Southeast Asian Deployments And A Growing Crisis In Indochina, 1954

During the latter part of 1953, the United States had maintained a high degree of readiness to respond in case of renewed fighting in Korea. As the situation there stabilized, a major reduction in deployed naval forces was planned to take place in January 1954. Conditions elsewhere in the Far East, however, led to reconsideration. Now that the Chinese were no longer engaged in combat in Korea, the threat against Taiwan intensified and the possibility of the People's Republic of China intervening in Indochina increased. As a consequence, the planned cutback in naval forces in the Western Pacific was cancelled, except for the return of a battleship and a destroyer division to the Atlantic.'

Secretary of State Dulles repeated a warning given the previous September, when, in a major address on 12 January, he stated that open Chinese Army aggression in Indochina would result in "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina." Expressing concern over the total cost of national defense, Dulles announced that President Eisenhower and his advisors on the National Security Council had made a basic policy decision. The decision was "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." The intention was to make allies and collective security "more effective, [and] less costly... by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power." With regard to the Far East, Dulles referred to the President's 26 December 1953 statement which had announced the progressive reduction of the United States ground forces in Korea. Accord

ing to the President, American military forces in the Far East would now feature "highly mobile naval, air and amphibious units...

"Fair Weather Training"

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On 6 February 1954, Admiral Carney advised Admiral Stump that he was considering recommending to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that two carriers and about six destroyers be deployed in the Subic area for a period of approximately six weeks. He said that, "the ostensible and announced purpose would be fair weather training." Admiral Stump concurred, recommending eight destroyers and the inclusion of mobile logistic support units capable of underway replenishment of the combat ships with oil, provisions, and ammunition. The training mission was logical. In more normal times of peace, units of the Fleet had usually operated mainly in northern Asiatic waters during the summer months, going south in the winter for training.

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Nine days later the operational control of two attack carriers and a squadron of destroyers was transferred from Commander in Chief, Far East to Commander in Chief, Pacific. Carney informed Stump that the purpose was "to conduct training exercises as a cover for possible operations to assist French in Indochina if such operations become necessary. . . ." The task force, he said, "should be ready to render prompt assistance during the time they are in South China Sea." As Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Stump ordered the carriers and destroyers south to be followed by a logistic support group. The latter consisted of 2 fleet oilers, 1 ammunition ship, 1 attack cargo ship, and 1 provisions store ship. An antisubmarine submarine (SSK) also joined the force. Two carriers remained in the Japan-Korean area under Commander in Chief, Far East's operational control.*

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The assignment of command of the southern force to a senior flag

Address, John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," The Department of State Bulletin, XXX (25 Jan. 1954), pp. 107-10. Later in the year, growing concern in the United States and elsewhere over the implications of a policy of "massive retaliation" and the possible use of nuclear weapons led the secretary to make statements in clarification of the administration's policy. See Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, Vol. XVII of The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Robert H. Ferrell, ed. (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967), pp. 144-51.

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3 Msgs, CINCPACFLT 090102Z Feb. 1954 and CNO 061717Z Feb. 1954. 'Msgs, CINCPACFLT 190016Z Feb. 1954 and CNO 152307Z Feb. 1954.

officer other than Commander Seventh Fleet (Vice Admiral Alfred M. Pride) was deemed desirable by Admiral Carney because of the continuing threat to Taiwan from mainland China, the need of a carrier strike force in that area to deter or counter an invasion attempt, the possibility of simultaneous crises there and in Indochina, uncertaintly as to the permanence of the Korean Armistice, and the different chains of command for the Japan-Taiwan area and for other portions of the Western Pacific. In a letter in which the CNO summarized his concept of using Commander First Fleet as a deployed task force commander under CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, Carney stated that "the realism of the threat in the Pacific lends added importance to any thinking which involves the utilization of the Commander First Fleet as the tactical commander for special operations.'

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Complying with Carney's desires, Stump ordered the commander of the First Fleet, Vice Admiral William K. Phillips, and a small operational staff, west to assume command. Phillips was well acquainted with the situation in the Western Pacific and the plans for action, if ordered. He had served as Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet from September 1952 to October 1953, under both Admirals Radford and Stump.

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The usual function of Commander First Fleet, normally operating off the West Coast of the United States, was fleet training. At Carney's instigation, the First Fleet commander already had been assigned responsibilities for coordinating and evaluating fleet readiness in the Western Pacific as well as off the West Coast of the United States. Carney envisaged occasional visits to the Far East to confer with Commander Seventh Fleet and Commander Naval Forces, Far East on training and readiness matters. Admiral Phillips's mission, while in command of the "Fair Weather Traning Force," was to conduct training in the South China Sea, to determine the state of readiness of forces assigned to him, and to evaluate the feasibility of future utilization of the Subic Bay-Sangley area as an operating base. He also had the classified mission of maintaining readiness for combat operations in case of a decision to employ his force against China or in support of French Union forces.

Phillips organized his ships into two task groups. One was an Attack Carrier Striking Group (TG 70.2), commanded by Rear Admiral Robert E. Blick, Jr. (also Commander Carrier Division 3), to which a carrier unit

of Wasp (CVA-18) and Essex (CVA−9), a screen unit of eight destroyers, and a submarine unit were assigned. The other was a Logistic Support Group (TG 92.2), commanded by Captain George H. Browne and consisting of the underway replenishment ships."

While maintaining a high state of readiness for contingencies, the force conducted a wide variety of training, including air-strike exercises, antisubmarine and air-defense operations, and day and night replenishment. One of the carriers that later joined the force, Boxer, reported that its lack of the new and more powerful catapults being installed in the Fleet, combined with low-wind conditions, led to a number of cancellations of planned jet fighter sorties. But this was an isolated problem. The overall offensive capabilities of the force were considered excellent."

In the spring of 1954, the force would be expanded to three carriers, twelve destroyers, and a larger logistic support group. Its deployment would be extended as a result of the deteriorating situation at Dien Bien Phu and training operations would be interrupted twice when the force was placed in readiness for possible combat action.

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In the light of future events, one of Admiral Phillips's recommendations of particular interest was that the Subic-Cubi-Sangley area facilities in the Philippines should be completed to serve as a fleet base, especially in view of its proximity to the Southeast Asian trouble spot. The validity of this recommendation would later be confirmed, when these facilities had to be expanded on an urgent basis in the 1960s to meet the needs of the Fleet and to support the programs of military assistance.

Navarre's Offensive

On 12 December 1953 General Navarre had notified his subordinate commanders of his decision to launch the promised offensive. His target was one of the six inter-zones into which the Communists had subdivided Vietnam for the administration and organization of their infrastructure. The Fifth Inter-Zone (Lien Khu V) in south-central Vietnam stretched along the coast from south of Tourane to north of Nha Trang and westward to the mountains along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. In addi

'COMISTFLT, OP-ORDER 10-54, ser 01A of 28 Feb. 1954.

COMISTFLT, report, ser 010A of 29 Apr. 1954; CAG 12, report, ser 031 of 4 Oct. 1954. 'COM1STFLT, report, ser 010A of 29 Apr. 1954.