Public Administration & Public Management: The Principal-Agent PerspectiveRoutledge, 21/08/2006 - 304 من الصفحات A perspective on the public sector that presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of exactly what it is and how it operates. Governments in any society deliver a large number of services and goods to their populations. To get the job done, they need public management in order to steer resources – employees, money and laws – into policy outputs and outcomes. In well-ordered societies the teams who work for the state work under a rule-of-law framework, known as public administration. This book covers the key issues of:
Public Administration & Public Management is essential reading for those with professional and research interests in public administration and public management. |
المحتوى
| 29 | |
Public principals and their agents | 48 |
The economic reasons for government | 77 |
Public organisation incentives and rationality in government | 100 |
Micro rationality versus macro rationality | 106 |
arena and organisation | 113 |
legality and rule of law | 125 |
Separation of powers | 131 |
the relevance of social policy | 163 |
Public teams are different from private teams | 171 |
Public insurance | 212 |
What is public management policy? | 228 |
contracting in the public sector | 250 |
Bibliography | 263 |
Index | 280 |
228 | 286 |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
accountability administrative law adverse selection agency agent allocation analysis asymmetric information basic behaviour budgetary budgeting bureau bureaucracy Cambridge Chicago School economics chicken game citizens competition concept constitutional contract coordination failure countries decision-making democracy deregulation efficiency effort employed employees enforcement ex ante ex post federal game theory goals Hayek he/she his/her implementation incentives institutions legal-rational authority macro rationality maximise meaning mechanism ment micro monitoring moral hazard OECD Osborne outputs and outcomes outsourcing perspective players policy-making political principal-agent framework Principal-agent interaction principal-agent problems private organisation private sector privatisation problem programmes public administration public enterprises public firms public law public management public organisation public policy public principal public sector reform public services regime regulation relevance remuneration risk rule of law social policies social security spontaneous order strategy tion traditional public transaction costs underlines University Press Weber well-ordered society Wildavsky