their support, and their strategic and tactical direction, and in departmental responsibilities and authority began in the wake of World War II. The process would continue during the prolonged Vietnam conflict. To lay a foundation for understanding the capabilities of the United States Navy during this period some understanding is needed of the evolutionary changes in the Navy brought about by World War II.

In part, the Fleet's extraordinary wartime effectiveness had stemmed from it size, composition, and versatility. It stemmed also from a simple and direct chain of command and from an efficient alignment of departmental responsibilities. The latter provided responsive support to the Fleet with a minimum of overhead and a minimum of diversion of the naval chain of command's attention from its primary tasks of war planning, readiness, and operations. The division of responsibilities within the Navy Department had been the culmination of a process underway since the beginning of the "New Navy" near the end of the nineteenth century, a process influenced by a shift of naval policy from coastal defense and commerce raiding to Fleet actions for control of the sea, and by the experiences and demands of two world wars. The outgrowth of a movement to bring the knowledge and experience of seagoing naval line officers to bear on the management of the affairs of the Navy Department and its direction of the Fleet, resulted in the creation of the position of Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. Rather than establishing a naval general staff with supervisory responsibilities over the entire department, as advocated by a vocal group of naval officers, a congressional act provided that the Chief of Naval Operations would, “under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war."

"1

Demands of a "Two-Ocean War"

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the operating forces were not ideally organized for a global war. There were three fleets-the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and a tiny Asiatic Fleet. In 1941, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, had also been designated Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. He was to assume

1

Quoted in Elting Morison, "Naval Administration: Selected Documents on Navy Department Organization, 1915-1940," 1945, p. II–3.

operational command in the latter capacity only when two or more fleets were concentrated or operated in conjunction with one another. Shortly after America entered the fray, the United States Fleet commander was assigned worldwide responsibilities. Confronted by a "two-ocean war," President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8984 on 18 December 1941, which provided that the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet:

shall have supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets of the United States Navy and the operating forces of the naval coastal frontier commands, and shall be directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President of the United States therefor.2

Admiral Ernest J. King became Commander in Chief, United States Fleet on 30 December 1941 and established his headquarters in Washington.

Insofar as the exercise of operational command was concerned, the Fleet's ability to respond flexibly and effectively to the dynamic needs of World War II was enhanced through the grouping and regrouping of forces in numbered fleets and through the use of a decimal system for designating task forces, groups, units, and elements. This task-oriented system would again prove its value in the Vietnam era.

At the start of World War II the business of the Department of the Navy was distributed among seven bureaus headed by flag officers. Except for those under the operating forces, each facility of the shore establishment was assigned to one of the bureaus. Navy Regulations provided for a mutual exchange of information between the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the bureaus, such as in matters requiring cooperation, and the Chief of Naval Operations kept the bureaus and offices of the department informed on matters related to the "war efficiency" of the Fleet. From the time of the establishment of his office, the Chief of Naval Operations had placed major emphasis on obtaining bureau actions responsive to the needs of the operating forces. Having no specific authority over the bureaus, he achieved this responsiveness with leadership and actions subject to the

2

* Executive Order 8984 of 18 Dec. 1941 in Title 3-The President, 1938-1943 Compilation of Code of Federal Regulations (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 1046; Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: Naval History Division, GPO, 1959), p. 109; Richard W. Leopold, "Fleet Organization, 1919–1941,” 1945, pp. 5-6.

'Furer, Administration of the Navy Department. pp. 8, 126. The seven bureaus were Aeronautics, Medicine and Surgery, Ordnance, Ships, Supplies and Accounts, Yards and Docks, and Navigation. The latter became the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1942.

Secretary of the Navy's approval. To meet the urgent demands of World War II, the President's Executive Order 9096 of 12 March 1942 assigned the Chief of Naval Operations direct authority within the Navy Department where Fleet effectiveness was concerned. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations was now charged with:

the preparation, readiness and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt.

The order stated that the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations might be assigned to one officer, "who shall be the principal naval adviser to the President on the conduct of the War, and the principal naval adviser . . . to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment." It further specified that "duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet." Two weeks later, on 26 March, Admiral King relieved Admiral Harold R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations.*

As result of the authority assigned under the two positions, the relative freedom from involvement in departmental management and administration, and the delegated authority, King was able to carry out his weighty responsibilities with a remarkably small staff and a minimum of "red tape."

The departmental overhead structure was similarly small, especially when compared with that in the Navy Department and above it in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam era. Throughout World War II, the Navy secretariat consisted of one secretary, an under secretary, and two assistant secretaries. Yet, more than 100,000 ships and craft joined the Fleet during World War II, 80,000 aircraft were accepted over a fiveyear period, and Marine Corps strength totalled almost a half-million men at the end of hostilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization which played such an important role during the Vietnam era, had its origin in World War II. This body met formally for the first time on 9 February 1942. The Joint Chiefs re

4

Executive Order 9096 of 12 Mar. 1942 in Code of Federal Regulations, pp. 1121-22; Furer, Administration of the Navy Department, pp. 132-34; Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1952), pp. 356–59.

ported directly to the President. They were responsible for strategic plans to guide the conduct of the war and for coordinating the operations of the armed services. Together with their British counterparts, the Joint Chiefs formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In July 1942, the President appointed Admiral Willam D. Leahy as his own Chief of Staff. Leahy also served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unified commands were established to undertake joint Army-Navy campaigns. Based, in general, on whether the effort involved primarily the Army or the Navy, either the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations was designated Executive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for each unified command. As a result, the Joint Chiefs could focus collectively on strategy, policy, and coordination of critical matters, delegating the details of planning and directing operations to one of the service chiefs.3

In the spring of 1942, when the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet also became Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas for United Nations forces, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy in the Pacific. The implementing directive stated that the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet would act as the Joint Chiefs's "Executive Agency" for the Pacific Ocean Areas command. This decision provided the Allies with an efficient chain of command for the direction of the struggle against Japan for control of the Pacific."

As a result of actions such as these to meet the demands of World War II, the assignment of responsibility and authority over the operating forces and for their support were well tailored to meet the requirements for prompt and effective global naval operations with limited resources in response to widely scattered crises. Provision had been made also for the unified control of joint operations involving two or more of the military services.

World War II also produced major changes in the composition and capabilities of the Fleet. Having expanded in response to wartime needs, the United States Navy of 1945 was not only vastly larger than the prewar force, but it was far more diversified and had gained an unparalleled capacity of endurance for combat operations in remote waters. One specific result of the Navy's experience in World War II was the ascendancy of

Vernon E. Davis, "Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff," Vol. I of "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Development" (Historical Section, JCS, 1972).

"Ltr, SECNAV to distribution list, A16-328 of 20 Apr. 1942.

the aircraft carrier. Screened, supported, and supplied by other ships, this type supplanted the battleship as the primary striking arm of the Fleet. In addition to proving their value in the war at sea, carriers conclusively demonstrated their worth as mobile bases for the launching of air attacks against land targets. Concentrations of carrier air power proved capable of neutralizing enemy airfields. With the introduction of high-performance fighter aircraft, radar, the best antiaircraft fire-control systems in the world, automatically controlled gun mounts, and effective tactical dispositions, the Fleet had gained the capability to withstand enemy air attacks.

In carrying out the island-hopping campaigns of the Pacific war and landing millions of troops on the continents of Africa and Europe, the United States Fleet and its Marine Force had achieved unprecedented advances in amphibious warfare. The limited capabilities and imperfect techniques of the prewar days had been expanded and refined, not only with regard to the assault landings, but also for the softening of enemy defenses by air attack and naval gunfire, the removal of obstacles by underwater demolition teams, close air and gunfire support of forces ashore, and logistic support by sea of subsequent operations.

To sustain ships in combat in distant waters and to support a wide variety of naval forces, the concepts of the fleet train and Base Force had been broadened and developed into the Pacific Fleet Service Force with its extraordinarily effective naval operational logistic system. Significant advances had been achieved in underway replenishment of supplies, ammunition, and fuel. Dependence on fixed bases had been minimized by the extensive mobile capabilities of ships and craft devised to provide repairs, services, and other logistic support. New concepts, techniques, and systems had been developed for the prompt establishment of advanced bases tailored to meet varying requirements. Navy Mobile Construction Battalions (SEABEES) were organized for the construction and maintenance of bases and support of the Marines in combat."

Major progress had been achieved by the United States in submarine warfare and in mining and minesweeping. The serious threat posed by the German U-boat campaign in the Atlantic had forced the assignment of top priority there to antisubmarine warfare. New concepts, tactics, techniques,

7

Worrall R. Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (Washington: Navy Department, GPO, 1952); Furer, Administration of the Navy Department; Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance, pp. 21-24.