Public Administration & Public Management: The Principal-Agent PerspectiveRoutledge, 21/08/2006 - 304 من الصفحات A perspective on the public sector that presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of exactly what it is and how it operates. Governments in any society deliver a large number of services and goods to their populations. To get the job done, they need public management in order to steer resources – employees, money and laws – into policy outputs and outcomes. In well-ordered societies the teams who work for the state work under a rule-of-law framework, known as public administration. This book covers the key issues of:
Public Administration & Public Management is essential reading for those with professional and research interests in public administration and public management. |
من داخل الكتاب
النتائج 1-5 من 62
الصفحة i
... incentives and rationality in government the essence of public administration : legality and the rule of law public policy criteria : the Cambridge and Chicago positions public teams and private teams public firms public insurance ...
... incentives and rationality in government the essence of public administration : legality and the rule of law public policy criteria : the Cambridge and Chicago positions public teams and private teams public firms public insurance ...
الصفحة v
... Incentives : how is egoism and social value recognised ? 33 Principal - agent games 34 The principal - agent approach and the public sector 38 Management , public organisation and the principal - agent model 41 Public management and the ...
... Incentives : how is egoism and social value recognised ? 33 Principal - agent games 34 The principal - agent approach and the public sector 38 Management , public organisation and the principal - agent model 41 Public management and the ...
الصفحة vi
... incentives 53 The fundamental agency problem in the public sector 57 Public sector agency : hidden action 58 Public sector agency : hidden knowledge 60 The two main solutions to the agency problems 61 Budgeting : the principal - agent ...
... incentives 53 The fundamental agency problem in the public sector 57 Public sector agency : hidden action 58 Public sector agency : hidden knowledge 60 The two main solutions to the agency problems 61 Budgeting : the principal - agent ...
الصفحة 8
... incentives in organisations . Thus , NPM would employ the following market - inspired mechanisms : Policy - provision split and purchaser - provider split : Governments do many things , which is why it is essential to isolate the ...
... incentives in organisations . Thus , NPM would employ the following market - inspired mechanisms : Policy - provision split and purchaser - provider split : Governments do many things , which is why it is essential to isolate the ...
الصفحة 11
... incentives , which Kooiman almost entirely bypasses . Public administration and management is , in my view , first and foremost strategy , and incentives are crucial for determining the strategies of the players involved , whether the ...
... incentives , which Kooiman almost entirely bypasses . Public administration and management is , in my view , first and foremost strategy , and incentives are crucial for determining the strategies of the players involved , whether the ...
المحتوى
| 29 | |
Public principals and their agents | 48 |
The economic reasons for government | 77 |
Public organisation incentives and rationality in government | 100 |
Micro rationality versus macro rationality | 106 |
arena and organisation | 113 |
legality and rule of law | 125 |
Separation of powers | 131 |
the relevance of social policy | 163 |
Public teams are different from private teams | 171 |
Public insurance | 212 |
What is public management policy? | 228 |
contracting in the public sector | 250 |
Bibliography | 263 |
Index | 280 |
228 | 286 |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
accountability administrative law adverse selection agency agent allocation analysis asymmetric information basic behaviour budgetary budgeting bureau bureaucracy Cambridge Chicago School economics chicken game citizens competition concept constitutional contract coordination failure countries decision-making democracy deregulation efficiency effort employed employees enforcement ex ante ex post federal game theory goals Hayek he/she his/her implementation incentives institutions legal-rational authority macro rationality maximise meaning mechanism ment micro monitoring moral hazard OECD Osborne outputs and outcomes outsourcing perspective players policy-making political principal-agent framework Principal-agent interaction principal-agent problems private organisation private sector privatisation problem programmes public administration public enterprises public firms public law public management public organisation public policy public principal public sector reform public services regime regulation relevance remuneration risk rule of law social policies social security spontaneous order strategy tion traditional public transaction costs underlines University Press Weber well-ordered society Wildavsky