صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

arrived in Saigon on 3 August. Its Navy Section consisted of Commander James B. Cannon and a staff of seven officers and men.

The Army portion of priority items, enough to equip twelve battalions, arrived in commercial ships by mid-August. About the same time, Dixmude departed France and proceeded to Alameda, California, to pick up the F6F aircraft. As a result of more debate on types of aircraft, Dixmude did not leave California until the end of September, arriving at Saigon on 28 October. French LST Rance, escorting six LSSLS and carrying the first shipment of LCVPs, reached Saigon late in November. On 23 December 1950, the United States signed military aid agreements with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and France.

48

At long last, American aid was flowing to the hard-pressed naval forces engaged in the French-Viet Minh War.

48 "Dossier Relatif a l'Aide U.S.,” pp. 2–3, 6, 17; NA Saigon, reports, 34-50 or 13 Nov., 39-C-50 of 22 Nov., and 42-C-50 of 30 Nov. 1950, JN 11284, box 13, FRC; "Estimate of the Situation for Indochina," Navy Member Report to Melby-Erskine Mission, 31 July 1950, encl. 8, p. 1; P. Ortoli, "The French Navy in Indochina," La Revue Maritime, trans. by Remote Area Conflict Information Center, LXXX (Dec. 1952), pp. 1497-1505.

The War Intensifies, 1950-1953

By the time American military aid had begun to arrive, the French situation had become precarious. As the summer of 1950 ended, the expected Viet Minh offensive was well underway against French positions south of the border with China's Kwangsi Province. Initiating his attack near the end of the southwest monsoon season, Giap recaptured Dong Khe in September. This was more than an isolated victory, for it severed the French line of communication to the northwest along Route 4. Since supplies and reinforcements could no longer reach the French stronghold at Cao Bang, that post was evacuated. As the 1,500-man garrison retired to Lang Son, which anchored the southern end of the Cao Bang ridge paralleling Route 4, the Viet Minh ambushed the French column repeatedly in the mountains and cut it to pieces. Subsequently, the Viet Minh captured other positions along Route 4, leaving Lang Son precariously exposed. This strategic point on the line of communication from China also was abandoned by the French.1

The only French success along the northern front was at Mon Cay, where seapower was brought to bear. Deploying all available naval forces to the Tonkin region, Vice Admiral Paul Ortoli, Commander French Naval Forces, Far East, landed the badly needed reinforcements when the Viet Minh threatened the last of the French border positions. Supplied by sea and under the protective guns of their navy, the French continued to repulse Viet Minh efforts to take the town."

Naval Requirements

As the French withdrew from their northern outposts, the United States evaluated the assistance needs of the Southeast Asian area as a whole.

'O'Ballance, Indo-China War, pp. 114–16.

2 NA Saigon, reports, 31-C-50 (A) of 8 Nov. 1950 and 36-C-50 of 15 Nov. 1950, JN 11284, box 13, FRC.

[blocks in formation]

A Joint State-Defense Survey Mission had been sent to the area two days after the President's announcement of accelerated aid to Indochina. The chairman of the mission was John Melby, who had served with the American Embassy in China from 1945 to 1949. Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, headed the Military Group. One of the mission's tasks was "to survey, evaluate and make recommendations as to the desirable type and scope of U.S. military assistance that should be provided to the countries of Southeast Asia, including the organization required for properly handling such assistance." 3

The Military Group's report of 22 November 1950 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the subject of Mutual Defense Assistance Programs for countries of Southeast Asia, judged the military problem to be "one dealing mainly with quelling internal communist inspired uprisings and maintaining internal security." The group concluded:

At the present time the situation in Indo-China warrants major consideration since it is the keystone in the arch of Southeast Asia, without which, the balance of the area will likely fall. It is also the most active theater within the area.1

The report noted Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh in the form of supplies, equipment, training, and provision of a refuge. A considerable increase in the combat efficiency of the Viet Minh troops also was reported. Of particular interest, in view of subsequent events, was the observation that:

The Commander-in-Chief has not been granted full authority commensurate with that of a theater commander in a theater of operations, apparently on account of the complicated political situation existing within Indo-China and the desire of the Paris office to have final approval of military operations. Unless the present political and military relationships are modified, resources increased and the state of mind improved, the French will not only be unable to restore order but will probably be decisively defeated.5

Erskine's group recommended that Indochina receive first priority and Thailand second, followed by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaya. The total cost of military aid for Indochina, in addition to programs already

3 Melby-Erskine Report, p. 1.

'Ibid., p. 2.

"Ibid., p. 3.

approved, was assessed as $298 million to take care of the immediate need for equipment, supplies, and training. In the case of the French Navy in Indochina, a $50 million program was proposed which emphasized spare parts, maintenance facilities, and training—in that order. The Navy members of the group, Captain Mervin Halstead and Commander Ralph J. Michels, identified two aspects of the naval war, as follows:

War on the open sea. There are three major objectives here. First to prevent the enemy from using the open sea for carrying supplies and ammunition from foreign countries to those sections of the Indochina coast which are occupied by the enemy. Second to use the open sea to support combined operations against the enemy held coast. Third to use the open sea to supply French forces as necessary.

River warfare. Here again there are three main objectives. First to deny the enemy the use of the rivers and to prevent arms traffic. Second to protect French river traffic from enemy mines, ambushes and attacks. Third to support combined military operations against enemy troops, installations, and shipping which latter consists only of sampans and junks. Commando raids are made. frequently for harassing and morale effect.

The Navy members concluded that the "French Naval Forces in the Far East are not prepared for a naval war" and that they would need American or British assistance against a strong naval power. The members reported that the French "want us to block off Tonkin Gulf and South China Sea to enemy forces which might attempt landing." They also noted requirements for port development, which the French were expected to accomplish without aid. One item was for the construction of a wharf in Tourane Bay to permit the docking of Liberty Ships. Regrettably, no deep-draft pier would be constructed until the fall of 1966, after a year and a half of extraordinary logistical difficulties in support of American Marines and other forces deployed to this area."

To the Navy members of the Erskine group, the most pressing naval requirement was for the delivery of ten Privateer or Liberator long-range patrol planes with high-discrimination, air-search radar for surveillance of coastal waters. They rejected, for the present, the escort carrier requested by the French, citing as reasons the lack of enemy planes or ships, France's shortage of trained personnel, and the existence of airfields controlled by

6

Ibid., pp. 2-3, 7, 10, Ann. B., pp. 1-2, 5; U.S.. Defense Department, Joint Logistics Review Board Report, "Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era," 1970, Vol. II, p. 240; Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance. p. 88.

« السابقةمتابعة »