at the start of the Korean War. However, with the emphasis on strategic warfare readiness, the Navy's share of funds was considerably smaller than in any of the prewar years. Modernization of the Fleet would have to be achieved in addition to meeting the continuing demands for readiness and worldwide deployments. Among the expanding requirements were nuclear propulsion, the equipping of ships with guided missile systems, the enhancement of antisubmarine warfare capabilities to meet the challenge of fast, deep-diving submarines, and the further development of the capabilities for carriers and their aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. Replacement of ships built in World War II would continue to be deferred. Increased Aid An increase in military aid to the French in Indochina was approved in September 1953. One requirement not covered by the plan concerned aircraft carriers. La Fayette was scheduled for relief by Arromanches in midJune 1953 and to enter drydock about mid-September for a six-month overhaul. The French needed an additional carrier which could be used for training French pilots in the use of the newly delivered Corsairs and then would be available to relieve Arromanches in the spring of 1954. Defense Minister Pleven had already initiated negotiations for a light carrier during his visit to Washington in March 1953. Accordingly, the President, with congressional approval, ordered the loan of Belleau Wood (CVL–24). La Fayette (transferred to France in 1951 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program) and Belleau Wood were of the light carrier types built on cruiser hulls for service in World War II. Faster than the escort types, they were better able to land and recover fighter-type aircraft. Their aircraft capacity, however, was limited to a normal load of twenty-six. Owing to the time taken to provide a qualified French crew, Belleau Wood (rechristened Bois Belleau) did not reach France until December 1953, two and a half months later than originally scheduled. The poor condition of her boilers at the time of reactivation and the need for further repairs caused some delay, as did French use of the ship to deliver planes to India. The French Army would be badly in need of air support that 33 33 Pierre Barjot, Histoire de la Guerre Aeronavale (Paris: Flammarion, 1961), pp. 402-05; memo, OP-30 to OP-03, ser 00025 of 25 July 1953; the authorization act, Public Law 188, is contained in U.S., Congress, United States Statutes at Large: 1953 (83rd Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1953), Vol. 67, p. 363; memo, Defense Member, NSC Planning Board to Presidential Assistant, of 10 Apr. 1954 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 380-81. winter and spring, but the carrier was not to arrive off Indochina until 30 April 1954. One of the functional areas affected by the series of changes in defense responsibilities was that of planning and implementing military aid. During the Korean War years, the Department of Defense's military assistance organization had grown in size, and staff authority had increased. The proposals by the Army and Air Force, that operating functions be delegated to the military services and that the Office of the Secretary of Defense not undertake extensive operating functions, was rejected. When the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs became one of the new assistant secretaries created in 1953, Department of Defense coordinating boards and committees involved with aid were dissolved. 34 The aid program had now developed separate lines of reporting and a separate budget. A typical pattern evolved whereby military assistance advisory groups in the various countries submitted requirements to be endorsed by the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Invariably, the total worldwide program exceeded what was considered warranted for the President's budget. Then, last-minute decisions in the Department of Defense cut the programs to fit the President's budget. In the opinion of one writer, this pattern resulted "in all critical decisions being made without benefit of military advice and in ignorance of the recommendations of the military assistance advisory groups on which programs should be given greatest priority. . . . Military authorities had de facto transferred the power to make important decisions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the State Department." 2935 A related problem concerning support of the conflict in Indochina was the review of military aid programs for the French and Associated States. Before being relieved as Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Radford had felt that, since he had been assigned responsibility for planning in connection with the defense of Southeast Asia, he should have the authority to comment on assistance programs recommended by MAAG Indochina and MAAG Thailand. He requested such authority in January 1953. Under the split responsibilities that existed at the time, the Department of the Army continued as executive agent, now under the Secretary of Defense, for military assistance matters in Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Indochina. Yet these countries were within the area of CINCPAC's unified command responsibility, for which the executive agent was the Navy. In March, the MAAGS were directed to submit information copies of their request to CINCPAC for comment. Six months later, MAAG Indochina and MAAG Thailand were told to forward recommended programs through CINCPAC, as was already the case in regard to Joint United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG) Philippines and MAAG Formosa. Later, on 30 December 1953, Admiral Stump, who became CINCPAC in July 1953, requested military command over the MAAGS and JUSMAAGS in Southeast Asia. He would be given this authority when, on 1 May 1954, the executive agent responsibilities for these groups were transferred to the Department of the Navy. The Coupling of Negotiations with Military Actions The signing of the Korean Armistice was the culmination of two years of discussion between the Communists and United Nations representatives while the war continued. Admiral C. Turner Joy, of the United Nations truce delegation in Korea, later observed that "the measure of expansion achieved by Communism through negotiations is impossible to disassociate from what they have achieved by force, for the Communists never completely separate the two methods." 36 The comment was equally applicable to the conflict in Indochina, as was evident a few days after conclusion of the Korean Armistice when the Soviet Union and Communist China called for a settlement of the French-Viet Minh War. That fall, Premier Joseph Laniel came under increasing parliamentary pressure to negotiate a settlement in Indochina. He won an important vote of confidence on 28 October 1953, but only after agreeing that everything should be done to achieve peace in Southeast Asia by means of negotiation. Shortly thereafter, the Viet Minh feigned an attack on Phu Tho, along the Red River northwest of Hanoi, in order to lure General Navarre's forces away from Phu Ly on the Day River. When the Viet Minh tactic became apparent, General Navarre, in operation Mouette, moved six mobile groups against Phu Ly, which had recently been occupied by the Viet Minh 320th 36 C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955), p. xi. Division. Several of the mobile groups moved to the battle in boats of Dinassauts 3 and 12. Another part of the French force made for Phu Nho Quan, the supply base for the Viet Minh 320th Division fifteen miles west of the Day River on Route 12. Two Viet Minh regiments blocked their advance until the supplies were removed. Everywhere the French encountered stiffer opposition than they had expected. By the 7th of November, the fighting had reached a stalemate and the French withdrew rather than commit more reserves to the battle. Despite the failure of Mouette to achieve its full objective, the operation inflicted heavy casualties on the Viet Minh 320th Division, putting it out of action for at least two months.37 On 20 November 1953, two French paratroop battalions captured the post at the little valley town of Dien Bien Phu and established a defensive position on the Laotian border to block the Viet Minh invasion of that country. There is some disagreement as to whether the defense of Laos was General Navarre's idea or based on directions from Paris.38 Nevertheless, the decision proved a fateful one. On that same day, Ho Chi Minh, replying to a series of questions posed by the Swedish newspaper Expressen, stated that, "if, having drawn the lessons of these years of war, the French Government wishes to conclude an armistice and solve the question of Vietnam by means of negotiations, the people and government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (D.R.V.) are ready to examine the French proposals. ❞ 39 Giap later claimed that the French were "compelled to combine their plan of attacking swiftly and win[ning] swiftly with that of invading step-by-step, and even of negotiating with us ." 40 One might infer that it was the Viet Minh who sought the negotiations. Possible reasons were the recent casualties sustained by the 320th Division plus evidence of a more aggressive French campaign. A statement in Khrushchev Remembers, purported to be the "O'Ballance, Indo-China War, pp. 205-06; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, p. 285; NA Saigon, reports, 205-53 of 13 Nov. 1953, 208-53 of 27 Nov. 1953, 211-53 of 2 Dec. 1953, JN-N-59-488, box 25, FRC. Premier Joseph Laniel stated that at a meeting on 24 July 1953 Navarre was instructed that the safety of the French forces was to be paramount. On the other hand, General Navarre claims that at the July meeting Laniel gave no answer to his question about defending Laos. Furthermore, Navarre continues, Maurice Dejean, the French Commissioner General in Indochina and Navarre's superior, declared to him in November 1953 that there was "no question of not defending Laos." Joseph Laniel, Le Drame Indochinois de Dien-Bien-Phu au pari de Geneve (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 20–22; Navarre, Agony of Indochina, pp. 302–03. |