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SPEECH OF JOHN TAYLOR,

ON

A RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, RELATIVE TO THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT ;*

DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
DECEMBER 2, 1803.

4440

MR. PRESIDENT,

THE Opposition to this discriminating amendment to the constitution, is condensed into a single stratagem, namely, an effort to excite the passion of jealousy in various forms. Endeavors have been made to excite geographical jealousies; a jealousy of the smaller against the larger states; a jealousy in the people against the idea of amending the constitution; and even a jealousy against individual members of this House. Sir, is this passion a good medium through which to discern truth, or is it a mirror calculated to reflect error? Will it enlighten or deceive? Is it planted in good or in evil-in moral or in vicious principles? Wherefore, then, do gentlemen endeavor to blow it up? Is it because they distrust the strength of their arguments, that they resort to this furious and erring passion? Is it because they know, that

-Trifles, light as air,

Are, to the jealous, confirmation strong

As proofs of holy writ.

So far as these efforts have been directed towards a geographical demarcation of the interests of this union

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into north and south, in order to excite a jealousy of one division against another; and so far as they have been used to create suspicions of individuals, they have been either so feeble, inapplicable, or frivolous, as to bear but lightly upon the question, and to merit but little attention. But the attempts to array states against states, because they differ in size, and to prejudice the people against the idea of amending their constitution, bear a more formidable aspect, and ought to be repelled; because they are founded on principles the most mischievous and inimical to the constitution, and could they be successful, are replete with great mischiefs.

Towards exciting this jealousy of smaller states against larger states, the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) has labored to prove, that the federal principle of the constitution of the United States was founded in the idea of minority invested with operative power: that in pursuance of this principle, it was contemplated and intended, that the election of a President should frequently come into the House of Representatives; and to divert it from thence by this amendment, would trench upon the federal principle of our constitution, and diminish the rights of the smaller states, bestowed by this principle upon them. This was the scope of his argument to excite their jealousy, and is the amount also of several other arguments delivered by gentlemen on the same side of the question. I do not question the words, but the ideas of gentlemen. Words, selected from their comrades, are easily asserted to misrepresent opinions ; as I have myself experienced, during the discussion on the subject.

This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller states, before they will suffer it to produce its intended effect; that of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To me it appears to be evidently incorrect. Two principles sustain our constitution; one, a majority of the people; the other, a majority of the states; the first was necessary to preserve the li

berty, or sovereignty of the people; the last, to preserve the liberty, or sovereignty of the states. But both are founded in the principle of majority; and the effort of the constitution, is to preserve this principle in relation both to the people and the states, so that neither species of sovereignty, or independence, should be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That of amending the constitution will suffice. Three fourths of the states must concur in this object, because a less number, or a majority of states, might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the constitution is not amendable by a majority of states, lest a species of state sovereignty might, under color of amending the constitution, infringe the right of the people. On the other hand, a majority of the people residing in the large states, cannot amend the constitution, lest they should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small states, the federal union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the states, to amend the constitution, became necessary; not because federalism was founded in the idea of minority; but for a reason the very reverse of that idea ; that is, to cover the will, both of a majority of the people and a majority of states, so as to preserve the great element of self-government, as it regarded state sovereignty, and also as it regarded the sovereignty of the people.

For this great purpose, certain political functions are assigned to be performed, under the auspices of the state or federal principle; and certain others, under the popular principle. It was the intention of the constitution, that these functions should be performed in conformity to its principle. If that principle is in fact a government of a minority, then these functions ought to be performed by a minority. When the federal principle is performing a function, according to this idea, a minority of the states ought to decide. And by the same mode of reasoning, when the popular principle is performing a function, then a minority

of the people ought to decide. This brings us precisely to the question of the amendment. It is the int ntion of the constitution, that the popular princi le shall operate in the election of a President and vice president. It is also the intention of the constitut on that the popular principle, in discharging the functions committed to it by the constitution, should operate by a majority and not by a minority. That the majority of the people should be driven by an unforeseen state of parties, to the necessity of relinquishing their will, in the election of one or the other of these officers; or that the principle of majority, in a function confided to the popular will, should be deprived of half its rights, and be laid under a necessity of violating its duty to preserve the other half, is not the intention of the constitution.

But the gentleman from Connecticut has leaped over all this ground, and gotten into the House of Representatives, without considering the principles of the constitution, as applicable to the election of President and vice president by electors, and distinguishing them from an election by the House of Representatives. And by mingling and interweaving the two modes of electing together, a considerable degree of complexity has been produced. If, however, it is admitted, that, in an election of a President and vice president by electors, the will of the electing majority ought fairly to operate, and that an election by the will of a minority would be an abuse or corruption of the principles of the constitution, then it follows, that an amendment to avoid this abuse, both accords with, and is necessary to save these principles. In like manner, had an abuse crept into the same election, whenever it was to be made under the federal principle by the House of Representatives, enabling a minority of states to carry the election, it would not have violated the intention of the constitution to have corrected this abuse also, by an amendment. For, sir, I must suppose it to have been the intention of the constitution, that both

the federal principle, and the popular principle, should operate in those functions respectively assigned to them, perfectly and not imperfectly; that is. the former by a majority of states, and the latter by a majority of the people.

Under this view of the subject, the amendment ought to be considered. Then the question will be, whether it is calculated or not, to cause the popular principle, applied by the constitution in the first instance, to operate perfectly, and to prevent the abuse of an election by a minority. If it is, it corresponds with the intention, diminishes nothing of the rights of the smaller states, and of course affords them no cause of jealousy. Sir, it could never have been the intention of the constitution to produce a state of things, by which a majority of the popular principle should be under the necessity of voting against its judgment, to secure a President; and by which a minor faction should acquire a power capable of defeating the majority in the election of a President, or of electing a vice president, contrary to the will of a majority of the electing principle. To permit this abuse, would be a fraudulent mode of defeating the operation of the popular principle in this election, in order to transfer it to the federal principle; to disinherit the people, for the sake of endowing the House of Representatives; whereas it was an accidental, and not an artificial disappointment in the election of a President, against which the constitution intended to provide. A fair and not an unfair attempt to elect, was previously to be made by the popular principle, before the election was to go into the House of Representatives. And if the people of all the states, both large and small, should, by an abuse of the real design of the constitution, be bubbled out of the election of executive power, by leaving to them the nominal right of an abortive effort, and transferring to the House of Representatives the substantial right of a real election, nothing will remain but to corrupt the election in that House, by some of those abuses of which elections by diets

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