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Meanwhile, the United States was groping for means of ensuring the security of South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. As the Seventh Fleet continued operations to protect American interests throughout the Far East, it was ordered to assist in the transportation of refugees from North Vietnam.

Passage To Freedom, 1954-1955

One of the immediate results of the French-Viet Minh Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam was the involvement of the United States Navy in the humanitarian task of helping provide passage south for those who desired and were able to flee Communist rule in the North. Throughout its history and in many scattered areas of the globe, the Navy had often been called upon to rescue people from areas of natural disasters, political turmoil, warfare, or oppression. The task was thus a familiar one, but each case had its own set of problems. Difficulties encountered in the Vietnam operations were in many respects unique.

In addition to requiring that each party regroup military forces, equipment, and supplies to its own zone (the Viet Minh forces to the north of the demarcation line and French Union Forces to the south), the agreement also stipulated that "until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district." The United States had urged such a provision during the negotiations. Experience in Eastern Europe and Korea had emphasized the importance of timely provisions to assist those who wished to escape a Communist dictatorship. Wherever the Communists had gained control, they had taken extraordinary steps to restrict communications across the borders and to prevent the inhabitants from leaving; in each case, the "iron curtain" had descended. Those remaining behind who actively sought freedom had often been subjected to coercion, imprisonment, torture, or even death. France sought the provision concerning movement of civilians so that it could withdraw not only military dependents and French citizens but also Vietnamese who would be in danger because of close affiliations with the French.

United States assistance would be requested because of the large number of people who desired to leave North Vietnam and the importance of civilian movements in the initial phases of regroupment. Although 300

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days were allowed for final withdrawal of troops, they were to be moved into provisional assembly areas within 15 days after the cease-fire date. Departure from the "Hanoi perimeter" was to be completed in 80 days and from the "Haiduong perimeter" in 100 days. Fear that once they gained control over an area the Communists would interfere with Vietnamese departures later proved justified.

On 23 July 1954, two days after the Geneva Conference ended, France offered to assist South Vietnam in evacuating civilian as well as military personnel from North Vietnam. The French agreed to build refugee camps in both the North and the South and to help resettle the refugees once they reached their destination. Doubting that the French could handle the task alone, Diem advised the United States Ambassador, Donald Heath, in Saigon that South Vietnam would need help in transporting Catholics and other anti-Communists from the North to the free zone of Vietnam.1

The cease-fire went into effect in northern Vietnam on 27 July, and by the end of the month, French troops had withdrawn into the HanoiHaiduong-Haiphong area. Along with the French military personnel, numbering some 80,000, thousands of refugees from the cities of Bui Chu and Phat Diem had already poured into the reduced area of French control.2 To help evacuate their equipment, much of which had been funded by the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the French requested the services of twenty American LSTs and one LSD. Concerned over the scarcity of such units in the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Carney proposed the use of ships of the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service. However, the French request soon was overtaken by a much larger commitment.

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On 5 August 1954 the French started a major effort by sea and air to transport troops, military equipment, and refugees from the Hanoi-Haiphong area to the South. They commandeered all available civilian and military passenger aircraft and began an intensive airlift, first from Hanoi, and then after 20 September, from Haiphong. Efficient as their efforts were, they could not handle all of those who wished to leave.

Also on the fifth, President Diem dispatched a personal message to President Eisenhower asking for American help in moving a million refugees from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. When France made an urgent plea

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1 Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam: The First Five Years (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1959), pp. 48–60.

2 Ibid., p. 55; O'Ballance. Indo-China War, p. 245.

'Memo, OP-63 to CNO, ser 00033 P63C of 11 Aug. 1954.

for the United States to transport 100,000 refugees a month to the South, Ambassador Heath urged acceptance of the request. Anticipating a favorable response, Admiral Carney alerted Admiral Stump to the probability of American participation in the large-scale evacuation from Haiphong and informed him of a Secretary of Defense authorization to employ elements of the Amphibious Force, Western Pacific together with such Military Sea Transportation Service units as were required to do the job.*

The possibility of assisting with an airlift as well as sealift was explored. However, it soon became clear that the French were making maximum use of the air terminals available in North Vietnam in transporting 3,000 refugees a day to the South."

On 7 August 1954, Admiral Carney directed Admiral Stump to imple ment the evacuation plan, in an operation which became known as the "Passage to Freedom." The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet was responsible for the sea evacuation and for providing overall support. Under CINCPACFLT, Rear Admiral Lorenzo S. Sabin, Commander Amphibious Force, Western Pacific (Task Force 90) and also Commander Amphibious Group 1, was assigned command of the sea operation. He was authorized to "use elements of PHIBFORWESTPAC [Amphibious Force, Western Pacific] and MSTS WESTPAC in proportions at your discretion as required to accomplish the task expeditiously." Stump directed Sabin to confer with Commander Naval Forces, Philippines (Rear Admiral Hugh Goodwin) concerning logistic support. The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (Major General O'Daniel) was designated the "over-all military co-ordinator ashore," responsible for refugee affairs. General O'Daniel designated Captain James Collett, head of the Navy Section of the MAAG, as his deputy.

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The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry was advised on 8 August that:

The United States Government desires to extend to the Government of Viet-Nam all reasonable assistance to evacuate from areas defined in the cease-fire agreement its nationals who understandably are unwilling to face

* Msg, CNO 062207Z Aug. 1954; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 341-45; CTF 90, report, ser 0252 of 8 Nov. 1954.

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* "Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom: Viet-Nam, 1954," The Depart ment of State Bulletin, XXXII (7 Feb. 1955), pp. 223-26.

"Lindholm, Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, p. 63; msgs, CNO 071633Z and CINCPACFLT 080259Z Aug. 1954.

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