for overhaul and repair of Vietnamese Navy ships at the shipyard. The inordinately high estimated costs provided by the French resulted in a decision to send Vietnamese ships to the United States Ship Repair Facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines, where the first of fifteen scheduled overhauls began in June. After their overhaul period, many of the ships conducted three weeks of underway training with the Fleet Training Group, Subic.43

Incidents in the South China Sea

In 1956, the possibility of aggression by the People's Republic of China against the Paracel and Spratly Island groups drew the attention of the new South Vietnamese Navy and at the same time became a matter of concern to the United States and other members of SEATO. Although their land areas were small, both island groups lay along the important northsouth shipping lanes through the South China Sea. The Paracels, some 200 miles east of Danang and southeast of Hainan, also lay astride air and sea routes between Luzon and the northern part of South Vietnam. The Spratlys were located midway between Vietnam and Borneo. As a prelude to their offensives in Southeast Asia, the Japanese had occupied both groups of islands in 1939.

At various times since August 1955, United States intelligence sources had received indications of a Chinese Communist presence on Woody Island in the Paracels. In the spring of 1956, information had been received that 200 Communist Chinese were occupying eleven new or rehabilitated buildings on the island. On 9 June, a French-Vietnamese meteorological team on Pattle Island reported 200 Chinese Communist troops landing on nearby Robert Island. The Vietnamese responded by dispatching a PC, an LSM, and two LSILS to the Paracels. A territorial company was landed there early in July. Part of the company joined the forces already on Pattle and the rest occupied the now deserted Robert Island. The Vietnamese Navy continued to support garrisons in the Paracels throughout the decade of the 1950s."4

3 Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Summary," of 31 Dec. 1957; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Monthly Activities Report," of 10 Mar. 1956; Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Quarterly Activities Report," No. 4 of 7 Mar. 1957.

44

'Memo, OP-61 to OP-06, of 27 Feb. 1956; "Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Part I," The ONI Review (May 1956), pp. 186-91; NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 23 of 9 June and 27 of 7 July 1956.

Meanwhile, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, had directed Admiral Stump to reconnoiter the islands and be prepared to support the thirty-man Vietnamese garrison on Pattle Island, in case such action was directed. On 11 June, carrier Yorktown (CV-10) and attack cargo ship Merrick (AKA-97) were alerted for possible action, and destroyers Stoddard (DD-566) and Mullany (DD-528) were dispatched for an on-site inspection. Reconnaissance by Task Force 72's air unit stationed at Sangley Point revealed about seventy-five men gathering guano. Stoddard and Mullany arrived at Robert Island on the 13th and found no evidence of military activity.*

45

Shortly thereafter an incident in the Spratly area (over which sovereignty was claimed by Communist China, Nationalist China, Vietnam, and the Philippines) focused attention on that group of islands. To challenge the Philippine claim, a platoon of Nationalist Chinese marines, transported in two destroyer escorts, scouted the islands in June 1956. On 22 August, Vietnam's PC Tuy Dong stopped at Spratly Island enroute to Saigon after an overhaul at Subic. The Vietnamese hauled down a Chinese Nationalist flag and substituted their own, thus affecting the symbolic occupation of the Spratly group."

46

Although the Spratly and Paracel Islands were deemed of little direct strategic importance to the United States, they had been of value to the Japanese in World War II and could serve another power in the future as weather, radar, radio, and observation sites, or possibly as advanced fuel and ammunition depots. Although possible actions by the United States were discussed, Washington preferred not to become involved."

In the fall of 1956, one Vietnamese YMS and one LSSL patrolled out of Danang to stop Communist craft. Later that year the Vietnamese employed the Navy to establish positions on strategically located islands in the south. Under the command of Le Quang My, 7 ships (2 PCs, 2 LSMs, 2 LSILS, and 1 LSSL) departed Cape Vung Tau on 6 November 1956.

45 Ltr, OP-61 to CNO, ser 00248P61 of 11 June; memos, DCNO (Fleet Operations and Readiness) to CNO, No. 0464-56 of 11 June, OP-61 to CNO, ser 000120P61 of 12 June, and OP-61 to CNO, ser 000122P61 of 13 June 1956.

48

NA, Saigon, report, 11-57 of 24 Jan. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC; memo, OP-61 to SECNAV, ser 00237P61 of 5 June 1956; "Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Part II," The ONI Review (June 1956), pp. 238-42; NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 34 of 24 Aug. 1956.

47 Memo, OP-60 to CNO, No. 241-56 of 3 Aug. 1956; ltr, OP-61 to OP-06, ser 00140P61 of 12 Mar. 1957.

For training purposes and in order to reassert Vietnamese sovereignty, the force then conducted amphibious landings on Son Island, east of the Camau Peninsula; on Khoai Island, south of the cape; and on Phu Quoc Island, Panjang Island, Wai Island, and Tang Island in the Gulf of Siam. In the 1960s, several of these islands would serve as U.S. bases in the effort to prevent the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. An Thoi, off the Cambodian border and on the southern tip of Phu Quoc Island, later also would serve as a base of operations for United States Navy ships and craft.18

United States Naval Assistance

The Saigon government requested United States Navy and Air Force participation in a first anniversary celebration of Vietnamese independence on 26 October 1956. Initially, the Saigon embassy and the Deputy Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs treated the proposal coolly. However, General Samuel Williams, Chief MAAG Vietnam, and Admiral Stump, CINCPAC, heartily endorsed the idea. With the backing of Admiral Radford, Chairman of the JCS, and Admiral Burke, the State Department was persuaded to accept the Vietnamese request insofar as the Navy was concerned. Because of possible operating difficulties and the likelihood of International Control Commission objections to use of Vietnamese airfields by American military aircraft, a fly-over by Navy planes from carrier Essex was substituted for Air Force participation."

On 24 October, the cruiser Los Angeles (CA-135) (Captain Frederick C. Lucas, Jr.), with Commander Cruiser Division 5, Rear Admiral George C. Wright, embarked, steamed up the Saigon River to the Vietnamese capital for a four-day visit. The fledgling Vietnamese Navy had assumed French responsibility for making all the arrangements for the visit. As the first visit by an American man-of-war to the new Republic of Vietnam, the occasion provided evidence of United States armed strength and demonstrated United States interest in South Vietnam and its future. But the American Naval Attache, concerned over giving the impression that the

48

NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 45 of 10 Nov. and 49 of 8 Dec. 1956. "Ltrs, OP-61 to CNO, of 15 Aug. and 8 Sept. 1956.

United States was moving in to replace the French, recommended that future visits not be made too frequently."

50

Another form of American assistance was the continuing use of the naval shipyard in Subic to overhaul Vietnamese ships. At the same time, efforts were made to increase the capabilities of the shipyard in Saigon which, on 14 September 1956, was transferred from French control to the Vietnamese. Although the facility was the largest industrial plant in South Vietnam and capable of handling ships the size of light cruisers, the depar

50

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Country Statement," of 22 Jan. 1958; USS Los Angeles, report, ser 1734 of 9 Nov. 1956; NA Saigon, report, 105-56 of 19 Dec. 1956, JN 62A-2199, box 81, FRC.

ture of the French had left the installation with few trained and experienced supervisors. Several weeks before the turnover, an American team from Subic surveyed the yard to determine the size of the work force which the Vietnamese would need to run the yard. Taking into account differences in physique and in skill levels, the team determined that the yard would require about 1,350 civilians. Steps were taken to build a core of trained managers for the yard and to recruit a competent work force. At the end of 1956, fifty-two Vietnamese commissioned officers, petty officers, and civilians began training at the Subic Bay Ship Repair Facility. Nineteen highly skilled Japanese shipyard specialists were recruited to assist the Vietnamese. By the end of the next year, 800 civilians would be working at the yard in Saigon, but the Vietnamese experienced difficulty in increasing the complement to the 1,500-man level then deemed desirable. The low wage scales set by the Vietnamese Army officers in control discouraged many, and other potential workers were ruled out for security reasons."

A National Navy

51

From the point of view of the Vietnamese Naval Staff, 1956 had been a momentous year. The extent of its pride in the transition that had taken place was reflected in a report that stated, "from the beginning of the year 1956 when the Vietnamese Navy liberated itself from the influence and authority of the French Navy, the whole Naval Force has completely changed in every respect." In regard to combat, the Vietnamese Navy claimed to have "participated in all operations. With a year-end strength of 4,807 men (3,371 Navy, 1,436 Marines), the Navy now was composed of the River Force, the Sea Force, and the Marine Force. The number of craft in the River Force had increased by 50 percent. Their dinassauts now numbered six-with units based at My Tho, Cat Lo, Vinh Long, Cat Lai, Can Tho, and Long Xuyen.

Great pride was derived from the Sea Force, particularly because it symbolized South Vietnam's status as a nation. In the Vietnamese Navy headquarters' view, "the year 1956 is the very year when the Vietnamese

NA Saigon, report, ser 167–57 of 19 Dec. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC; Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Summary," of 31 Dec. 1957; Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Quarterly Activities Report," of 7 Mar. 1957; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Monthly Activities Report," of 10 Mar. 1956; ltr, CNO to ASD (ISA), ser 0261P60 of 27 Aug. 1957.