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programs and budgets after time-lags which had become longer as a result of the echelons added to the review processes.

As the Soviet Union built up its nuclear stockpile and delivery capabilities, continental defense increasingly became a claimant for limited peacetime funds. The Soviets tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and launched satellites into orbit around the earth. By 1956, a condition was reached which some described as a "balance of terror." Hints of continuance of a policy of "massive retaliation" continued, as evidenced by the President's statement in January 1958 that "the most powerful deterrent to war in the world today lies in the retaliatory power of our Strategic Air Command and the aircraft of our Navy." In the same address, he stressed the threat of Communist imperialism, observing that "the Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war."

Such statements were, however, accompanied by evidence of increased recognition of the need for conventional forces to cope with limited warfare situations. One sign of a shifting policy toward a more balanced strategy was the President's highlighting of the need to maintain freedom of the seas. In January 1960 Eisenhower would identify conventional forces required to meet "situations of less than general nuclear war." Among these forces were Navy carriers and the Marine Corps. An eventful period lay ahead for these conventional forces.

34

The Struggles for Power Continue

The year of 1959 started with Fidel Castro's overthrow of Fulgencio Batista; Cuba soon would be under the rule of the Communists. During the Twenty-First Party Congress of the Soviet Union, which convened in Moscow on 27 January 1959 with seventy foreign Communist parties represented, Khrushchev highlighted the "national liberation" struggles in Asia, Africa, and South America, with lesser attention focused on Europe. In March, the Chinese employed military force to crush Tibet. Thomas Gates, now Secretary of Defense, assessed the overall situation in the Far East later that year, when he observed: "During Fiscal Year 1959, Communist China stepped up the pace of its offensive against the independent

"Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," 9 Jan. 1958 in Dwight D. Eisenhower, pp. 3-4.

"35

nations along its frontiers, again resorting to overt military action while continuing its policy of constant political and economic pressure." Communist struggles for power were continuing.

SECDEF, Annual Report, FY 1959, p. 90; Leonhard, Kremlin Since Stalin, p. 331.

The Stage Is Set, 1957-1959

In June 1957, the United States MAAG had reported a "slight but notable increase" in Communist violence within the Republic of Vietnam. Aggressive acts were particularly evident along the Mekong and its interconnecting Bassac River, which flowed from the Cambodian border to the sea. Chau Doc (Chau Phu), was the scene of a mass murder of seventeen citizens in July. In September a district chief and his family were gunned down in My Tho. In November 1957, Chau Doc, Sa Dec, Long Xuyen, Vinh Long, Can Tho, My Tho, and Truc Giang were scenes of killings, other acts of violence, and kidnappings of civilian officials, civil guardsmen, security agents, and others. December witnessed more spectacular assassinations. Then, major incidents occurred in An Giang and Phong Dinh Provinces downriver from Chau Doc Province, and at the village of Thanh My Tay (near Chau Doc). Attacks on shipping and against foreign nationals were reported.'

Vietnamese military operations against guerrilla units in these and other areas were largely dependent on supplies transported by water. The Danang area alone required 2,000 tons of military supplies a month. Although much of the cargo was shipped in merchant marine bottoms, the Vietnamese Navy now employed four LSMs, a small tanker (YOG), a small cargo ship (AKL), and LCUs to transport cargo along the coast.2

2

3

Despite the acts of violence, Diem continued to make remarkable progress in building a nation within South Vietnam. As assessed by one student of the period, "Diem alone carried Vietnam into statehood." Communist sources confirmed the effectiveness of the campaign against their infrastructure. One South Vietnamese Communist observed that "from 1957 to 1960 the cadres who had remained in the South had almost all been arrested." Another stated that "the period from the Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was

1U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, tab 1, p. 30, tab 2, p. 56; NA Saigon, report, ser 2-S-58 of 10 Jan. 1958, JN 63A-2336, box 53, FRC.

'Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Country Statement," of 22 Jan. 1958. 'Shaplen, "Cult of Diem."

the darkest time for the VC [Viet Cong] in South Vietnam," and that "the political agitation policy proposed by the Communist Party could not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by RVN [Republic of Vietnam] authorities." Referring to the 1957-1958 period, a captured Viet Cong history stated:

At this time, the political struggle movement of the masses, although not defeated, was encountering increasing difficulty and increasing weakness; the Party bases, although not completely destroyed, were significantly weakened, and in some areas, quite seriously; the prestige of the masses and of the revolution suffered.*

As Diem reacted to assassinations and other Communist activities, criticism began to mount against the priority he assigned to security, rather than to land reform and "rural revolution." In some cases, the criticism was Communist inspired, but negative comment also emanated from those who felt that the resolution to South Vietnam's problems lay primarily in peaceful reforms in the countryside rather than the use of force."

By 1958 the Communists were in firm control of North Vietnam. Bolstered by the moral and material support of other "socialist" countries, the North Vietnamese were able to devote an increasing amount of their effort toward the longer-range goal of extending Communist control to South Vietnam. The aid they were receiving was substantial. According to a Communist source, "the socialist countries" through 1959 provided approximately two billion rubles worth of uncompensated aid and long-term credits to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Of this amount, 400 million rubles in uncompensated aid was given by the U.S.S.R. Also, for the period 1955-1958, 4,755 technical experts from "socialist countries" visited North Vietnam, 1,083 of whom were from the Soviet Union and 3,245 from the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union by now had resolved the internal struggle which had been triggered by Stalin's death. When a Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries convened in November 1957, Ho and Le Duan went to Moscow. In the final declaration, concurred in by all

*Quoted in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, tab 2, pp. 51, 52, 54. Ibid., pp. 24-26.

Bui Kong Chyng, "Pomoshch'stran sotsialisticheskogo lageria v vosstanovlenii i razvitii narodnogo khoziastra DRV," in Demokraticheskara Respublika V'etnam, 1945-1960, ed. A. A. Guber and Nguyen-khan'-Toan (Moscow: Publishing House of Eastern Literature, 1960).

...

the participants except Yugoslavia, note was made of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an independent state, the intensification of struggle in colonial and dependent countries for "national liberation," the war in Indochina, the SEATO "aggressive bloc," "the possibility of nonpeaceful transition to socialism," the fostering of "solidarity between the Communist and Workers' parties of all countries . . . [as] the main guarantee of . . . victory," their "responsibility with regard to the destinies of the world Socialist system and the International Communist movement," and "the joint struggle for the common goals. . . ." After his return to Hanoi, Le Duan issued a statement in which he said that the North Vietnamese viewed the Moscow declaration as a signal from Peking and Moscow to pursue their objectives in the South by force.'

The Vietnamese Navy

Under these threatening circumstances, the task of strengthening the South Vietnamese Navy was becoming more urgent. The first group of Vietnamese had returned from the United States and its members were serving as instructors at the Vietnamese naval schools. Saigon MAAG officers concluded that, "judging by the performance of US trained Vietnamese Navy instructors, the US school training program has proved very effective." Further progress in the training within Vietnam was made possible by increases in the number of American naval officers and enlisted men assigned there. However, the total number of naval personnel, including Marines, assigned to MAAG and the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission was still only seventy-eight, a marginal number considering the future problems anticipated. By the spring of 1958, the Saigon shipyard had gained the capabilities needed to take over the entire overhaul program for the Vietnamese Navy, in addition to providing routine upkeep for small craft and dry-docking services for merchant ships. Subic completed the last scheduled overhaul of a Vietnamese ship in April 1958.8

7

"Declaration of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries," Current History, XXXIV (Jan. 1958), pp. 42-47; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, p. 28.

8

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Country Statement," of 22 Jan. 1958; NA Saigon, reports, 14-57 of 12 Feb. and 57-57 of 9 Apr. 1957, JN 62A-2681, box 69, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Quarterly Activities Report," of 10 Sept. 1957; Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Summary," of 31 Dec. 1957.

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