual Summary of Naval Forces Western Pacific, 1 October 1947 to 31 March 1948," 17 Apr. 1948, pp. 2-3.