 | Herbert Spencer - 1870 - عدد الصفحات: 704
...if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling but two or more. Obviously if it ifl indistinguishable from an adjacent portion of consciousness, it forms one with that portion —... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1873 - عدد الصفحات: 660
...under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exi»t either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling but two or more. Obviously if it ia indistinguishable from an adjacent portion of consciousness, it forms one with that portion —... | |
 | 1876 - عدد الصفحات: 598
...which, when introspectively contemplated, appears to be homogeneous. These are the essentials. * * * And obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness...appreciable duration, it cannot be known as a feeling." " A feeling proper is either made up of like parts that occupy time, or it is made up Of like parts that... | |
 | 1876 - عدد الصفحات: 600
...which, when introspectively contemplated, appears to be homogeneous. These are the essentials. * * * And obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness...appreciable duration, it cannot be known as a feeling." " A feeling proper is either made up of like parts that occupy time, or it is made up of like parts that... | |
 | Shadworth Hollway Hodgson - 1878 - عدد الصفحات: 458
...homogeneous. These are the essentials. * * * And obviously 1 Vol. I. § 65. pp. 163.165. 2nd edit. if it does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable...appreciable duration, it cannot be known as a feeling." " A feeling proper is either made up of like parts that occupy time, or it is made up of like parts that... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1881 - عدد الصفحات: 698
...if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling...consciousness, it forms one with that portion — is not an mdividual feeling but part of one. And obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1882 - عدد الصفحات: 682
...if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling...consciousness, it forms one with that portion — is not an mdividual feeling but part of one. And obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable... | |
 | Charles Arthur Mercier - 1888 - عدد الصفحات: 396
...if under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling,..." A relation between feelings is, on the contrary, characterising by occupying no appreciable part of consciousness. Take away the terms it unites, and... | |
 | William James - 1890 - عدد الصفحات: 720
...if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling...it does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable urea, or an appreciable duration, it cannot be known as a feeling. " A Relation between feelings is,... | |
 | William James - 1890 - عدد الصفحات: 720
...if, under introspection, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling...obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness an sppreclable area, or an appreciable duration, it cannot be known as a feeling. " A Relation between... | |
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... individuality marked off from adjacent portions of consciousness by qualitative contrasts ; and which, when introspectively contemplated, appears to be homogeneous. These are the essentials. Obviously, if under introspection, a state of consciousness... 
