took station in international waters off the coast to rescue any refugees who could reach them. But General Ély had delayed the decision on the rescue operation until too late, and agents had no chance to alert potential refugees to the presence of the rescue ships offshore. As a result, none appeared. According to the Geneva agreement, the movement of civilians between the North and South was scheduled to cease on 19 May 1955. At the last moment, on the morning of 18 May, all United States ships departed Indochinese waters. Captain Winn sailed for Sangley Point in the Philippines, where on the 20th the Passage to Freedom task force was disestablished.50 Since the preceding August, 74 United States Navy and 39 MSTS ships had evacuated 310,848 passengers from North Vietnam, all but 17,846 of them civilians. In addition, the United States Navy and MSTS saved 68,757 tons of cargo and 8,135 vehicles from the Viet Minh. The performance was particularly notable since most of this was accomplished on short notice over the initial three-month period. In combination with the effective ten-month operations of the French, about 800,000 people had been carried to freedom.5: 51 In addition to humanitarian considerations, the decision to transport refugees to South Vietnam had economic, political, and security implications. Many of the refugees were settled on fallow fields to grow rice for domestic consumption and export. Their presence, and the realization that they had left their homes for an uncertain future in their search for freedom from Communist dictatorship, represented a potential element of strength in the emerging state of Vietnam. 1955. COMPHIBGRU1, report, ser 055 of 15 June, encl. 1: ltr, Winn to Sabin, of 19 May "COMPHIBGRU1, report, ser 055 of 15 June 1955, encl. 1; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, pp. 153-54; SECNAV, "Semiannual Report," Jan.-June 1955 in U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan.-June 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 146; Lindholm, Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, pp. 49, 56, 60. The figures on the total number of refugees fleeing the North conflict. Bui Van Luong, General Director of the Refugee Committee of the Government of Vietnam, explains that the records of the refugees were destroyed by fire in 1955. He claims that the figure 888,503 is the most reliable. Viet Minh relocations from the South to the North consisted of 90,000 troops but only 40,000 non-active military, including dependents. U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, tab 1, pp. 16-17. The Changing Role Of As the United States Navy helped the French and the State of Vietnam carry out the resettlement provisions of the 20 July 1954 Vietnam agreement, Washington grappled with the more fundamental problem of the security of Southeast Asian states against external and internal threats. The Communists had gained control of China and northern Korea. Now they had been accorded the right to rule northern Vietnam down to the provisional demarkation line along the 17th parallel, halfway between the northern boundary earlier claimed by the Kingdom of Champa and the southern limits of China's zone of occupation after World War II. The future role of the French with regard to the security of South Vietnam was uncertain. Lacking the organization, support, and means of providing for its own defense, the survival of the South Vietnamese government was in doubt. Ho Chi Minh had characterized the Geneva Conference as "a great victory for our diplomacy," but he and his comrades had much to do before they would be in a position to launch a military offensive or until North Vietnam could act as an effective base for operations in the South. Giap would describe the months that followed as the time when "the north entered the socialist revolutionary phase." First of all, the Viet Minh would consolidate their rule over areas they already occupied and gain control of the "neutral zones" and those areas from which the French were withdrawing. Secondly, they would eliminate opposition and create "an independent and socialist state with a complete national administrative structure." 1 This would give South Vietnam some time, but it had a long way to go 1 Giap, Banner of People's War, p. 45. before it could become a nation. In the scattered villages and hamlets, and in the delta, lowlands, and mountains, the local populace had, in many cases, lived in relative isolation from other communities and the central government. Ethnic backgrounds, customs, and religions varied. Key areas in the South were largely controlled by three armed, semiautonomous groups, the so-called Sects. After the majority of the Viet Minh regular forces had been withdrawn to the North, the Communists no longer posed an immediate military threat within South Vietnam. However, they would, through their infrastructure, create and exploit dissension, take political actions, and exert coercion in opposition to Diem and his government. The Viet Minh units which had remained in the South provided nuclei for the formation of guerrilla and organized military units. The long-range danger was particularly great in three areas that had been centers of Viet Minh armed strength-the central highlands of Annam, the region along the Cambodian border west of Saigon, and the Camau Peninsula in the extreme south.2 The United States would adopt a twofold approach to the problems of military defense within Southeast Asia. Through collective actions, it would attempt to provide for regional security and strengthen the resolve of peoples within the area. Through, unilateral military aid, advice, and training, it would try to enhance the self-defense capabilities of individual states. The United States Navy would be involved in both approaches. One of the early American actions was to increase its aid to Thailand as the Geneva Convention drew to a close in July 1954.3 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Assessing the implication of Geneva on 20 August 1954, the National Security Council recommended negotiation of "a Southeast Asia security treaty with the UK [United Kingdom], Australia, New Zealand, France, the Philippines, Thailand and, as appropriate, other free South and Southeast Asian countries willing to participate. . . ." The council identified the following significant consequences which it felt would jeopardize the security interests of the United States in the Far East and increase Communist strength there: 2U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, pp. 8–9. U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, tab 1, p. Q. a. Regardless of the fate of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the Communists have secured possession of an advance salient in Vietnam from which military and non-military pressures can be mounted against adjacent and more remote non-Communist areas. b. The loss of prestige in Asia suffered by the U.S. as a backer of the French and the Bao Dai Government will raise further doubts in Asia concerning U.S. leadership and the ability of the U.S. to check the further expansion of Communism in Asia. Furthermore, U.S. prestige will inescapably be associated with subsequent developments in Southeast Asia. c. By adopting an appearance of moderation at Geneva and taking credit. for the cessation of hostilities in Indochina, the Communists will be in a better position to exploit their political strategy of imputing to the United States motives of extremism, belligerency, and opposition to co-existence seeking thereby to alienate the United States from its allies. The Communists thus have a basis for sharply accentuating their "peace propaganda" and "peace program" in Asia in an attempt to allay fears of Communist expansionist policy and to establish closer relations with the nations of free Asia. d. The Communists have increased their military and political prestige in Asia and their capacity for expanding Communist influence by exploiting political and economic weakness and instability in the countries of free Asia without resort to armed attack. e. The loss of Southeast Asia would imperil retention of Japan as a key element in the off-shore island chain.1 Discussions between the United States, France, Thailand, and the Philippines during the French-Viet Minh War had already laid much of the groundwork for a regional defense organization. The United States position was that its military actions would be confined to the application of sea and air power in support of the ground forces of other countries. Participation by both European and Asian nations would be a precondition to American military involvement." Representatives of Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Manila in September 1954. The conference adopted a Pacific Charter strongly affirming the right of self-determination and expressing the intent of the signatories to prevent, or counter by appropriate means, any attempt in the treaty area to subvert freedom or to destroy sovereignty or territorial integrity. Another result of the meeting was the drafting of a Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the basis for the subsequent Southeast Asia NSC, Policy Statement, 5429/2 of 20 Aug. 1954 in Ibid., bk 10, pp. 731-37. Treaty Organization (SEATO). Each party to the agreement recognized that: Aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. In case of threats by other than armed attacks, which one of the parties considered might endanger the peace of the area or threaten the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of those protected by the treaty, the parties would consult to reach agreement on the measures to be taken for the common defense." Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and chief Defense Department representative with the delegation at Manila, observed in his report that: The Manila Conference convened following communist military achievements in Indochina and political and psychological successes at Geneva. Against this background the effort of the Manila Conference to construct a collective defense arrangement for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific was directed in large measure to recovering from the psychological blow thus administered to the Free World. Much of what was said at the Conference bore witness to the preeminence of psychological objectives in the thinking of participating States. In a real sense, the Treaty that emerged at Manila is a response to the Geneva Agreements.7 SEATO, it was hoped, would strengthen the resolve of countries threatened, encourage a combined approach to threats of mutual concern, and help deter aggression. The Security of South Vietnam Ho made it clear from the outset that the struggle for control of all Vietnam would continue. Forecasting that "the peaceable and democratic "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty" and "Pacific Charter," of 8 Sept. 1954 in Department of State, United States Treaties and other International Agreements (Washington: GPO, 1956), Vol. VI, pt. 1, pp. 81–85, 91–92. |