Navy became officially a member of the Navy family of the World and introduced itself to friendly nations by visits made during the month of April to these nations." Noting the extent of the coastal waters and river network, the Vietnamese Navy command identified deficiencies. They highlighted the lack of repair personnel, weakness in technical matters of rapidly trained river force personnel, the need to send commissioned and noncommissioned officers to technical courses in foreign countries, and insufficient overall naval strength. They concluded that, "the present defense activities must be more active and permanent," and that this could only be obtained "when equipment and strength become more complete."

Their aspirations were high. Once the Vietnamese Navy was well equipped and carefully trained, its leaders hoped to be able to perform the following offensive actions:

1. blockade the enemy naval territory

2. make landings to occupy enemy territory

3. conduct operations for the destruction of enemy positions 4. destroy the enemy naval forces

These ambitions were beyond the Vietnamese missions as then envisaged by the United States.52

Nevertheless, during 1957 the Vietnamese Navy continued to make valuable contributions to the new nation. In February, twenty Vietnamese sailors from Danang established a base at Dong Ha, near the 17th parallel, from which 6 utility boats conducted inshore patrols along the northern border. Also in February, 1 LSIL, 2 LCMs, and 4 LCUS repatriated 2,400 Vietnamese recently expelled from Cambodia. During the last week in April, 4 LSMs and 3 LSILS transported 1,500 Vietnamese from Danang to Cat Lai on the Dong Nai River near Saigon for future resettlement in Phuoc Long Province next to the Cambodian border. 53

Between 29 May and 5 June 1957, a Vietnamese LSSL and three LSILS conducted tactical maneuvers and gunnery exercises in the Gulf of Siam. A second purpose of the operation was to investigate alleged Cambodian seizures of Vietnamese fishing boats in the gulf. In the months that followed, the Vietnamese Navy continued to operate and support Army garrisons

52

62 NA Saigon, reports, 48-56 of 15 May, 49-56 of 16 May 1956, JN 62A-2199. box 80, FRC, and 11–57 of 24 Jan. and 126-57 of 11 Sept. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC. 63 NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 6 of 9 Feb., 7 of 16 Feb., 17 of 26 Apr. 1957.

in the area. That summer the Navy transported a marine battalion from Nha Trang to Phu Quoc for a two-month occupation of the island."

As evidence of continuing American support of the small Vietnamese Navy, Rear Admiral Paul D. Stroop, Commander of the Taiwan Patrol Force, paid a four-day visit to Nha Trang during July in his flagship, seaplane tender Pine Island (Captain William L. Dawson). A luncheon held at the Vietnamese Naval Training Center and hosted by Lieutenant Commander Chung Tan Cang, who would later serve as head of the Vietnamese Navy in the 1963-1965 period, highlighted the visit. In December, an American team of one officer and six petty officers began assisting in the instruction of Vietnamese officers at the training center."

55

One of the concerns earlier that year had been the proposed diversion of the Saigon shipyard's limited capabilities into non-naval work, as when the Vietnamese discussed plans to use the facility's machine shops for the production of 60,000 bayonets and scabbards for the Vietanmese Army. The American naval advisors warned that the capacity of the yard was limited and that such projects might interfere with the yard's primary mission of support for the Navy. If the proposed projects resulted in the yard passing to civilian control, then it would lose United States military assistance support. The plans were abandoned and the shipyard commenced its first ship overhaul in August 1957.56

The Threat of North Vietnam

As Diem struggled with the problems of establishing a South Vietnamese nation and providing for its security, Ho had been facing the problems of consolidating his rule over North Vietnam. By August 1956, the situation had deteriorated to the point that Ho admitted errors and promised to redress incorrect classifications and misjudgments by Land Reform Committees. In a public statement at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party Central Committee in October, Giap listed past excesses in the handling of minority problems and in the collectivization program. He said:

"NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 23 of 8 June, 32 of 9 Aug., and 42 of 18 Oct. 1957. NA Saigon, report, 126-57 of 11 Sept. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC; USS Pine Island, report, ser 767 of 6 Aug. 1957.

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Country Statement," of 22 Jan. 1958; NA Saigon, reports, 57-57 of 9 Apr. 1957, 14-57 of 12 Feb. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Quarterly Activities Report," of 10 Sept. 1957.

In regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners. . . . When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the party, executions, dissolution of party branches and cells. Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization.57

Despite these statements and changes in top leadership, violence broke out in Nghe An Province the next month. On 9 November 1956, several hundred peasants gathered near Vinh to petition the International Control Commission to sanction migration to the South and to bring about a return of land that had been confiscated. A Communist propaganda team and armed forces were sent to the scene of the disturbance. Efforts to make arrests produced a riot which grew to the proportions of an uprising. On 13 November, troops stormed the town, dispersing the rebels and causing heavy casualties. Two reinforced divisions of 20,000 men were committed to suppress the rebellion.

Early in 1957 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, again following the Maoist example, invited criticism by sponsoring a "Hundred Flowers" campaign. The party leaders expressed surprise over the strength of the response. Critics were identified, arrested, and tried and much blood was spilt. The exact number of persons killed is unknown, but estimates range up to 500,000. Whatever the precise count, it was a costly period in terms of human lives. In any case, the various steps taken after the Geneva agreement tightened Communist control over the North, strengthened the Communist leadership in the army, and accelerated the "advance to socialism."58 With the blunting of opposition and the consolidation of power, North Vietnam would now be able to provide increased support to Communist efforts in the South.

07

Quoted in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, p. 7, tab 3, pp. 11-12; Ho, On Revolution, pp. 304-06.

U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, p. 7, tab 3, p. 13; Human Cost of Communism, p. 7.

A Transitional Period

Since 1953 the Vietnam conflict had gone from war through a time of consolidation of Communist control in the North, the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam in the South, and the phasing out of the French to a period of increasing violence. The period had been transitional also in other respects. Initially Cold War tensions eased after Stalin's death but, as a new regime resolved its problems within the Soviet Union, a more aggressive policy was resumed on the international scene. The Far East continued to be a troubled area in which the United States Navy was frequently required to respond to crisis situations, many of which involved the People's Republic of China. Meanwhile, technological achievements altered the capabilities of the United States Navy and the roles of its Fleet. The period also witnessed changes in strategic policy, the chain of command of the operating forces, and the administration of the national defense.

The Employment of United States Naval Forces

Vietnam had been brought to the forefront of United States attention by events during the final phase of the French-Viet Minh War and by Communist gains at the Geneva bargaining table. In the long term, Vietnam— at least insofar as the United States Navy and its operations were concerned

-was but one feature of a much larger picture. Many of the problems of stability, self-determination, and security for the emerging Republic of Vietnam were intertwined with the overall security problems of Southeast Asia. These in turn were related to those of the Far East as a whole and, with regard to both the international Communist movement and the employment of naval operating forces, the instabilities, threats, and crises of the Western Pacific were linked to similar events elsewhere, such as in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Moreover, the influence of a naval presence in one area was bolstered by evidence of the willingness to act and effectiveness demonstrated in other areas.

After the Geneva accords the United States continued to maintain a Navy presence in Southeast Asian waters. Vice Admiral Phillips remained in command of the "Fair Weather Training" force until 21 August 1954 when operational control of Task Group 70.2 was transferred to Vice Admiral Pride (Commander Seventh Fleet). Phillips then returned to his First Fleet command in the Eastern Pacific.

Signs soon appeared of a potential crisis resulting from a Chinese Communist threat against the Tachens, a group of Nationalist-held islands off the mainland about 200 miles from the northern tip of Taiwan. Seventh Fleet destroyers visited the Tachens on 19 August and other major units of the Fleet were assembled nearby. Further south, the People's Republic of China tested Quemoy Island on 26 August with a small raid. This was followed by a heavy bombardment from the mainland on 3 September. Seventh Fleet units, including Task Group 70.2, were sent to the Taiwan area, where they remained until the crisis eased. The shelling continued sporadically during the months that followed, as the Chinese Communists increased their military forces on the mainland opposite the Taiwan Strait. Seventh Fleet task forces were sent to the area at critical periods, in readiness for action if required and to help deter offensive actions by the Chinese Communists.1

Shortly after midnight on 14 November 1954 the Chinese Nationalist destroyer escort T'ai P'ing was patrolling north-east of the Tachen Islands when two suspicious contacts appeared on the radar. Minutes after general quarters sounded, a torpedo from either a motor torpedo boat or a submarine slammed into the port side of the ship. Meanwhile, the ship opened fire on the attackers with 3-inch and 40-millimeter guns. The engagement was over in five minutes. Crippled T'ai P'ing radioed for held and by 0530 destroyer escort T'ai Ho had T'ai P'ing under tow. Less than two hours later the forward bulkhead, severely damaged by the torpedo, collapsed and the ship rolled over and sank. Washington considered, but rejected, a show of force in response to this incident."

Starting on 10 January 1955, the Chinese Communists started a heavy aerial bombing of the Tachens. Not only did the Chinese Nationalist Air Force lack the capabilities of providing continuous air cover at that distance

1A discussion of this crisis from the deterrence point of view is in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, pp. 266–94. 'NA Taipei, report, 158-54 of 1 Dec. 1954, JN 59A-2184, box 16, FRC.