On 2 September 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had warned the Chinese of the consequences of aggression in Indochina. During the next month, the visit of an American destroyer division gave visible evidence of American interest and support of France and the State of Vietnam. Commander Destroyer Squadron 30, Captain Willard Saunders, embarked in destroyer Caperton in company with Dashiell, Dortch, and Gatling, docked at the Catinat Wharf in Saigon for a two-day visit starting 20 October 1953. During his visit Captain Saunders met with Ambassador Heath and local French naval officers, including Vice Admiral Auboyneau. A few days later, General W. M. Black (APB-5) of the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service, arrived at Saigon from Korea with a French infantry

battalion. The French unit had won an outstanding reputation fighting with the United States 2nd Division in Korea. Saigon newspapers reported that French naval and military authorities in Indochina were favorably impressed with continuing American efforts to aid their cause."

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52

NA Saigon, reports, 216-53 of 21 Dec. 1953, JN-N-59-488, box 25, FRC and 10-54 of 23 Jan. 1954, JN-N-59-2184, box 44, FRC; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 1, pt. IIA.3, p. A50.

Left to right are General of Division Gardet, Commander in Chief Ground Forces South Vietnam; Vice Admiral D'Escadre Philippe Auboyneau, Commander in Chief French Naval Forces, Far East; Admiral Felix Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific; His Excellency Le Van Hoach, Vice President of the Council, Government of Vietnam; and General Nguyen Van Hinh, head of Vietnamese Armed Forces, in Saigon, November 1953.

Vietnam was one of the first concerns of the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, who had assumed his post in August 1953. He had previously served as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics and as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe. During World War II, he had served as Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, when the latter was Commander South Pacific Force and later as Commander Third Fleet.

On a trip to the Pacific in the fall of 1953, Admiral Carney met with Admiral Stump, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, who had recently been directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare plans in case the Chinese intervened militarily in Indochina. Admiral Stump reported increasing U.S.

involvement in coordination and preparations should a worsening situation in Indochina occur. Possible tasks of the Pacific Fleet in the Western Pacific, in case of a Chinese intervention in Indochina, included blockade of the China coast and action against the Chinese mainland "to destroy or neutralize the Communist air, to interdict lines of logistic support and, generally, to reduce the military potential of Communist China." In case air strikes were ordered, Stump's concept was to employ naval aircraft operating from a carrier task force. If he was ordered to assist the French, he would use naval air and ship gunfire in direct support, accompanied by supporting air strikes against selected targets in Indochina. In the opinion of Admiral Stump, Chinese Communist ground forces then in position north of the border and air forces either within combat range or capable of rapid deployment could drive French forces out of Tonkin in a few weeks. He felt a Southeast Asia force should be organized under Commander First Fleet and based at Subic Bay, and believed the "existence of such a force would at least be a deterrent to further Chinese Communist aggression and might be a controlling factor in preventing such aggression."

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63 Memo, OP-002 to OP-09, of 23 Nov. 1953, encl. For a discussion of deterrence of Chinese aggression, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 235–65.