populated the coastal and inland waterway regions, and earned their living from fishing or operating small craft, those with a technical education were few and illiteracy was common. Faced with heavy commitments to their own operations, the French were hesitant in diverting their limited resources to the supply of instructors for the lengthy process of creating a Vietnamese navy. Two programs were initiated to acquire the necessary officers. Those needed immediately would be obtained by providing accelerated training to selected university graduates. The longer-range policy would be to train cadets in the established French naval schools. The first Vietnamese naval officer aspirants chosen after the short-lived group selected in 1949 were 9 former officers in the merchant marine (6 line and 3 engineering) who received a six-month course of instruction on board French ships. After graduation on 1 October 1952, they were assigned to French combat units for practical experience prior to the commissioning of the first Vietnamese ships and craft. A second shipboard class of 12 line and 4 engineering officer candidates began another course on 1 November 1952; 5 more officer candidates left for the French Naval Academy in Brest. By the end of January 1953, 25 officer candidates would be enrolled in courses of two or more years at naval schools in France; 16 at the Naval School and 5 at the Engineering School, both located in Brest, and 4 at the Paymaster School in Toulon. Before an adequate enlisted training program could begin, a recruit training center had to be constructed. The site chosen was the deep-water bay at Nha Trang. While the center was under construction, French personnel were selected to form the first faculty and began to study Vietnamese. Since it would take some time before they became proficient in the language, the ability to speak some French was a prerequisite for the first recruits. The French instructors (five officers and twenty-five petty officers) arrived in May 1952. The initial class (150 apprentice seamen and 25 petty officer candidates including many who had served in the French Union forces) was admitted in June. The Nha Trang Naval School opened officially on 12 July. 36 Although developments in 1952 were encouraging, the Vietnamese still had no navy of their own, despite the French-Vietnamese Military Agreement of 1949. It would not be until the spring of 1953 that the Vietnamese Navy finally would have its modest beginning. 36 ONI, "Development of and Plans for the Vietnamese Navy," pp. 123–25. The Tangled Events Of 1953 The Effects of the Protracted War on France By 1953, the French-Viet Minh War had entered its seventh year. The Communist strategy of a "long-term resistance war" was beginning to have its effects. Giap later claimed that the Communists undertook a prolonged conflict because the French, after World War II, were considered to be weary of war, beset by internal political dissension, capable of democratically expressing their impatience, and lacking the "psychological and political means to fight a long-drawn-out war. . . .” ." A decade and a half later, the United States engaged in the seemingly endless Vietnam War, in a remote area, and constrained by limited objectives and the controlled application of force would experience a similar erosion of national resolve. Within Vietnam, the Communists had emphasized propaganda from the start as a key element in their struggle to gain control. This psychological offensive was orchestrated with military, cultural, and economic measures. Its importance in overall strategy was reflected by the statement of General Giap, with regard to the early phases of the war, that "the most essential and important task was to make propaganda among the masses and organize them. . . ." In stressing "armed propaganda,” Giap stated that "political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda...." French impatience increased as many reports were received of scattered guerrilla-type actions by individuals and small groups. These reports presented a cumulative image of far greater enemy successes than were actually being achieved. Discontent and divisiveness were fueled by persistent propaganda on the part of the Viet Minh and the world Communist movement, and by others voicing opposition to continuing the war. The eventual impact 'Quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. 113; see also Giap, People's War, People's Army, pp. 98-100. was highlighted by Giap's subsequent claim that the enemy had a "weak point" because he was "internally divided, not supported by the people of his own country and did not enjoy the sympathy of world opinion." The General cited, as one of the reasons for victory in the French-Viet Minh War, the support of "progressive peoples" throughout the world, "among whom are the French people under the leadership of their Communist Party. The French Communist Party had, throughout the war, retained links with the Viet Minh, and done its best to hinder the French efforts, even to the extent of sabotaging military equipment consigned to Indochina." In Giap's assessment, the fighting spirit of the French had been deteriorating as a result of their reduced manpower and wealth after World War II. The morale of the French Expeditionary Force in Indochina was indeed being depressed by the realization that their government and people were not fully behind their efforts, the knowledge that an unrestrained press was providing intelligence to the enemy, and the leaks of operational plans and security measures. Articles and reports which seemed deliberately written to hit at morale appeared in French newspapers and periodicals." The French "New Strategic Plan" Although war weariness had not reached crisis proportions by the start of 1953, United States policy-makers were seeking an early conclusion to the war and urged more aggressive French military action. The situation in Indochina had been discussed at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization minister's meeting in Paris in December 1952. At this meeting, the delegates passed a special resolution which linked the efforts of the armed forces for France and the Associated States of Indochina against Communists to the common security of the "Free World." 4 On 19 January 1953, in view of what he assessed as a "continued stalemate” in the military situation in Indochina, Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster requested that the Joint Chiefs reexamine America's 2 Ibid., pp. 36, 78–79, 99, 101, 102, 126, 127; O'Ballance, Indo-China War, p. 198; Henri Navarre, Agony of Indochina, trans. by Naval Intelligence Command (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 189-90. CIA, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1954," 4 June 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, p. 48; O'Ballance, Indo-China War, p. 198. "Results of Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Paris, December 15-18," The Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII (5 Jan. 1953), p. 4. role in the war, paying particular attention to the training of indigenous forces. In their response of 13 March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against active combat participation because of the extent of other worldwide United States commitments and their belief that France and the Associated States had the capability to provide the military strength required. They again recommended that the French be encouraged to augment the Vietnamese Armed Forces, suggesting that United States military aid pay for the additional troops." In reevaluating the situation in the spring of 1953, General Salan proposed to reassign thousands of French troops who had been tied down in static positions to mobile units. He planned to train Vietnamese soldiers to take over garrison duties. These proposals would require substantial American aid, estimated at about $1.5 billion for fiscal years 1954 and 1955.* Since the initial decision in May 1950 to send aid to Indochina, the United States had continually urged the French to prepare an overall military plan upon which America could base its assistance program. The French had resisted justifying their aid requirements in this fashion. Now, faced with a hugh new aid request, the American government insisted that no further aid would be "considered without full knowledge of French political and military plans. . . French Prime Minister René Mayer and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, accompanied by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Associated States, visited Washington from 25 to 28 March 1953 to present their case for increased aid. The French High Commissioner for the Associated States, Jean Letourneau, and the French Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Jacques Allard, presented "a new strategic plan" to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Frank Nash, who was now responsible within the department for aid. The presentation was also attended by Brigadier General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, USA, Chief, MAAG Indochina, and the United States Ambassador to Indochina, Donald R. Heath. The objectives of the plan were the ultimate destruction of the Viet Minh forces and general pacification of Indochina through a series of operations 6 Memo, DEPSECDEF to JCS, of 19 Jan. 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 4, 11-14. Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, End of a War: Indochina, 1954 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 33; memo, OP-30 to CNO, No. 135-53 of 13 Apr. 1953. *Msgs, SECSTATE, of 26 Mar. 1953 and 19 Mar. 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. |