THE RÔLE OF THE INFANTRY IN MODERN

WARFARE1

GENERAL MALLETERRE

[General J. M. G. Malleterre is an officer of the French Army who was wounded at the first Battle of the Marne and is now Governor of the Invalides, Paris. He has also served as military critic of the Paris Temps. The article of which the present selection is only one part was put into English by Herbert Adams Gibbons, and is an admirable example of the simple exposition of a technical subject.]

In spite of the revolution that has been wrought by modern science, the chief rôle in everything that is done in this world is played by men working together. The forces that we have created by our brains are not a substitute for our own efforts, individually and collectively. They enable us only to do more than we would otherwise have done. They are not substitutes; they are accessories. They would be substitutes in warfare only if one side alone employed them. Employed by both sides, they neutralize each other, and we fall back upon man power as the final and decisive element.

Those who are not actually engaged in the new warfare think that it consists in long periods of stagnation, with an occasional local action here and there, and a rare offensive movement on a large scale. The daily bulletins issued by the armies lend color to this impression. It is, however, wholly wrong. Trench warfare is a continuous battle that will not end until the armistice is signed. On the front there is always firing, there is always fighting. The artillery has no rest night or day; the infantry, never ceasing its vigil, exposed all the time to shell fire and sniping, plies the shovel

1 From "How Battles Are Fought To-Day," Harper's Magazine, October, 1917. Copyright, 1917, by Harper & Brothers. Reprinted by permission.

and the pick, with arms at hand to repel or attack. This has taught us to make the unit battalions instead of divisions or regiments, and to exert every effort to avoid daily losses from needless and thoughtless exposure, and to get the day's work accomplished by division of labor that will keep the men in condition for the test that may come at any moment.

It is by battalion that sectors are occupied, by battalion that offensive movements are carried on, by battalion that small operations are organized. The officer who commands a battalion does not have to think about tactical and strategic problems, but he is the chief reliance of the General Staff in the execution of an offensive movement. If we want to understand how an offensive is prepared and carried outin a word, how war is being fought in the autumn of 1917, the rôle of the infantry must be treated from the standpoint of the battalion. A sector is that portion of the front lines occupied by a battalion. The battalions are the units. When a battalion moves up to relieve another battalion the problem of the organization of the sector confronts the commanding officer of the battalion. From the moment the order is given to move forward to occupy a sector until the battalion is brought back for rest, the responsibilities and duties of the commanding officer are as great and as onerous as those of his superiors. He is like the foreman in industrial life - constantly at it, responsible for what the men under him are doing, responsible to them as well as to the men higher up. He has to think of everything, carry a dozen different things at one time in his head, and be ready for any emergency. He must keep his men in good moral and physical condition by a just division of labor and by looking after their food and their safety. Psychologist, pathologist, carpenter, builder, engineer, cook, physician, scout, judge, father get all these professions together, none of which are learned at St.Cyr, and you have a good chef de bataillon.

The organization of a sector consists of: (a) accessory defenses (élements de tranchée) which are made to arrest and

retard the enemy advancing under fire of the defense; (b) first line of surveillance, occupied by very few men, from which all ground in front can be well seen; (c) line of resistance, occupied very strongly, which must be defended, in principle, whatever happens; (d) lines of support, which contain here and there strongly organized centers that can be defended while lines in the rear are being organized. These successive lines are connected by communication trenches (boyaux). The boyaux serve primarily for protecting the soldiers going forward or coming from the front lines, the transmission of ammunition and food, the evacuation of wounded, and the passage of officers on their rounds. But at the moment of an attack, if the enemy has broken through one or more lines, the boyaux can be used also as defensive trenches, and are extremely useful in subjecting the enemy to a flanking fire. All the lines of trenches, as well as the centers of resistance on the line of support and the boyaux, are now protected by a prodigality of barbed-wire entanglements. The parallel trenches, as far as is possible, are dug in zigzag form, following the old principle of fortification, not only in order to subject the attackers to cross fire, but also to enable the defenders to hold a portion of the trench more readily, if the enemy breaks through at any point. Just before a general offensive movement steps are dug in the wall of the trench nearest the enemy, to facilitate the climbing out of the attacking forces, and the boyaux are widened so that reënforcements and munitions can pass rapidly.

The accessory defenses depend entirely upon the nature of the ground that lies in front of the first line of surveillance, and this consideration dictates also how strongly it is advisable to occupy élements de tranchée. The first line of surveillance cannot always be a continuous line. Sometimes it means only a little post here and there. Watchers (guetteurs) must be on the qui vive in the first line night and day. With adequate artillery preparation, it is always possible for the

enemy to occupy the elements de tranchée and the première ligne. When one reads in the bulletins of the capture of these two advanced lines, the same or a following bulletin generally states that a counter attack has driven out the invaders. An offensive movement can be considered as serious only when the line of resistance, where the defenders are well dug in, has been carried. This line, too, can be smothered by heavy artillery. As we fight to-day, a big offensive is launched only after the line of resistance is supposed to be wholly destroyed, and the line of support subjected to a demoralizing shelling, which continues during the offensive. The line of support, occupied by entire companies, to whom reënforcements can be sent without delay, is where the attacking forces, if the artillery preparation has been sufficient, begin to suffer their first serious losses. The centers of resistance, villages and concrete forts, where existing buildings cannot be utilized, pour a deadly machine-gun fire upon the attackers.

Under these conditions one might think that the infantry, constantly exposed to annihilation, has to play a passive rôle at least in the first three lines. What can be done against a crushing artillery fire? Nothing can be done in the sector or sectors upon which the enemy concentrates his fire. But we must remember that there never will be enough cannon and enough ammunition to batter down the first and second positions, and keep shelling during the attack the lines of support, for more than a few kilometers at a time. Even within the few kilometers chosen for a concentration of fire, we have learned that millions of shells do not create everywhere equally great ravages and equally favorable openings for the attackers. Consequently, while some sectors are doomed to destruction, others remain to take the enemy on the flank as he pours through the holes his artillery has made. This is true of offensives on a large scale as well as of local operations. Hence it is of a prime importance for each sector to keep in contact with the neighboring sectors, to be ready at any moment to go to the aid

of a threatened sector, or to help surround enemy forces that have advanced too far. The battalion commanders are in touch with their neighbors on both sides and with the higher command in the rear. If this contact be never lost, it is always possible for the commanders of groups of units, on up to General Headquarters, to know what is happening, and to direct operations in the ensemble.

At this point one may ask why I have started in to describe an offensive movement by talking about defensive organization. This is easily understood if one realizes that offensive warfare means now unfortunately! no more than the moving of a few sectors forward a few kilometers. The success of this limited biting into the enemy lines depends upon the rapid organization of the ground taken. The battalion commanders can tolerate no moment of repose, no matter how exhausted their soldiers may be. Hesitation, bungling, slowness, are fatal. For very soon new enemy batteries will enter into action, and violent counter-attacks to gain the lost ground must be expected. So every offensive implies a defensive. If the officers and men who attack are not able to organize without delay the ground they have won, not only will they be subjected to a heavy bombardment before they have dug themselves in, but they will be forced to defend themselves in positions inferior to ones they have left. With artillery conditions such as they are, the infantry is able to conquer ground with slight losses; but, by the same token, holding the ground won necessitates sacrifices.

For taking the offensive, then, the first training for officers and men is in organizing defensively a sector, and in learning how to keep in touch with the sectors on both sides and with the higher command in the rear. The use of pick and shovel is as important as that of rifle and bayonet and grenade. Learning how to avoid needless exposure, how to go back and forth in the boyaux at night, and how to bring up supplies, must be followed by instruction in the study of the enemy ground in front. Space forbids me even to mention the