Two factions competed for leadership of the Vietnamese Navy; one was led by the head of the Navy, Captain My, and the other by his rival Lieutenant Commander Ho Tan Quyen, who had political backing in the Defense Ministry and the Vietnamese Army's General Staff. One of the criticisms leveled against My was his advocacy of a "much bigger Navy than the U.S. or his own government considered necessary or would support." In November 1957, My was ordered to report for training at the Navy's Post Graduate School at Monterey, California.

9

Prior to My's departure, the MAAG helped Quyen draft a new plan for the organization of the Vietnamese Navy, which Diem approved on 1 July 1958. As reported by the Navy Section of the U.S. MAAG:

The new organization formalized for the first time a written organization for the VN Navy approved by the President and established missions and command channels. The Naval Deputy now has under his direct, exclusive command a prescribed Naval Staff, shore facilities command (Naval Stations and Schools Command), and three operating commands; viz, Sea Forces, River Forces, and Marine Corps. It places part of the Supply Depot functions under Navy control but leaves all other logistics functions, including the shipyard, under the Director of the Naval Technical Service, who in turn reports to the General Staff on logistical matters and to the Director of Administration, Budgeting and Accounting on finance matters.

The Navy Section viewed the reorganization as "a step in the right direction," but stated, "it is impossible to evaluate all the ramifications of the change at this early date."

>>10

American naval officers who visited Saigon early in 1959 left with favorable opinions of the condition of the small South Vietnamese Navy, which then had a strength of about 3,600 men. Admiral Hopwood reported in March 1959 that, on a recent trip through Southeast Asia, he was "favorably impressed with the Vietnam Navy, its ships, craft and facilities." His Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Captain Rufus L. Taylor, had previously concluded, after a four-day visit to Saigon, "that the Vietnamese are really trying to achieve an effective naval force." These assessments were more favorable than those of the Naval Attache's office, which con

NA Saigon, reports, ser 14-58 of 18 Jan., 25-S-58 of 6 May, and 27-S-58 of 9 May 1958, JN 63A-2336, box 54, FRC.

10

1o NA Saigon, reports, 25–S–58 of 6 May and 27-S-58 of 9 May 1958, JN 63A-2336, box 54, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Narrative Study," of 24 Aug. 1958.

sidered most of the Vietnamese ships to be in an unsatisfactory overall condition "by U.S. standards." "1

Preliminaries to a New Phase

The period of low-level conflict between the Communists, following the 1954 Geneva Agreement, was drawing to a close. Although the implementing order would not be issued until four months later, North Vietnam's decision to resume the armed struggle apparently. was made at the Fifteenth Central Committee Conference in January 1959.12

Early in 1959, Hanoi ordered the preparation of guerrilla bases in South Vietnam. By sea and by land the Viet Cong in the south were receiving increased military supplies from North Vietnam. When Admiral Felt, now Commander in Chief, Pacific, visited Saigon in February 1959, Diem informed him of infiltration from Laos and Cambodia and of his protest to the International Control Commission over Viet Minh incursions into the demilitarized zone.

From January 1957 to July 1959, the Republic of Vietnam reported 174 assassinations to the commission. In May 1959, the Fifteenth Plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee in North Vietnam "called for a strong North Vietnam as a base for helping the South Vietnamese to overthrow Diem and eject the United States." On 13 May, one day after the conference communique. an editorial in Nhan Dan stated:

Our compatriots in the south will struggle resolutely and persistently against the cruel U.S.-Diem regime, holding aloft the traditions of the (1941) South Vietnam uprising, the (1945) Ba To uprising, and the August (1945) general uprising . . . and other valuable traditions of the workers' movement and of countless legal and semilegal struggles. . . . Our people are determined to struggle with their traditional heroism and by all necessary forms and measures so as to achieve the goal of the revolution.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam began to commit its armed forces

"Ltrs, CINCPACFLT to CNO, ser 2/00226 of 17 Mar. 1959 and CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, ser 61/00257 of 26 Mar. 1959. For the views of the Naval Attache, see NA Saigon, report, 87-59 of 16 Apr. 1959, JN 63A-2990, box 46, FRC.

12 King C. Chen, "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War," Political Science Quarterly, (Summer 1975), p. 246.

to the conflict in Laos the following month. Guerrilla actions in South Vietnam soon would approach a state of insurgency."

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Increased aid would be required by the Republic of Vietnam to counter the mounting Communist offensive, and the primary source of that aid would be the United States. The Vietnam conflict had undergone many changes since World War II. Step-by-step the United States had progressed from a period of non-involvement in the military aspects of the conflict, through a stage in which the Navy and other military services were indirectly or remotely involved, to the point where primary responsibility had been assumed by America for assisting South Vietnam in its defensive efforts.

The Prolonged Conflict

By 1959, the Vietnam conflict was completing its fourteenth year. The time was nearing when United States military forces would become more directly involved in the struggle. In many respects the experiences of the French and Vietnamese naval forces foreshadowed roles the United States Navy later would be required to fulfill.

The conflict had emerged at the end of World War II during the transitional period from hostilities to peace in the Far East, where the situation differed basically from that in Europe. At the time the Germans surrendered, the Allied armies occupied Germany and possessed the position and strength to force their enemy's disarmament and to carry out the duties of occupation. In the Pacific, when the war ended with unanticipated suddenness American forces were preparing for an assault on the Japanese home islands. The immediate military concerns of the United States involved projecting occupational forces by sea into Japan, where opposition was still possible, supporting the occupation, aiding the Chinese during surrender of the powerful Japanese forces on the mainland, and assisting in the Japanese evacuation from Asia.

In Vietnam, the four-month-old Bao Dai government, installed by the Japanese in March 1945 when they ousted the French, was tenuous at best and lacked military forces. By striking when signs of an impending Japanese surrender first appeared, Ho Chi Minh and his comrades were able to gain

13

Quoted in Ibid.; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, tab 1, p. 30, tab 2, pp. 23-31; "Speech Opening the Third National Congress of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party," in Ho, On Revolution, pp. 345–51.

footholds in key cities, force Bao Dai's departure, announce the establishment of a provisional government, and proclaim independence all prior to the arrival of Allied occupational forces.

Advocating eventual independence for the states of Indochina, the United States refrained from supporting the French return. No alternate plan charted the way toward the ultimate goal of free and independent states. Occupational responsibilities, assigned essentially on the basis of the wartime Allied military situation, placed China in control of the area of Vietnam that it had ruled for so long in early history. Chinese use of Haiphong and the railroad into Kwangsi was the price paid by the French for the final withdrawal of the Chinese occupational forces. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh had extended their influence in Tonkin. Through negotiations, they achieved tacit French recognition of their government. Involvement of the United States Navy during this period was confined to the amphibious withdrawl of Chinese occupation forces in 1945-1946 and their transportation to North China.

In the South the British welcomed the French, to whom they transferred occupational responsibilities. Through riverine and amphibious operations, the French Navy gained control of critical points in the Mekong Delta and along the coast. An amphibious operation landed troops in Tonkin, where French naval forces assisted in the occupation of key cities.

The struggle for power between the Viet Minh and France erupted into war in December 1946. By now the United States Navy was extensively involved as a complement to diplomacy in the expanding Cold War. Torn between the goal of independent Indochinese states and the desire to stem Communist advances, American decision-makers denied the military aid requested by France for use in the French-Viet Minh War, pending substantial progress toward Vietnamese independence. Although France took some steps in this direction, the United States government considered them insufficient. Despite the lack of direct aid, French Union forces, making effective use of their limited naval capabilities in combination with their land and air forces, won or regained control of heavily populated and strategically important delta and coastal regions in the North as well as the South. Withdrawing to remote bases, the Viet Minh confined their armed activities to guerrilla-type actions.

The Communist victory in China in 1949 then led to a new phase of the French-Viet Minh War. Following the ratification by the French National Assembly in February 1950 of an agreement with the State of

Vietnam, the United States determined that the minimum prerequisites for economic and military aid had been met. Trained in China and supplied with increasing quantities of arms and munitions, Viet Minh regular forces seized key points along lines of communication south of the Chinese border. On 1 May 1950, President Truman approved funding for urgently needed military items. When war started in Korea, the President ordered expansion and acceleration of the aid for Indochina. Some American naval and other military aid to France and the Associated States arrived barely in time to help defeat Viet Minh offensives against the Red River Delta.

As 1952 drew to a close, the United States sought an early conclusion to the protracted French-Viet Minh War, urged more aggressive French military actions, and sought information on French strategy. Major increases in military aid were approved after France presented a new strategic plan.

The Korean armistice in July 1953 resulted in the release of more Chinese arms and munitions to support the Viet Minh. China's troops and aircraft could now deploy elsewhere and the United States became increasingly concerned with the possibility of Chinese intervention in the war in Indochina. A United States Navy task force was deployed to the South China Sea. It primary purpose was to deter such aggression.

Early in 1954 France launched a major offensive in central Vietnam, but this operation would have little effect on the outcome of the war. Reacting to Viet Minh incursions into Laos, French troops had already occupied a land-air base at Dien Bien Phu. This occupation and the subsequent siege by Chinese-equipped Viet Minh troops were preludes to the final engagement. Support by American carrier aircraft, requested by France, was considered but not approved. War weariness, dissension, and the defeat at Dien Bien Phu led to French compromises at the negotiating table whereby the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was accorded the right to rule Tonkin and northern Annam. In 1954–1955, United States ships would aid in the transportation of large numbers of refugees to the South. The conclusion of the conference at Geneva in July 1954 was followed by a period of consolidation of Ho's rule in the North and the extension of Diem's authority in the South. The United States gradually assumed training and advisory responsibilities for South Vietnam's military forces, at first jointly with the French. Following establishment of the Republic of Vietnam and the departure of French forces in 1956, France no longer shared direct responsibility for the security of South Vietnam, and American