The Soviet threats against Turkey became more ominous. On 6 March 1946, Washington announced the decision to send a naval force to Turkey with the remains of the recently deceased ambassador, Mehmet Munir Ertegun. The visit to Istanbul was made by battleship Missouri (BB-63), cruiser Providence (CL-82), and destroyer Power (DD-839) under Admiral Hewitt.

Because of the seriousness of the situation, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes initially sought to dispatch a larger force, including two aircraft carriers. Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, held similar views and expressed concern that the show of force would not be effective unless a larger task force steamed into the Sea of Marmara. But the visit of even the relatively small force that was sent proved highly successful. This gesture was interpreted by the Turks as proof of the importance the United States attached to Turkey, and the welcome was extraordinarily enthusiastic. Missouri-an impressive warship, the ship in which the Japanese had signed the surrender instrument, and a symbol of the colossal naval power that conquered the vast Pacific-had been a wise choice for this mission. Viewing the Missouri visit to Turkey as most effective, Secretary of State Byrnes concurred with Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, in June 1946, in a policy of informal and unannounced cruises to the Mediterranean to establish the custom of showing the flag." The application of pressure on Turkey continued as Moscow sent a note to Ankara proposing the cession of certain Turkish territory and urging joint RussoTurkish control of the straits by the establishment there of a Russian base. In this same note, the Soviets pressed for the revision of the convention governing transit of the passage. This new convention would have been entered into only by those nations bordering the Black Sea, thereby excluding Great Britain and other powers.

In May 1946, the Communists seized power in Hungary. That same month another crisis occurred concerning Trieste. The Soviets supported Yugoslav claims to the area while the United States and Great Britain backed Italy. Toward the end of June, Rear Admiral Bernard H. Bieri, Commander United States Naval Forces, Mediterranean, visited Trieste in the cruiser

Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144-45, 171; Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 19441947: Prelude to the "Truman Doctrine" (Thessalonicki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), pp. 168-70, 175-78; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 96; see also Jonathan Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," Political Science Quarterly, XC (Fall, 1975), pp. 451-75.

Fargo (CL-106) as a counter-balance to Yugoslav troop demonstrations. An almost continuous American naval presence in the Trieste area would be required from 1946 to 1950, during which period either an Adriatic Task Group or a Northern Adriatic Group (two destroyers or a cruiser) was normally maintained in readiness nearby. By the summer of 1946, the British, weakened by financial woes and demobilization, were having great difficulty keeping their Mediterranean forces up to strength. Great Britain sought increased support from the United States and expressed disappointment that the Eighth Fleet training exercises had not been held in the Mediterranean.50

50

Stephen G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXIV (Aug. 1958), pp. 44-46; Forrestal Diaries, pp. 183-84; ltr, Burke to Hooper, of 28 Jan. 1974.

Following a request by the United States Ambassador to Portugal, the new and larger attack carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB-42) visited Lisbon. The ship then deployed to the Twelfth Fleet. As a result of mounting political tensions in the Mediterranean and Near East, all Twelfth Fleet destroyers were ordered to the inland sea that same month. The French Governor General of Algiers requested visits by ships of the American Fleet because of political unrest in that colony. Franklin D. Roosevelt's schedule was revised to include visits to Piraeus, the port for Athens, and Algerian ports. The announcement that a port call would be made in Greece was released just before a plebiscite was held, concerning the retention of the monarchy, on 1 August 1946. During the visit, carrier aircraft conducted an impressive air demonstration."1 These events occurred during the time when the Soviets were supporting the application of pressure on the Greek border by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Simultaneously the Communist-controlled National Liberation Front attempted to seize power in Athens. During a tense period of frontier incidents and guerrilla actions, accompanied by Bulgarian claims to the Greek province of Thrace, destroyers Warrington (DD-383) and Noa (DD-841) visited Salonika.

On 30 September 1946, the American Government released a statement which stressed the need to maintain American naval units in the Mediterranean. According to press accounts, this "formally linked naval operations with American foreign policy for the first time in the post-war.'

» 52

Thus it was that the peacetime roles of the United States Navy unfolded. Despite the decline in the strength of the Fleet, the need for deployment of naval forces in the Far East and Mediterranean was well established by 1946.

Now it is time to review events that would lead to the prolonged Vietnam conflict and to the subsequent involvement of the Navy and other American military forces.

51 COMNAVEU, "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe," pp. 125-28; Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, pp. 267-306.

52 Forrestal Diaries, p. 211; New York Herald Tribune, 1 Oct. 1946.

The "August Uprising" And Allied Occupation Of Vietnam, 1945-1946

The abrupt ending of World War II presented the Communists in Indochina with extraordinarily favorable opportunities for the seizure of power. After the Japanese coup of March 1945, French military forces had been interned or swept out of the region. Munitions and other military supplies left behind were seized by the Communists. Five months later, Japanese forces stopped combat operations as soon as they received Emperor Hirohito's cease-fire message. A full month would pass before the initial arrival of Allied occupational forces and still more time would pass before these forces would be in position to control key locations in Indochina.

Ho Chi Minh and his fellow Communists had been preparing for such a chance. Shortly after Japan's 10 August message to the Allied governments announcing its willingness to accept the surrender terms, the Vietnamese Communist Party set in motion what they called the "August Uprising." The ensuing struggle for power signified the start of a conflict which would last at least three decades at varying levels of intensity and with a changing list of participants.

On 11 August, Viet Minh forces struck Ha Tinh Province, north of the ancient Gate of Annam. A few days later they attacked Thai Nguyen, at the northern point of the delta, forty miles from Hanoi, and a key point for controlling roads into the mountainous Viet Bac region. The Viet Bac would become the main base area for the Viet Minh.1

The Viet Minh Central Committee hastily convened a "National Congress" on 16 August in remote Tuyen Quang Province in the Viet Bacin such a fashion that few representatives of non-Communist organizations

'Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 83-85; see also Giap, Banner of People's War.

were present to express their views. Planning to disarm the Japanese, take over the governing power from them and also from the government of Bao Dai, and assume the role of leading the people, the Communists hoped to present Allied occupation forces with a fait accompli when the latter arrived. To direct the struggle, the congress appointed a "National Liberation Committee." Following the conference, Ho called on the Vietnamese people to join and support the Viet Minh Front. Declaring the committee to be the provisional government, he announced that "the decisive hour in the destiny of our people has struck." He called for a united fight for independence and prophesied that the struggle would be long and hard.2

On 19 August 1945, the Communists took the initiative in the Tonkin capital of Hanoi. Emperor Bao Dai, under Viet Minh pressure, abdicated three days later. On the 24th, he issued an imperial rescript to the Vietnamese nation in which he advised "all the different classes of people, as well as the Royal Family, to be all united, and to support the Democratic Republican Government wholeheartedly in order to consolidate our national independence."

3

The U.S. Office of Strategic Services, whose representatives had been in contact with Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese leaders for some time, prepared an analysis of the overall Vietnamese political situation at the time of Bao Dai's abdication. This document noted that the provisional government being established by Ho was dominated by the Viet Minh, "a 100% Communist party, with a membership of approximately 20% of the active political native element," and by a diverse coalition of nationalists organized into "six minority parties and a score of independent ones." The OSS stated that these groups sought an American protectorate similar to that established by the United States in the Philippines. Vietnamese activists reportedly hoped that the United States would "intercede with the United Nations for the exclusion of the French, as well as Chinese, from the reoccupation of Indo-China."

Ho continued his drive to seize control in key locations. The Communists

2 Ho, On Revolution, pp. 141-42.

3

"Bao Dai's Rescript on His First Abdication," of 24 Aug. 1945 in Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945–1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 18–19.

Memo, Director OSS to SECSTATE, of 22 Aug. 1954 in U.S., Defense Department, United States-Vietnam Relations: 1945-1967 (Washington: GPO, 1971), bk 8, pp. 46-48 (hereafter cited as U.S.-V.N. Relations).