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an act of direct hostility? It is among the first limitations to the exercise of the rights of property, that we must so use our own as not to injure another; and it is under the immediate sense of this restriction that nations are bound to act toward each other.

But it is not this transfer alone. There are circumstances both in the time and in the manner of it which deserve attention. A gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. WRIGHT) has told you, that all treaties ought to be published and proclaimed for the information of other nations. I ask, was this a public treaty? No. Was official notice of it given to the government of this country? Was it announced to the President of the United States, in the usual forms of civility between nations who duly respect each other? It was not.... Let gentlemen contradict me if they can. They will say perhaps that it was the omission only of a vain and idle ceremony. Ignorance may indeed pretend that such communication is an empty compliment, which, established without use, may be omitted without offence. But this is not so. If these be ceremonies they are not vain, but of serious import and are founded on strong reason. He who means me well, acts without disguise. Had this transaction been intended fairly, it would have been told frankly. But it was secret because it was hostile. The First Consul in the moment of terminating his differences with you, sought the means of future influence and controul. He found and secured a pivot for that immense lever, by which, with potent arm, he means to subvert your civil and political institutions. Thus, the beginning was made in deep hostility. Conceived in such principles, it presaged no good. Its bodings were evil, and evil have been its fruits. We heard of it during the last session of Congress, but to this hour we have not heard of any formal and regular communication from those by whom it was made. Has the king of Spain? Has the First Consul of France no means of making such communication to the President of the United States? Yes, sir, we have a minister in Spain; we have a minister in France. Nothing was easier, and yet nothing has been done. Our first magistrate has been treated with contempt; and through him our country has been insulted.

With that meek and peaceful spirit now so strongly recommended, we submitted to this insult, and what followed? That which might have been expected; a violation of our treaty. An open and direct violation by a public officer of the Spanish government. This is not the case cited from one

of the books. It is not a wrong done by a private citizen, which might, for that reason, be of doubtful nature. No....it

is by a public officer. That officer, in whose particular department it was to cause the faithful observance of the treaty which he has violated. We are told indeed that there was a clashing of opinion between the Governor and the Intendant. But what have we to do with their domestic broils? The injury is done, we feel it. Let the fault be whose it may, the suffering is ours. But, say gentlemen, the Spanish minister has interfered to correct this irregular procedure. Sir, if the Intendant was amenable to the minister, why did he not inform him of the step he was about to take, that the President of the United States might seasonably have been apprized of his intention, and given the proper notice to our fellow-citizens? Why has he first learnt this offensive act from those who suffer by it? Why is he thus held up to contempt and derision? If the Intendant is to be controled by the minister, would he have taken a step so important without his advice? Common sense will say no. But, the bitter cup of humiliation was not yet full. Smarting under the lash of the Intendant, the minister soothes you with kind assurances, and sends advice boats to announce your forbearance. But while they are on their way, new injury and new insult are added. The Intendant, as if determined to try the extent of your meekness, forbids to your citizens all communication with those who inhabit the shores of the Mississippi. Though they should be starving, the Spaniard is made criminal who should give them food. Fortunately, the waters of the river are potable, or else we should be precluded from the common benefits of nature, the common bounty of heaven. What then, I ask, is the amount of this savage conduct? Sir, it is war. Open and direct war. And yet gentlemen recommend peace, and forbid us to take up the gauntlet of defiance. Will gentlemen sit here and shut their eyes to the state and condition of their country? I shall not reply to what has been said respecting depredations on commerce, but confine myself to objects of which there can be no shadow of doubt. Here is a vast country given away, and not without danger to us. Has a nation a right to put these states in a dangerous situation? No, sir. And yet it has been done, not only without our consent previous to the grant, but without observing the common forms of civility after it was made. Is that wonderful man who presides over the destinies of France, ignorant or unmindful of these forms? See what was done the other day. He directed his minister to

communicate to the elector of Bavaria, his intended movements in Switzerland, and their object. He knew the elector had a right to expect that information, although the greater part of Swabia lies between his dominions and Switzerland. And this right is founded on the broad principles already mentioned.

As to the depredations on our commerce, they are numerous, and of great importance; but my honorable colleague has told us, our merchants are in a fair way of getting redress. I own, sir, I am surprized at this information, which is, I presume, a state secret, communicated from the executive department. My honorable colleague, who is the pattern of discretion, who was the monitor, and threatened to be the castigator of those, who, from treachery or weakness, might betray or divulge the secrets of the Senate, cannot possibly allude to any thing on our files. He has, therefore, received this information from some other quarter, and I feel myself much obliged by his kind communication. But he must pardon me, sir, that until it comes forward in some body, shape, or condition, which I can grasp, I am compelled to withhold my faith.

Having thus examined the existent state of things, I proceed to consider the consequence to the United States, resulting from the possession of that country by France. To this effect I shall suppose the Floridas to be included in her newly acquired dominion, and shall state what I conceive to be the conduct which she will pursue. She will, I presume, consider herself as not bound by our treaty with Spain. Declaring this to the inhabitants of the western country, and repelling the claim of right, she will (as matter of favor) give them unlimited freedom of trade to and from New Orleans. At that place, she will eventually raise a considerable duty on exports, to pay the expence of her garrisons, and of the civil administration. But to compensate this, she will probably give an exclusive privilege of commerce to her colonies, and obtain from Spain and Holland similar privileges. Under these circumstances, let us examine the general and particular consequences to this our country.

The general consequences are those which affect our commerce, our revenue, our defence, and what is of more importance even than these, our union. Your commerce will suffer, because you will no longer hold the means of supplying the West-India islands subject to your single control, and because all the export from New Orleans, being, of course, in R

French bottoms, your navigation will be proportionably dimi nished. Your revenue will suffer as much as your commerce. The extensive boundary of more than two thousand miles, will be stocked with goods for the purpose of contraband trade. The inhabitants will naturally take their supplies in that way. You must therefore multiply your revenue officers and their assistants, and while your receipt diminishes, the expence of collection will be encreased. As to what regards your defence, it is evident that the decrease of your navigation and revenue, must narrow your means of defence. You cannot provide the same force either by land or by sea; but the evil does not stop there. With this country in your possession, you have means of defence more ample, more important, more easy than any nation on earth. In a short time all the West-India islands, fed from your granaries, must depend on your will. And in consequence, all the powers of Europe who have colonies there, must court your friendship. Those rich sources of commercial importance will be as it were in your hands.... They will be pledges for the amity of others in seas and dominions far remote. It is a defence, which though it costs you nothing, is superior to fleets and armies. But let the resources of America be divided, (which must happen when the French are masters of New Orleans) and all this power and influence are gone. One half your resources will be in their hands, and they will laugh at your feeble attempts with the other half. It is the interest of this country that the possessions of European powers in the West-Indies should be secured to them. And in this view of the subject it is important that the island of St. Domingo should be subjected by France, it would therefore have been wise to have aided in that subjugation. There is indeed a special reason for it beyond the considerations of external policy. That event will give to your slaves the conviction that it is impossible for them to become free. Men in their unhappy condition must be impelled by fear, and discouraged by despair. Yes!...The impulsion of fear must be strengthened by the hand of despair! Consider, moreover, your condition in the wars which are most likely to happen. These must be either with France or England. If with France, your interior is ruined; if with England, the commerce of the Atlantic states will be distressed, and that of the western country too, though not perhaps in so great a degree. Thus let the war be with whichsoever of those nations it may, one half of the United States must be peculiarly inju and in all cases it will be difficult for them to assist each

red;

other. The interior has no seamen for naval defence, the seaboard can send few if any troops beyond the mountains. This powerful influence of one nation on one great division of our country, and of another nation on the remainder, will tend to disunite us. The ridge of mountains will mark the line of distinct interests. The effect of those differing interests will be felt in your councils. It will find its way to this floor. This must be the case so long as man is man. Look I pray at those nations. The enmity of France and England can terminate only by the subjection of one to the dominion of the other. It must be by the complete exertion of force, and the utter impossibility of resistance. They are the Rome and Carthage of modern times. Their implacable spirit will stimulate them to attempt a division of this country, by sentiments of hatred, deadly as their own. These efforts will, I hope, be vain: but with such powerful engines to operate on the interest and the will, is there not danger to that union so essential to our pros perity? There will be a constant struggle in Congress as to the kind of public force which ought to be maintained. The one part will desire an army, the other a navy. The unyielding spirit of party, will, perhaps, prevent the support of either; leaving the nation completely defenceless, and thereby increas ing the power of those who may influence or command our destinies. For let it be remembered, that a nation without public force, is not an independent nation. In a greater or smaller degree, she will receive the law from others.

Having thus considered the effect of this cession upon the United States, in a general point of view, let us now examine it more particularly, as it regards the greater divisions of our country, the western, the southern, the middle, and the eastern states. I fear, sir, I shall detain you longer than I intended, certainly longer than the light of day will last, notwithstanding my effort to comprise what I have to say in the smallest compass. As to the western states, the effects will be remote and immediate. Those more remote may be examined under the twofold aspect of peace and war. In peace they will suffer the diminution of price for their produce. The ad vantage of supplying the French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies, may at first sight lead to a different opinion; but when the port of New Orleans is shut to all but French ships, there will no longer be that competition which now exists, and which always results in the highest price that commodities can bear. The French merchants have neither the large capital, nor have they the steady temper and persevering industry which

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