tion by US carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu ... to save the situation." According to Dillon, the French stated that the extensive presence of Chinese Communist personnel and supplies in the area of the besieged garrison "fully established" the fact of Chinese intervention. They acknowledged that such action by the United States might lead to Chinese air attacks in the Red River Delta. Nevertheless, since Bidault considered the fate of Southeast Asia dependent on the outcome at Dien Bien Phu, he did not hesitate to request immediate United States action.37

Prior to receipt of this request and in compliance with President Eisenhower's desires, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford discussed the possibility of the use of American combat aircraft with eight members of Congress. The congressmen were told that the operation was not supported by the other four service chiefs and that the plan had not been discussed with friendly nations. As a consequence, the congressmen advised Dulles first to seek allies.38

President Eisenhower wrote a letter on 4 April 1954 to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggesting an "ad hoc grouping or coalition" of nations concerned with checking Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. In addition to the United States and Great Britain he suggested including France, the Associated States of Indochina, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. On 5 April the French were told that American combat action was "impossible except on a coalition basis with active British Commonwealth participation." The French reaction was expressed by George Bidault who felt that the time for formulating coalitions had passed and said that the fate of Indochina would be solved in the next ten days at Dien Bien Phu.39 Meanwhile, during an 8 April meeting with Rear Admiral Herbert G. Hopwood, Stump's Chief of Staff, General Navarre reported that his radar had picked up several flights of jets over the Tonkin delta during the last few days which he suspected were United States aircraft. He told Hopwood that he had no objections to American planes overflying the area, but that he would appreciate advance information on the flights. The primary pur

"Msg, U.S. Embassy Paris, of 5 Apr. 1954 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 296–97.

38 Chalmers M. Roberts, "The United States Twice Proposed Indochina Air Strike," Washington Post, 9 July 1954 in The Congressional Record-Senate (83rd Cong., 2nd sess.), Vol. 100, pp. 10137-39. The article was based both on the scanty public record and private information. Msgs, SECSTATE, of 5 Apr. and 6 May 1954 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 359-60; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–1954 (Garden City, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 346–49.

39

pose of Hopwood's visit had been to ensure the adequacy and suitability of plans previously formulated with Commander in Chief, Indochina. The general agreed with Admiral Hopwood that the Eastwold Plan, drawn up in November 1952, and previously established liaison procedures between United States and French military authorities, were adequate for the present."

40

That same day (7 April 1954 in Washington), Carney informed Stump of the decision that there would be no unilateral military action then. Admiral Stump was told to complete the reconnaissance along the border by 12 April. Requirements were added for reconnaissance over the Dien Bien Phu battlefield and the Viet Minh supply routes to the north of the French positions. Carney reminded Stump that the flights were to be undertaken covertly, without even the French being notified. At this time, other American planes also flew over the Dien Bien Phu battlefield. In order to view the situation first hand, General Joseph Caldara, USAF, Chief of the Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command participated in three reconnaissance flights over the valley during a visit to Indochina in early April. Caldara would command the Air Force bombers should their participation be ordered. In addition to reconnaissance, American civilian pilots flying C-119 "Flying Boxcars" made numerous flights over the valley to augment French efforts to parachute vital supplies of food and ammunition into the base.11

41

In the second week of April, as the possibility of direct American participation in the Indochina conflict faded, Task Group 70.2 returned to the Philippines. By mid-month, Boxer had relieved Wasp which headed for Yokosuka, Japan, enroute to San Diego.

40

41

Msgs, CINCPACFLT 081941Z Apr. and 090115Z Apr. 1954.

"Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place. pp. 305, 327-28, 373-74; msgs, CNO 072241Z and 082159Z Apr. 1954.

The End Of

The French-Viet Minh War

The United States responded to the worsening situation in April 1954 by agreeing to send more military aid to the French and Associated States. Added evidence of American support was given when Lieutenant General O'Daniel replaced Major General Trapnell as head of the U.S. MAAG on 11 April. Because of American concern over a rank predating that of Lieutenant General Navarre, O'Daniel was assigned to Indochina as a major general.1

The French continued to call for more and more American equipment, particularly aircraft. Vice Admiral Auboyneau, Commander of French Naval Forces, Far East, had suggested to General Navarre the use of twenty-four idle pilots from the carrier La Fayette, now drydocked in France, to fly Corsair aircraft that might be provided by the United States Navy from stocks in the Western Pacific. Navarre requested the pilots because the French Navy was conducting the majority of the sorties in support of Dien Bien Phu. He felt that the higher instrument qualifications of naval aviators and the better instrument capabilities of their aircraft made them better suited for support missions in the poor weather which so often enveloped the valley at Dien Bien Phu in the spring.

The French request for naval aircraft was approved on 13 April 1954, and Saipan (CVL-48) set sail from Yokosuka, Japan, with twenty-five AU-1 Corsair aircraft (formerly designated F4Us), maintenance material, and spare parts. Also on board were one officer and five enlisted men with temporary duty orders to Indochina to help the French with maintenance problems. On 18 April at 0830 Saipan, in company with destroyer Colahan

1

'Admiral Carney agreed with General Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, that it was unfortunate

the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted on the appointment of General O'Daniel, and that the latter's rank was being reduced. Memo, OP-004 to CNO, of 26 Feb. 1954.

(DD-658), rendezvoused with the French patrol craft L'Inconstant off Tourane harbor. Two French liaison officers came on board and shortly thereafter the Corsairs were flown off by Marine Corps pilots attached to Saipan's air group. The original plan had been to fly the aircraft to Cat Bi airfield near Haiphong, but because that airfield was so overcrowded, the planes were order to Tourane. When the aircraft touched down on the steel Marston-matting of the airfield, the American aviators were greeted by French pilots, many of whom had trained with the Americans at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida. Soon thereafter, Saipan sailed into the harbor and anchored near the French carrier Arromanches. The United States pilots returned to their carrier by helicopter while deck crews unloaded the spare parts for the aircraft into French LCUs and LCMs. The entire operation was completed without incident by 1600 that afternoon, when the carrier and its escort put to sea for the Philippines."

2 Saipan, reports, ser 060 of 28 Apr. 1954 and 21 Apr. 1954.

Within a week of their arrival, French naval pilots began flying the Corsairs in support of Dien Bien Phu. They went into battle just in time to bolster the badly depleted squadrons of Arromanches, which were down to two-thirds of their original strength. On 30 April, carrier Bois Belleau finally arrived on station to augment the air effort. In praise of the naval air arm. General Navarre later declared that it was the only military service which met and surpassed its obligations at Dien Bien Phu."

Other aid also continued to flow to Indochina. In May, the French obtained a second squadron of ten Privateer patrol planes. Although their

3

4

Barjot, Histoire de la Guerre Aeronavale, pp. 402-05; Navarre, Agony of Indochina, p. 84. By July 1954, the United States had delivered aid to Indochina at a cost of $2.6 billion. The items included 2 light aircraft carriers, 438 other naval ships and craft, and approximately 500 aircraft. NA Saigon, report, 14-S-54 of 24 June 1954, JN-N-59-2184, box 44, FRC; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 1, pt. IVA.2, p. 15.