The recommendations of the Minority of the Poor Law Commission may be noted here.* Three reforms were proposed, each of which was a desirable step in itself, apart from the beneficial effect it would have in absorbing the persons set free by the decasualising scheme. To a limited extent these proposals have been adopted, but there is still ample scope for further application. The first reform proposed was the raising of the schoolleaving age, and the provision of some technical training during the latter years of the school curriculum. Two advantages would thus be achieved. The youth of the country would receive a better preparation for industrial life, and be less likely to swell the ranks of unskilled workers. Also, the competiton between youths and adults for employment would be reduced, providing an opening for some of the surplus labour. The second proposal was the reduction of hours of labour, where they were in excess of the normal working day. It was not argued, of course, that a reduction in hours would in all cases reduce unemployment, for, in so far as a shorter working day improved the worker's efficiency and caused a greater output per hour, there would be no demand for extra labour. There are still many occupations, however, in which the length of the working day is injurious to the worker and relatively uneconomical to the community. Systematic overtime, too, is carried to excess in certain industries. Reduction of hours in these occupations would alleviate the burden of the workers therein, and provide work for a number of unemployed.† The third proposal was the public maintenance of widowed mothers of young children. Before the war, about 100,000 * See Minority Report, pp. 271-280; also Webb, Prevention of Destitution, pp. 132-137. † For the inter-relation of hours and employment see pp. 108-9. widows with dependent children were in receipt of inadequate relief under the Poor Law, and the number has grown since then. Here, again, a double object would be achieved. Widows would be relieved from the burden of seeking employment, often unsuitable, and would be able to give proper attention to their children, while their withdrawal from the labour market would place a large number of openings at the disposal of the employment exchanges.* To these recommendations of the Minority of the Poor Law Commission other proposals can be added. Thus, the retirement from industrial life might be effected at an earlier date by reducing the age limit for old age pensions. If there must be unemployment at all, it is preferable that old people should be relieved of arduous toil, and that employment should, as far as possible, be allocated to workers in their prime.† Further, there is the proposal to extend the area of industry. As shown in the previous chapter, there are in the best of times about two per cent. of the wage-earners unemployed, and some of these might find permanent employment if the scope of industrial effort were widened. There are certain necessary economic services which, since they do not give an immediate return, are rarely undertaken by private enterprise. Afforestation, for instance, is a vital necessity, but, as many years have to elapse between the investment of capital and the gathering of the profits, few individuals are prepared to supply this service. Other essential services such as extended road and bridge construction are obviously beyond the scope of private enterprise, and should be supplied and maintained at public expense. Schemes of this nature would provide additional means of absorbing the surplus, and might cause * See below, pp. 343-5 † See pp. 340-3. the so-called" irreducible minimum of unemployment" to belie its name. Control of It is obvious that a certain degree of unemployment is inevitable so long as society continues to advance in methods of production and organisation. Unemployment due to the introduction of machinery, for instance, would be found in the Socialist as well as in the individualist state. The proper course to be adopted is not to prevent machines from being introduced (and certainly not to smash them when set up, as the Luddites did a century ago), but to have some kind of control over the speed of their introduction. The control might come from two or three quarters. Enlightened employers might so adjust the introduction of labour-saving machinery as to cause the least hardship. But the more intense the competition and price-cutting, the greater would be the difficulty of a conscientious employer, who sought to minimise unemployment in this manner. The pace would be set by the most unscrupulous employer, bent on immediate profit, and indifferent to the suffering his action would cause. Secondly, the control might come from the employers and the workers jointly. So far as there is, at present, any effective regulation of the introduction of new machinery, it is exercised by elected boards, representative either of the trade unions and the employers' federations, or of the men and management of a particular firm. Thirdly, the State might exert its influence and, by a maintenance or insurance scheme, compel the employers to bear a part or the whole of the burden of unemployment, occasioned by the introduction of machinery. But such a plan presents many difficulties. It is shown in a later chapter that insurance or maintenance by individual in dustries is not always practicable, and that the responsibility for the unemployed should rest, in the main, on a national rather than an industrial basis. The problem is more difficult in the case of industrial re-arrangements due to improved methods of organisation. Where there has been overlapping of departments, some unemployment must necessarily be caused, yet attempts to restrict a programme of proper co-ordination and unification are to be deprecated. Indeed, in the long run, the economies may, as in the case of labour-saving machinery, lead to such a rise in the demand for the product that employment is actually increased. Where, however, the re-arrangement leads to a monopoly, which deliberately restricts the output in order to force up the price and secure greater profits, the result may be the But the fault does not lie with the concenvery reverse. tration of production, which is a good thing, but rather with the restrictive policy of the monopolist. The real problem is to secure all the economies of unified organisation, but at the same time to prevent the monopolist from misusing his power to the detriment both of his employees and of the community at large. Re-distribution of Income and Change of Industrial System. Many maintain that unemployment is inextricably bound up with the economic system, and that, while such steps as those indicated in the previous pages might do something to reduce the evil, no real solution will be found until a radical alteration in the control of industry is secured. Mr. J. A. Hobson, for example, condemns the tendency to "fritter away the unity of a great subject" in detailed examination of many phenomena, which are themselves effects rather than causes, and which are liable to conceal the essential single cause. In so far as the distribution of the social dividend could be improved without changing the present system of industrial control (e.g. by taxation), employment would be increased, owing to a more regular and economical apportionment of spending power.* There would be less consumption of luxuries and more expenditure on necessaries and reproductive goods. Much of the problem presented by unemployment is at bottom a matter of wages. If the seasonal or casual worker received better rates of pay while actually at work, he would not in slack times fall into the same distress, and therefore not throw the same burden on the community as he does at present. But re-distribution alone would not altogether cure unemployment, for, as has been shown above, one formidable cause, the absence of any co-ordination among producers, would be left untouched. Socialists argue, therefore, that attempts at re-distribution must necessarily be incomplete, unless at the same time some control is exercised over the system of production. In the individualist state, it is contended, resources and labour are too frequently misdirected; markets are glutted and unemployment results. The competitive struggle leads to combination, which often finds a restricted output and high prices the most profitable course to pursue. Reduced output involves less labour, while the higher prices cause, up to a point, a smaller demand for other goods, again affecting the volume of employment. The Socialist would substitute public for private production. Thereby, he claims, overlapping of functions would be eliminated and misdirection of efforts and materials would be less common, and, with the suppression of the restrictive policy of monopolist combination, output would be increased. All this, it is maintained, would increase and regularise employment, while consumers as a whole would benefit. *See above, pp. 241-2. |