An Evolutionary Approach to Social WelfarePsychology Press, 2003 - 247 من الصفحات While not evident immediately, social norms and values play a crucial role in the theory of social choice. In the first half of the twentieth century, the special acknowledgement by economic theory of the autonomy of individuals and their subjective view of the world had led to the serious problem that socially acceptable decisions could not be made in the absence of unanimity. In this work, social norms and values are reintroduced to overcome this shortcoming by applying a common standard and, thus, making individual preferences comparable. In particular, it is shown, how the adoption of these standards is part of every individual's social development, how the standards themselves arose in the course of social evolution and how human beings were endowed with the necessary learning mechanism by Darwinian evolution in the first place. This impressive, unique book is well informed and clearly written. It will be of great interest to all those students, academics and researchers who are interested in evolutionary economics as well as social welfare and philosophy. |
المحتوى
Propagation of behavioral determinants | 4 |
14272 | 23 |
Evolution and learning the rise of behavioral plasticity | 29 |
PART II | 135 |
Welfare and evolution | 182 |
Conclusions | 212 |
Notes | 220 |
228 | |
240 | |
241 | |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
An Evolutionary Approach to Social Welfare <span dir=ltr>Christian Sartorius</span> لا تتوفر معاينة - 2003 |
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
achieved action actual adaptation adopted aggregation allows alternatives approach argument Arrow's Arrow's impossibility theorem Arrow's theorem basic behavioral traits Bentham capability cardinal chapter classical conditioning cognitive comparison of well-being consequence context cooperation coordination cultural derived determined discussed drives economic effect emotions environment eventually evident evolution evolutionary existence genes genetic give rise given happiness hypotheses implies income increase individual's influence innate instance institutions interaction interpersonal comparison kin selection kind latter learning major marginal utility mechanism memes mental model moral Moreover motivation natural selection needs normative assumption normative principles norms and values organism Pareto criterion payoff payoff matrix person perspective player positive possible potential prevail prisoner's dilemma problem propagation reason regard reinforcement reinforcement learning relevant replicators respective response role rules situation social group selection social welfare function societies specific stimuli structure theory tion tive transmission underlying utilitarianism utility welfare economics