Force, a River Force, a Transport Force, a Corps of Marines, and a naval command headquarters. The need for a navy to prevent Communist infiltration and resupply was recognized by General Le Van Ty, Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. He emphasized the requirement for coastal patrol and surveillance, stating: "If the Vietnamese Navy were well equipped, it would be able to closely supervise the southeast coast of Vietnam and also the area between HUE and BEN HAI.... The TRIM plan was approved by Ty on 7 December.

18

Force levels recommended by the plan were modest and confined to those judged to be reasonably attainable. As before, the numbers and types of ships and craft were limited by the number of personnel who could be adequately trained to man them. The plan assumed that the "Naval Schools at Nha Trang could under an accelerated program, turn out 300 trained recruits quarterly, 300 specialist ratings semi-annually, and 60 reserve ensigns every nine months." The need for such a program was acute. At the end of the year, Vietnamese Navy personnel strength stood at 1,735, an increase of only 219 over the 1 September 1954 figure.1

19

Although the French had passed command of the Naval Schools at Nha Trang to the Vietnamese on 7 November 1955, seven French naval officers and thirty-seven enlisted men stayed on as instructors. The training center now conducted a basic recruit school, petty officer schools, a specialist course, and a six-month officer training program. A special three-month accelerated officer course began on 8 November to satisfy the increased need for river operations. Three motor minesweepers at Nha Trang served as training ships. The center could now graduate 1,200 men a year, but the training was still far too slow to meet the demands of the Vietnamese Navy, and the courses were weak in maintenance, tactics, and supply procedures.20 Furthermore, the qualifications required to man, operate, and maintain seagoing ships were much more demanding than those for amphibious craft on inland waters.

In the fall of 1955 President Diem emphasized his independence by announcing that no more Vietnamese military personnel would be sent

18 Ltr, Ty to Naval Attache in NA Saigon. report, 79-55 of 17 Nov. 1955, JN 60A-2142, box 62, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Naval Forces of Vietnam," pp. 12-18.

19

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Country Statement," of 15 Jan. 1956; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Naval Forces of Vietnam," pp. 12-17.

20 Ibid.,

p. 10; NA Saigon, report, ser 7-57 of 22 Jan. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Country Statement,” of 15 Jan. 1956.

to France for training. By mid-1956, American advisors were offering courses in the English language to prepare twenty-two Vietnamese prior to their attendance at naval schools in the United States."

21

Continuing Operations against the Sects

Many in the Cao Dai military arm had by now joined forces with Diem, and the Binh Xuyen had surrendered. In October 1955, defecting Cao Dai generals disarmed their pope's palace guard. However, the civil war was not yet over.

Some elements of the Hoa Hao continued to resist the Republic of Vietnam. On 17 November, a joint Army-Navy campaign was launched against the Ba Cut faction, now in the area of Rach Gia on the Gulf of Siam. Two Vietnamese Navy dinassauts participated in the operation.2

22

Activities against the government also continued along the Mekong River, and took on a new dimension when the French reported that there were 100 Viet Minh advisors with the Hoa Hao. In December 1955, the Navy was assigned the mission of patrolling the Mekong River from the Cambodian border to the sea and the coastal waters from Cape Vung Tau to Ha Tien. The Vietnamese minesweeper Bach Dang started patrols between Saigon and Cape Bai Bung and LSSL No Than cruised between the cape and Rach Gia. Minesweeper Chi Lang was sent south from Danang to assist. Two other ships on temporary loan from the Vietnamese customs office were stationed at the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.23

In January 1956, South Vietnamese Army units occupied Tay Ninh, the Cao Dai stronghold. After their pope fled to Cambodia in February, the Cao Dai leaders signed an agreement with the government. Under its terms, the Cao Dai religion was legalized, but members of the sect were forbidden to engage in political activity.2

24

" Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Naval Forces of Vietnam;" Navy Section, MAAG, "Country Statement," of 20 July 1956.

22

Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, p. 412; NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 47 of 30 Nov. 1955, 50 of 17 Dec. 1955, and 16 of 20 Apr. 1956.

23 NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 49 of 11 Dec., 50 of 17 Dec., 51 of 23 Dec. 1955; NA Saigon, report, 14-56 of 7 Feb. 1956, JN 62-A-2199, box 80, FRC.

24

Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, p. 412; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, pp. GG, HH.

By the end of the month, the Vietnamese had opened a second front against the Hoa Hao in the Plain of Reeds region, a stronghold of the Soai faction along the Cambodian border. Four dinassauts operated on the Mekong and waterways southwest of Saigon. When the Soai faction rallied to the government on 12 February, the dinassauts redeployed and then proceeded to the Rach Gia area to press the illusive Ba Cut in operation Nguyen Hue. Ba Cut was finally trapped and captured in April 1956 and the Hoa Hao resistance collapsed.25

At the height of the campaign against the Hoa Hao, General Ty praised the role of the Vietnamese Navy, saying:

The most remarkable feats... are no doubt those realized during the operations against the rebels. South Vietnam is a country watered by numerous rivers and streams, thus forming isolated regions. This is why during operations Dinh Tien Hoang [against the Hoa Hao], Hoang Dieu [against the Binh Xuyen], and Nguyen Hue, the... [Vietnamese Navy units] have played a preponderant and decisive role for the success of the Army. The daring assaults of the marines have increased the value of the Vietnamese Navy.26

Successes in the Sect Civil War released an increasing percentage of the republic's armed forces for participation in the efforts to reduce Communist strength and influence. Evidence of Diem's resoluteness, progress in the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, and the extension of governmental controls produced highly favorable results in the State of Vietnam. That spring a government official claimed that "94,041 former communist cadres had rallied to the... [South Vietnamese government], 5,613 other cadres had surrendered . . . 119,954 weapons had been captured . . . and 707 underground arms caches had been discovered." The claim may have been exaggerated and the declaration that the campaign had "entirely destroyed the predominant communist influence of the previous nine years" was certainly an overstatement, but there could be no doubt that substantial progress had been realized. By 1956, according to the authors of the Department of Defense study, United States-Vietnam Relations, "Diem's success in the South had been far greater than anyone could have fore

"NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 49 of 11 Dec., 50 of 17 Dec. 1955, 4 of 27 Jan., 7 of 17 Feb., and 9 of 3 Mar. 1956; Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, p. 413; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, p. JJ.

*NA Saigon, report, 14-56 of 7 Feb. 1956, JN 62-A-2199, box 80, FRC.

seen...." The North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duan confirmed Diem's progress when, after visiting the South in 1955 and 1956, he concluded that, unless the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reinforced the supporters in the South, the Communist movement there would be stamped

out.

27

Military Assistance Problems

Training was but one of many obstacles to be overcome in the development of a navy adequate to South Vietnam's needs for self-defense against the Communist threat. Strong French feelings against My made it difficult for TRIM to assist the Vietnamese Navy in overcoming its general lack of experience and leadership-no officers over thirty years of age were in the Navy. Although Captain Rechér no longer headed the Vietnamese Navy, he remained Chief of the Navy Division of TRIM. Another factor reducing the effectiveness of TRIM's assistance efforts was the virtually constant commitment of the bulk of Vietnamese Navy and Marine forces to pacification operations.

Further development of the Vietnamese Navy was impeded also by its subordinate status within the Vietnamese Armed Forces General Staff. Although the Navy commander was a Deputy Chief of Staff, his rank was only that of lieutenant commander, junior even to the lieutenant colonel who headed the Marines, a part of the naval establishment. Other members of the general staff were, except for the Air Force deputy, from the Army. Under the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, the Navy and Air Force were at the level of the Army Quartermaster and Chief of Engineers. The Navy had no control over its funds. With the Army managing common-type supplies, the Navy encountered difficulties in competing with the extensive demands of the far larger ground forces."

28

A continuing problem during this transitional period was that of providing urgently needed aid in a timely fashion. As in the French-Viet Minh War, administrative delays were encountered. In the assessment of the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, "of course one

"U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, pp. EE, pt. IVA.5, pp. 6, 28, tab 2, pp. 27-28, 50. 28 NA Saigon, report, 5-56 of 16 Jan. 1956, JN 62A-2199, box 80, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Naval Forces of Vietnam," p. 11.

difficulty in the MDAP field is that there are many interested parties with consequent diffusion of responsibility and complexity of administration.” His views were shared by other Americans, and the troubles were not confined to Vietnam. Subsequently, an official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would announce to Congress that the administrative lead-time for the aid program had been reduced from six to three months between 1956 and 1957. But a three-month administrative lag in addition to the time required to obtain the items and deliver them to Southeast Asia was still undesirably long for actions in response to rapidly changing situations.29

Two years later, in the light of growing criticism concerning administration of the Military Assistance Program, President Eisenhower would appoint a committee to study this effort and help in its justification to the Congress. The committee, chaired by William H. Draper, Jr., submitted its preliminary conclusions on 17 March 1959. While strongly supporting the program, the committee acknowledged that many criticisms had been made by the public, by the Congress, and by persons within the Executive Branch. It reported evidence of "long delays from the initiation of proposals to the development of a firm program and of an excessive number of reviews and over-coordination during the programming process." Among various other shortcomings, the committee cited "faulty or uneconomic programming" and criticized deficiencies in the promptness and effectiveness of policy coordination.30 Actions were then taken to improve the situation. Having been largely dependent on the French for logistic support, the Vietnamese Armed Forces needed additional training and assistance before they could be self-sufficient. United States help to them would be limited by the number of American military personnel permitted in-country. Although not a party to the Geneva accord, Washington continued the self-imposed 342-man ceiling which was consistent with the cease-fire agreement's prohibition of "the introduction into Viet Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel..

31

Admiral Stump had recommended, with the concurrence of Admiral Burke, that additional manpower be authorized to fill TRIM spaces vacated

"Ltr, CNO to OP-63, ser 0101P60 of 6 Apr. 1956; U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Security Appropriations for 1958 (85th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 357.

30

'The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, "Composite Report" of 17 Aug. 1959, Vols. I, VII, pp. 3–15.

31

Article 16 of "Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam" in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents (Washington: GPO, 1957), Vol. I, p. 757.