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Vietnam to 21,500 by early December 1945. The British force comprised 22,000 officers and men, the majority of them assigned to the 20th Infantry Division.31

As Allied forces south of the 16th parallel increased in strength, British and French commanders formulated a basic agreement on the employment of their respective units which called for the concentration of British forces in the Saigon region. Small detachments also would be stationed at Phnom Penh in Cambodia and at Cape Saint Jacques, the strategic peninsula that flanked the entrance to the waterways connecting Saigon with the sea and close to the mouth of the Mekong River. Until the British withdrew from Vietnam, the primary mission of the French Expeditionary Corps would be restoration of authority in the interior of the country. In this task, the French would be assisted by British and Japanese troops. To make Japanese assistance possible, Admiral Mountbatten found it necessary, early in October, to defer the former enemy's disarmament for several months."

32

Riverine Operations

In view of the subsequent development of United States riverine capabilities in the 1960s, the operations of the French Far East Naval Brigade are of particular interest. The Naval Brigade, initially commanded by Captain Robert Kilian, attained a strength of approximately 3,000 officers and men by January 1946. Naval infantry units, trained for amphibious assault operations similar to those undertaken by marine organizations of other navies, composed a major part of this brigade. In addition to the troop units, the brigade contained about fifty landing craft and thirty junks, scows, and launches obtained within Indochina. Also included in the brigade were paratrooper-trained commando units and communication, repair, river base, and medical elements.33

31

Early objectives of the Naval Brigade in the Mekong Delta were three

Auphan and Mordal, French Navy in World War II, p. 366; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, p. 14; Kirby, Surrender of Japan, pp. 302–03; msg, CG U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater 081100 Dec. 1945; memo, British Chiefs of Staff, CCS 644/38 of 21 Dec. 1945.

Msgs, SACSEA 241402 Sept. and 022131 Oct. 1945; msg, CG U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater 081100 Dec. 1945.

33

Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 5, 225-28. The French Navy did not have a separate marine organization. See NA Paris, reports, 403-47 of 9 Oct. 1947 and 253-50 of 7 June 1950.

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strategically located provincial capitals, their populations numbering from 45,000 to 80,000 people. Each of these cities would later become a site for an American naval base. The first objective was My Tho, capital of Dinh Tuong Province. My Tho, situated at the juncture of several highways, including strategic Route 4 from Saigon, is on the north bank of the main shipping channel to Phnom Penh. The second objective was Vinh Long, capital of the province with the same name, a river port and transshipment center. Vinh Long is located at a point where the Mekong diverges into several outlets to the sea. The third objective was Can Tho, the capital of Phong Dinh Province, a center of rice production, a trading

point, a principal inland port, and center of the Hoa Hao religious sect. Can Tho lies along Route 4 at the confluence of the Can Tho and Hau Giang (Bassac) Rivers and is near the center of the intricate waterway network serving the Mekong Delta.

French Army units moving overland from Saigon via Route 4 had initially been detailed to seize My Tho from the Viet Minh. However, the French column found the road sabotaged, and their vehicles repeatedly bogged down in the sponge-like delta terrain. Thus, the reoccupation of My Tho during the last week in October was effected by units of the Far East Naval Brigade, transported there in small river craft.34

On 29 October, in a joint operation with army troops, who advanced overland, another contingent of the Naval Brigade embarked in the sloop Annamite, and took control of Vinh Long. Then, on 30 October, a ninetyman force from the brigade overcame enemy resistance at Can Tho and captured that city. Operating from Can Tho, the small French force conducted patrols, ambushes, and river raids against rebel concentrations south of the Bassac River to create the illusion that the French had sizeable forces at their disposal. By mid-November, after a second unit of the Naval Brigade arrived in Vietnam, the French were able to extend the operational area to a twenty-five kilometer radius around Can Tho. They seized four towns in that sector, capturing ammunition and equipment.

35

The initial success achieved by the Naval Brigade in restoring French control impressed General Leclerc. In November, he directed one of the brigade's unit commanders, Captain Jaubert, to establish within the force a permanent flotilla of small boats and a self-contained landing force of naval infantry, with the capability to undertake sustained operations throughout southern Indochina. The task of this new riverine amphibious force, initially designated the Naval Infantry River Flotilla, was to reestablish a French presence along the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The force also was ordered to assist in occupying and securing a zone extending south from Saigon to My Tho and Vinh Long."

36

34

Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, p. 18; Commander in Chief, French Forces Indochina, Lessons of the War in Indochina, trans. by V. J. Croizat (France: 1955), Vol. II, p. 348.

35 Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 19–21; Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 137-38.

38

'E. Le Breton, "The Marines in Indo China," La Revue Maritime, XXX (Oct. 1948), trans. by Remote Area Conflict Information Center, pp. 3-5; Guy Hébert, "The Birth of a Flotilla," La Revue Maritime, XLII (Oct. 1949), trans. by Remote Area Conflict Information Center, pp. 3-5; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, p. 10; Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 132–33.

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Within a few weeks, Jaubert had obtained and armed 5 small vessels, including 2 former Japanese junks acquired from the British Navy and 3 armored craft, and barges, launches, and steamers captured from the Viet Minh. In early December French aircraft carrier Béarn delivered to Vietnam a flotilla of 14 landing craft, assault (LCA) and 6 landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP), purchased from the British at Singapore. Small boats and junks provided living quarters for Jaubert's landing force, which was composed of two companies of naval infantry (about 400 men), augmented by a small detachment from Béarn. Throughout December, while preparing for extended campaigns, these units conducted mopping-up operations near Saigon.3"

Captain Jaubert's Naval Infantry River Flotilla was the embryo which developed into the well known French naval assault divisions (dinassauts).

"Hébert, "Birth of a Flotilla," pp. 6-8; Le Breton, "The Marines in Indo China," pp. 4-5.

The United States Mobile Riverine Force, established in 1967, would represent a further development of the dinassaut concept.

By December 1945, the combined efforts of the British and French ground and naval forces restored relative stability to the Saigon region. Following a visit to Saigon in December, Admiral Mountbatten reported that the Cholon-Saigon area was "quiet and likely to remain so, apart from the continuation of occasional sniping, outrages against French Nationals and grenade throwing." The admiral noted that the French were gradually assuming control of major towns outside Saigon, although "the intervening country is not yet pacified."

"38

Coastal Operations

Meanwhile, important land and sea operations were underway in other parts of southern Indochina. A key French objective on the coast of Annam was the city of Nha Trang. This provincial capital was controlled by the Viet Minh, and rebel reinforcements were believed to be available in the area. Further, a garrison of 1,000 Japanese troops was stationed in the vicinity. Despite evidence of Japanese-Allied cooperation in other regions of Vietnam, the reaction of the former enemy at Nha Trang to the arrival of British and French units could not be predicted.39

On 15 October, General Gracey dispatched a combined force, composed of one British landing craft, infantry (LCI) and the French destroyer Triomphant, to occupy Nha Trang. When a sixty-man landing party from the French ship entered the city, the local Viet Minh commander issued an ultimatum threatening an armed attack on the detachment unless it was withdrawn. The British naval commander, headquartered in Saigon, authorized the French to remain. On 22 October, the Viet Minh launched an assault on the French which was repulsed with the assistance of the Japanese garrison. Later in the month, the French battleship Richelieu arrived offshore, ready to support the forces on land with her eight 15-inch and twenty 5-inch guns. By early November, additional French reinforcements had arrived, and Nha Trang appeared secure. Nevertheless, the Viet

38

Msg, CG U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (quoting Mountbatten) 081100 Dec. 1945; see also Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 146-47.

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