Public Administration & Public Management: The Principal-Agent PerspectiveRoutledge, 21/08/2006 - 304 من الصفحات A perspective on the public sector that presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of exactly what it is and how it operates. Governments in any society deliver a large number of services and goods to their populations. To get the job done, they need public management in order to steer resources – employees, money and laws – into policy outputs and outcomes. In well-ordered societies the teams who work for the state work under a rule-of-law framework, known as public administration. This book covers the key issues of:
Public Administration & Public Management is essential reading for those with professional and research interests in public administration and public management. |
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النتائج 1-5 من 42
الصفحة vi
... enforcement mechanism and groups 87 Contractarian schools 89 Contracting in the public sector 93 The two kinds of transaction costs 93 The state and transaction costs 95 Transaction costs and fairness 98 Conclusion 99 48 77 Public ...
... enforcement mechanism and groups 87 Contractarian schools 89 Contracting in the public sector 93 The two kinds of transaction costs 93 The state and transaction costs 95 Transaction costs and fairness 98 Conclusion 99 48 77 Public ...
الصفحة 14
... enforce contracts with their employees that solicit a high work effort resulting in high quality and quantity outcomes . The macro objectives of a public organisation laid down in policy docu- ments and stated in public law can only be ...
... enforce contracts with their employees that solicit a high work effort resulting in high quality and quantity outcomes . The macro objectives of a public organisation laid down in policy docu- ments and stated in public law can only be ...
الصفحة 24
... enforced . However , government cannot operate according to private organisation . The market selects the winners and the losers from among the private enterprises as the business cycle unfolds , some companies expanding and others ...
... enforced . However , government cannot operate according to private organisation . The market selects the winners and the losers from among the private enterprises as the business cycle unfolds , some companies expanding and others ...
الصفحة 31
... enforcement of agreements between first , the leaders of government and an organisation responsible for service delivery , and second , the leaders of the organisa- tion and single individuals . It makes little sense under the PAF to ...
... enforcement of agreements between first , the leaders of government and an organisation responsible for service delivery , and second , the leaders of the organisa- tion and single individuals . It makes little sense under the PAF to ...
الصفحة 38
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المحتوى
| 29 | |
Public principals and their agents | 48 |
The economic reasons for government | 77 |
Public organisation incentives and rationality in government | 100 |
Micro rationality versus macro rationality | 106 |
arena and organisation | 113 |
legality and rule of law | 125 |
Separation of powers | 131 |
the relevance of social policy | 163 |
Public teams are different from private teams | 171 |
Public insurance | 212 |
What is public management policy? | 228 |
contracting in the public sector | 250 |
Bibliography | 263 |
Index | 280 |
228 | 286 |
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عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
accountability administrative law adverse selection agency agent allocation analysis asymmetric information basic behaviour budgetary budgeting bureau bureaucracy Cambridge Chicago School economics chicken game citizens competition concept constitutional contract coordination failure countries decision-making democracy deregulation efficiency effort employed employees enforcement ex ante ex post federal game theory goals Hayek he/she his/her implementation incentives institutions legal-rational authority macro rationality maximise meaning mechanism ment micro monitoring moral hazard OECD Osborne outputs and outcomes outsourcing perspective players policy-making political principal-agent framework Principal-agent interaction principal-agent problems private organisation private sector privatisation problem programmes public administration public enterprises public firms public law public management public organisation public policy public principal public sector reform public services regime regulation relevance remuneration risk rule of law social policies social security spontaneous order strategy tion traditional public transaction costs underlines University Press Weber well-ordered society Wildavsky