primary mission was to augment the coastal patrol against Viet Minh infiltration, most of the Privateers were diverted to flying bombing missions in support of the garrison of Dien Bien Phu.

The battle at Dien Bien Phu was now raging on the valley floor. Outposts to the west of the field had been evacuated. Major Viet Minh assaults on defensive positions just north of the airstrip on 3 to 5 April were repulsed, but the situation was ominous. By now, Soviet 75-millimeter antiaircraft guns were interfering with the dropping of supplies and reinforcements, and with air strikes."

In the light of America's refusal to fly combat missions, Navarre suggested sorties by unmarked aircraft. Admiral Radford rejected the proposal on 11 April. Then the French Secretary of State for Air, Louis Christianens, on a visit to the United States, discussed the loan of American B-29 bombers, only to discover that there were no French pilots trained to fly the planes. General Navarre proposed that the United States carry out night raids on Viet Minh supply lines leading to Dien Bien Phu, but this suggestion also was rejected.

The United States continued to explore the possibility of united action with its allies in Southeast Asia. However, not even Dulles's personal trip to Europe, during 11-15 April, could persuade the British to agree to such a course. On 20 April, upon the secretary's return, he informed congressional leaders that, under these circumstances, American action in Indochina was neither imminent nor under consideration.

On the night of the 13th, a Communist commando force infiltrated the airfield at Dien Bien Phu and blasted a trench across it. With the help of such trenches and underground passageways, the Viet Minh steadily closed their lines. Defensive positions to the west and north were almost cut off from the rest of Dien Bien Phu. Fortification Huguette 6 just north of the airfield was evacuated on the 18th.

At that point, the military situation at Dien Bien Phu took another turn for the worse. The loss on 23 April of the key outpost of Huguette 1, located on the western side of the strip, made parachuting of reinforcements virtually impossible. Compounding the disaster was the loss of an elite parachute battalion in a desperate attempt to retake the position. It was

"Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place. pp. 210-24.

"Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, pp. 89, 91–92; Ély, Indo-China in Turmoil, p. 42; Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, pp. 101-102.

the garrison's last operational reserve. The Viet Minh trench system grew tighter around the fortress, which had shrunk to only one and a half kilometers in diameter. French leaders estimated, even before the battle for Huguette 1, that Dien Bien Phu would fall by asphyxiation within ten days and after that the Viet Minh would break through to the Tonkin delta.'

That same day in Washington, Admiral Donald B. Duncan-the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who was acting for Admiral Carney during the latter's temporary absence-studied an alarming dispatch from Secretary of State Dulles, who had returned to Europe, reporting conversations with French Foreign Minister Bidault. Bidault had taken Dulles aside during a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Paris to show him a message in which General Navarre again declared that only massive air support could save Dien Bien Phu. Bidault asked Dulles point-blank if the United States would reconsider the 5 April rejection of air support. Only American military intervention could save the fortress. Its loss, said Bidault, would result in public revulsion against the war and an irresistable demand for the French to withdraw. Bidault was not interested in Dulles's proposal of a Far Eastern collective security treaty to defend Indochina, which he felt would do nothing to save Dien Bien Phu. When Dulles stated that he would like to get Britain into the picture, Bidault countered that the British contribution would be small at best.

Admiral Duncan immediately ordered that Phillips's attack carrier striking force be placed on "twelve hours notice for possible resumption of operations previously conducted in western South China Sea."

18

In anticipation of a scheduled meeting with the President on the morning of the 23rd, Radford consulted with Duncan about the deployment of Seventh Fleet carriers. Duncan informed Radford that Boxer and Philippine Sea (CV-47) were in Subic on a twelve-hour steaming notice. Radford urged that Essex (CV-9) be returned to the force. Essex was then midway in a passage from the Philippines to Japan, but Duncan withheld action, pending the White House meeting. The consensus at the conference on 23 April, at which the Navy was represented by Secretary of the Navy

"Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 243, 258, 271, 276; Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, p. 90; Navarre, Agony of Indochina. pp. 378-79.

8

* Memo, VCNO to CNO, of 23 Apr. 1954; Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, p. 93; msg, CNO 222323Z Apr. 1954.

Anderson, was that Bidault's alarming report would need to be evaluated before any action was taken. The Navy was to retain its high state of readiness and "Fair Weather Training" operations were extended another two weeks. But no decision to enter the fray was made."

On the 24th, Admiral Radford arrived in Paris to join Dulles in the deliberations with the French. So desperate was the French situation that Premier Laniel instructed Bidault to make still another plea for American assistance. In a letter to Dulles on the 24th, Bidault declared anew that French military experts firmly believed that a massive United States air raid could indeed save the garrison. Again the State Department replied that such action depended on British cooperation, which the British refused

Memo, VCNO to CNO, of 23 Apr. 1954; msg, CNO 271611Z Apr. 1954.

to give. Then, on the 25th, René Massigli, the French Ambassador in London, hurried to the British Foreign Office with a report on conversations between Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith and Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador in Washington. Massigli pled for British intervention. Citing Admiral Radford's statement to that effect the day before, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told Massigli that the proposed operation could not save Dien Bien Phu. British military officers did not believe that attacks on the Viet Minh rear lines of communication would have much effect on the battle. Instead, Eden continued to place his hopes in the Geneva Conference, then in session, which he felt would surely be doomed to failure by a decision to intervene.'

10

In one final attempt to get British agreement, Laniel instructed Massigli to meet with Prime Minister Churchill on the 26th. The old statesman expressed his admiration for the defenders at Dien Bien Phu, but declared that he could do nothing to save them. He reiterated the previous British arguments against intervention. After the meeting, Churchill appeared before the House of Commons to announce the final British decisions: "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to give any undertaking about United Kingdom military action in Indochina in advance of the results of Geneva. We have not entered into any new political or military commit

News of the British position had been reported to Washington by Admiral Radford on the morning of the 26th but Under Secretary of State Smith tried one final move. He suggested that Australia and New Zealand join in the intervention, thus bypassing Britain. Some congressional leaders contacted on the matter were favorably disposed to the idea, but no action was taken.12

On 28 April, Admiral Carney informed Vice Admiral Phillips that he would be designated Commander Southeast Asia Defense Command, as a subordinate unified commander under Commander in Chief, Pacific. It was contemplated that he would establish headquarters in Saigon, but the command was never activated.13

10

Victor Bator, Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy: The Origins of United States Involvement (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1965), pp. 67–73; Devillers and Lacouture, End of

a War, pp. 96-99; Gurtov, First Vietnam Crisis, pp. 105-10.

11

Quoted in Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, pp. 97-98.

12 Ibid., p. 98.

13

Msg, CINCPACFLT 280532Z Apr. 1954.

On 29 April, President Eisenhower discussed the possibility of an air strike with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He later wrote: "Although the three service chiefs-Army, Navy, Air Force had recommended against this course, there was some merit in the argument that the psychological effect of an air strike would raise French and Vietnamese morale and improve, at least temporarily, the entire situation." No such strike was ordered. However, carrier Essex was directed south from the area of Commander Naval Forces, Far East, on 5 May, in order to augment Admiral Phillips's force.1*

Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May 1954 when at 1730 Viet Minh troops swarmed over the command post and captured recently promoted General de Castries and his staff. After a feeble breakout attempt failed, the last French outpost of the main camp fell. Later that night, a French naval Privateer was shot down while bombing Viet Minh communication lines. The plane commander, Ensign Monguillon, and the eight-man crew were the last Frenchman killed in action at Dien Bien Phu."

Geneva

The day after the fall of Dien Bien Phu the delegates at the Geneva Conference took up the problem of Indochina. The only important bargaining chip possessed by the French to forestall a breakdown of negotiations at Geneva was the threat of American intervention. To give credibility to the French position, Laniel once again inquired as to the circumstances in which the United States would intervene in the Indochina war. In the reply which Douglas Dillon handed Maurice Shumann, the French Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 15 May, the United States set down a number of conditions which would have to be met before this course would even be contemplated. This time the United States stipulated that only British consent, not participation, was necessary. There was the familiar call for the French to reaffirm the complete independence of the Associated States. The United States also insisted that the French promise not to withdraw their troops since any American forces committed would be intended to supplement rather than to replace French troops. The decision for intervention would also be conditioned upon agreements as to the

"Msg, CNO 061031Z May 1954; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 354; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 310-11.

15 Ibid., pp. 410–15.