worker does not understand. It is significant that these premium systems have been largely worked out by engineers whose mathematical inclinations have led them to calculate the wages of labour almost as precisely as the costs of driving the machinery. But men cannot be standardised like machines.*

Efficiency

Systems of Wages.

According to the so-called " efficiency" method of payment, not only a man's total wage, but the basic rate itself, varies with his efficiency. One system of wages that comes within this category employs a differential piece rate, which rises or falls with the output. The more one produces the higher the piece rate; the less one produces the lower the piece rate. In some instances (e.g. in the Taylor plan) a specific standard of quality is imposed, and imperfection in one piece means a reduction in the whole scale.

The advantage from the employer's side is obvious, for though he pays higher piece rates for higher outputs, he secures the economies in overhead charges noted above. The efficient workers may also prefer the method, but the less fortunate are doubly penalised. "This is a system of which it may truly be said that nothing succeeds like success and nothing fails like failure."† A man who can produce two-thirds as much as another man may only get one half his wage. The object of the differential piece rate is to weed out the inefficient. But if the rates are such that a worker of average ability cannot earn a living wage, the method is indefensible.

To remedy this injustice, various modifications have been made by firms adopting the efficiency system. In some cases a simple minimum wage is guaranteed. The Gantt

* See Cole, The Payment of Wages, Ch. VI., for criticism of premium bonus schemes.

† Prosser, op. cit., 58.

plan, for example, differs from the Taylor system in that there is only one piece rate, and that a minimum wage is assured. The "task system" is employed, according to which the workers are put on a task, which, it has been ascertained by experiment, can be completed by an efficient workman in a certain time. If they perform this work in the same time, they obtain a specified premium; if not, they receive the minimum time wage.

"Under this system each man has his work assigned to him in the form of a task to be done by a prescribed method, with definite appliances, and to be completed within a certain time. The task is based on a detailed investigation by a trained expert of the best method of doing the work; and the task setter, or his assistant, acts as an instructor to teach the workmen to do the work in the manner and time specified. If the work is done within the time allowed by the expert and is up to the standard for quality, the workman receives extra compensation (usually 20 to 50 per cent. of the time allowed) in addition to his day's pay. If it is not done in the time set, or is not up to the standard for quality, the workman receives his day's pay only.'

Several other "fancy" methods of remuneration could be described, but they all resemble in essential principle those already mentioned. Efficiency" and similar systems of payment are associated to a greater or less degree with "scientific management," the object of which is to reduce waste in industry to the minimum. This aspect of the subject is considered in the following chapter.

* Going, Principles of Industrial Efficiency, p. 135, quoted in Pigou, Economics of Welfare, P. 442

UNIV. OF CAL

CHAPTER V.

Reduction of Working Hours.

HOURS AND EFFICIENCY.

There is a close connection between the struggle for higher wages and the movement for a reduction of working hours. The worker may be primarily concerned with improving his cash income so as to secure more of the necessaries and comforts of life. At a certain point in his progress, however, he may decide to forego for the time the possibility of an increased wage in terms of money, and to press instead for a curtailment of the working day. If he is successful in obtaining this reduction in hours while his weekly wage remains unaltered, he receives in effect an increase in the real reward for work done. The worker thus decides virtually to "buy more leisure" rather than an additional quantity of ordinary commodities. In other words, leisure takes its place as an essential factor in a person's standard of life.

For upwards of a century, the workers have fought for more leisure both by industrial and by political means. The Industrial Revolution, especially in the early years, caused an enormous amount of over-working. Trade unions were as yet in their infancy, and reformers sought State intervention. This was no easy matter at a time when the "let alone' principle dominated public policy. But this apathy could not be maintained in face of the glaring abuses of the factory system. Children, young persons

ΙΟΙ

and women were the worst sufferers, and several Acts were passed during the first few decades of the nineteenth century limiting the hours of young workers. For example, twelve hours a day became the maximum for child workers in the cotton trade in 1819; the age was raised to eighteen in 1833, and in 1835 employment of juveniles at night was declared illegal. Women were brought within the scope of the Factory Acts in 1844, when their hours were limited to twelve, exclusive of meal-times. Some years later, employment of women in the mines was forbidden.

The "Ten Hours Movement of the 'thirties and 'forties resulted in many trade unions obtaining this maximum working day, even before the legislation of 1847, which made ten hours the maximum for women and young persons and provided for a Saturday half holiday. The legislation, which at first was applied to the textile trades only, was gradually extended to other industries. Although the working hours of men were not specifically controlled by this legislation, the restrictions on female and juvenile employment inevitably affected the working hours of men, especially in the textile mills, for employers did not find it profitable to keep the machinery and plant in operation. for the adult male workers only.

The ten hours maximum having been secured, the workers began to press for a nine hour day. The stone-masons and carpenters had been agitating for the nine hour day even before the Ten Hour Act of 1847, but it was left to the engineers first to obtain this concession from the employers in 1871-2. Several strikes occurred about this time in the struggle for the reduction of working hours.

The next move was the claim for the eight hour day. The demand was not a new one. Robert Owen had advocated it in 1817, while it had figured in the programme of the Chartists and other revolutionaries in the 'forties. The

Trades Union Congress passed a resolution in its favour in 1869. The agitation did not become extensive, however, until the 'eighties, when the Socialists, who were now becoming prominent, gave it their support. In 1888 an Eight Hour Bill for miners was introduced in the House of Commons, but without success. An increasing number of municipalities and private firms granted an eight hour day to their workers, but there was no legislation passed until 1908, when the Miners' Eight Hour Act marked the first direct attempt on the part of the State to control the working hours of adult male labour. The hours of the miners were further reduced to seven in 1919.*

* It is becoming recognised that even national legislation on the subject of working conditions is inadequate, and that some international agreement is essential if the position of the worker is to be improved. The first session of the Conference of the International Labour Organisation (Washington, 1919) adopted several draft conventions, applying to hours, unemployment, childbirth, night work of women, employment in unhealthy processes, employment of children and young persons and the use of white phosphorus. The convention relating to hours was the most important. It aimed at limiting the hours of work in industrial undertakings to eight in the day and forty-eight in the week, subject to certain exceptions. So far, this country has not given legislative effect to this convention. The second session of the conference (Genoa, 1920) dealt solely with the conditions of work of seamen. The third session (Geneva, 1921) was concerned largely with agricultural questions, though attention was also given to such problems as the weekly rest in industry and the use of white lead. The fourth session (Geneva, 1922) was occupied mainly with the improvement of the machinery of international labour legislation, based on the experience gained during the previous three years. The subject of emigration was also considered. In the fifth session (Geneva, 1923), the general principles of the organisation of factory inspection provided the subject for discussion. A detailed recommendation was adopted, relating to the sphere of inspection, the functions and powers of inspectors, and the general organisation of inspection and reports. The sixth session (Geneva, 1924) dealt with the workers' leisure,