Garnier and his small squadron sailed from Saigon in October 1873 and arrived in Hanoi on 5 November. After several futile attempts to negotiate with the mandarins, Garnier issued an ultimatum-either the king would agree to disarm the forces in the citadel of Hanoi and authorize the French to use the Red River for trade with Yunnan, or the lieutenant would resort to force. When Tu Duc rejected these demands, Garnier and his men stormed the citadel and captured the city on 20 November. His small force then occupied five other fortified towns, including Haiphong. One month later all the delta between Hanoi and the sea was under French control.

The French position was not yet secure. Chinese rebels and coastal pirates moved in on Garnier's lines, launching an attack on 21 December. Rallying his men, the lieutenant counterattacked, charging straight toward the enemy into an ambush and his death. The triumphant rebels cut off his head, an act guaranteed to outrage the French reinforcements who reached Hanoi four days later. Faced with certain defeat by the determined French, Tu Duc sent his emissaries to Saigon where they agreed to Admiral Dupré's terms in a treaty signed on 15 March 1874. Dupré recognized the sovereignty of the king. Tu Duc, for his part, agreed that his foreign policy would conform to that of France. The monarch also recognized the full sovereignty of France over six provinces in the south and acceded to the opening of the Red River to Yunnan for commerce. Finally, the king promised to respect freedom of worship for all Christians.27

In a conciliatory mood, and aware of the king's incapacity to maintain order in the face of widespread anarchy, the governor turned over to Tu Duc 5 gunboats, 100 small cannon, 1,000 rifles, and ammunition—to be used against bands such as the Black Flags. More importantly, he provided a naval and military mission to reorganize the king's fleet and army and to build bridges, roads, and other public works. But peace and order were hard to achieve, especially since Tu Duc followed a strategy of encouraging piracy against French shipping."

28

When a revolt broke out in 1878, Tu Duc appealed to China for help in crushing the insurrection. Only too happy to demonstrate its role as lord and protector of Indochina, Peking sent two gunboats plus troops

"Teston and Percheron, L'Indochine Moderne, pp. 43-44; Hall, History of South-East Asia, pp. 621-22; Staunton, War in Tong-King, pp. 23-25; Buttinger, Smaller Dragon, p. 372. Teston and Percheron, L'Indochina Moderne, p. 44; Staunton, War In Tong-King, pp. 25–27; Hall, History of South-East Asia, pp. 622-23.

to help its nominal vassal defeat the insurgents. This challenge to the authority of a French protectorate could not be ignored. The French government responded by sending a naval force to Tonkin, this time under the command of Captain Henri Rivière. On 25 April, with three warships, a French landing force, and a detachment of Cochin Chinese riflemen, Rivière attacked and once again captured the citadel at Hanoi from the forces of Tu Duc. The Black Flags threatened to move on Hanoi. Leading 400 men against a Black Flag stronghold on the Red River just above Hanoi, Rivière followed Lieutenant Garnier's earlier route to Son Tay along the river bank. Like Garnier before him, Captain Rivière was killed in an ambush.29

In Paris, news of Rivière's death caused an immediate wave of indignation and a demand for action. In the French Chamber of Deputies, where debate had centered on whether or not to vote funds for an expedition to Indochina, the bill for Tonkin military appropriations passed unanimously. Premier Jules Ferry ordered that an imposing operation be mounted ostensibly against the Black Flags, but in actuality to establish a French protectorate. For this purpose, twenty-nine ships and craft and about 4,250 naval personnel were gathered at Hanoi. From France and New Caledonia came 4,000 infantry troops. With additional artillery forces, the army strength totaled 6,000. Rear Admiral Amédée Anatole Courbet commanded the naval forces, while General Alexandre Eugène Bouët was in charge of army troops."

30

This impressive invasion force was ready for action by mid-August 1883, at which time Admiral Courbet sailed his ships south to the mouth of the Perfume River. Following familiar tactics, the squadron first bombarded the forts guarding the approach to Hue and then landed the troops. As a result of this action, the Vietnamese sued for peace.

31

In the month before this French triumph, the death of the aging Tu Duc had generated a dynastic crisis. His successor, Hiep Hoa, signed a new treaty according France full rights of intervention and under which the king agreed to a French protectorate over Annam and Tonkin. The king retained his title but agreed to receive the French commissioner general for private, personal interviews, a right never before granted to any foreigner. The French now controlled the administration, levied taxes and customs,

20 Ibid.; Staunton, War in Tong-King, pp. 27, 38-40.

30

Thomas F. Power, Jr., Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1944), p. 164; Staunton, War in Tong-King, p. 42.

31
1 Ibid.

manned the forts and military posts on all rivers, and exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction in the courts. As for the French Navy, the treaty made clear that France alone would suppress the Black Flags and patrol the Red River.32

33

Following a dispute among the local French administrators, the government placed Admiral Courbet in supreme military command and sent more troops to Tonkin. With the addition of control over Annam and Tonkin to that of Cochin China and Cambodia, the greatest of France's overseas colonies was founded, and senior French naval officers were reminded anew of the navy's responsibility for security of the waters surrounding Indochina and the lines of communication to France.

Limited War between France and China

French consolidation of their position in Tonkin challenged traditional Chinese suzerainty over their former tributary. A vest-pocket naval war settled the issue. The Chinese and foreign press carried accounts describing the strong war feeling in Peking along with reports of military and naval activity and the movement of troops to the Tonkin border. Twice in June 1884 French and Chinese troops clashed in Tonkin, thus paving the way for the commander of French forces in Indochina, Admiral Courbet, backed by Premier Ferry, to announce that France would neither yield her protectorate nor control of the Red River. On 13 July 1884 France presented an ultimatum to China demanding the immediate withdrawal of its troops from Tonkin, the payment of an indemnity of 200 million francs, and an answer to these demands within a week. The Chinese failed to comply. Rather than attempting a land campaign, Premier Ferry ordered Admiral Courbet to sail north ready to take retaliatory action.*

34

When Peking still demonstrated that it would not relinquish its suzerainty over Tonkin, the French squadron was ordered to force an agreement. After an unsuccessful attack against the port of Keelung on the northern coast of Formosa, Admiral Courbet steamed to Foochow, where he destroyed the Chinese southern fleet as it lay at anchor. Subsequently, he returned to Formosa, and his forces repeatedly attacked the Keelung forts until they

32

13

Ibid., pp. 42-43; Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 625; Power, Jules Ferry, p. 166. Staunton, War In Tong-King, p. 43.

34

Staunton, War in Tong-King, p. 45; Power, Jules Ferry, pp. 172–73.

finally capitulated in March 1885. Soon afterwards, Courbet occupied the Pescadores.35

Sensing the futility of further fighting, Peking recognized the French claims. Laos, the last Chinese tributary in Indochina, also was destined to become a protectorate, since France claimed that it had "inherited" Vietnamese suzerainty over the territory. This claim resulted in a short conflict with Siam which then relinquished its claim to Laos. The issue was settled when China concluded a convention with France in 1895 recognizing French hegemony in Laos.3

36

Although all of Indochina was now part of the French empire overseas, the arduous task of persuading the people to accept French rule still lay ahead. French forces in Indochina spent the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century attempting to establish order and introducing French institutions. Resistance and rebellion continued even after the French were firmly entrenched. Most of the fighting took place in the mountains or deltas and was led by the mandarins or by local chieftains.3

37

For French troops to reach various points in the delta regions, it was necessary to travel via the inland waterways in naval river gunboats. Predecessors of the "brown water" navies of the next century, these canonnieres gave mobility to the French forces, lent authority to their presence, and assured essential logistic support to field units. The river gunboats were indeed a key element in maintaining the French presence in Indochina.

Another visible element of France's status as a great colonial power was its Far Eastern Fleet which by 1900 numbered six cruisers and eleven sloops and gunboats. The shallow-draft, armed sloops were well suited for detached duty on foreign stations.

38

Against the backdrop of the preceding 2,000 years, the history of Vietnam to 1900 revealed that the maritime element had been decisive. Chinese seapower, particularly during the Ming era, provided one means of gaining and maintaining suzerainty over kingdoms to the south. Later, technical advances in shipbuilding and navigation, coupled with European acquisitiveness and zeal for evangelism, brought Western vessels carrying traders and

Ibid, pp. 174-76; Hall, History of South-East Asia, p. 626.

* Buttinger, Smaller Dragon. pp. 380–81, 421.

38

Frank N. Trager, Why Viet Nam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 33.

3 John Leyland, ed., The Naval Annual, 1900 (Portsmouth, England: J. Griffin and Co., 1900), p. 66.