...jaxieiy^of ideas jar objects_of knovvledge, there is likewise something3 which knows or- jr^rceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing,...them. This perceiving, active being is what I call imnd,spirit~soltl, or myself. By whjch wocds. I do not denote any one_o£ my ideas, but a thing. .ent.irdy_disti.nct_.f...

...are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MJND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do^not denote any_ one .of my ideas, but a thing entirely...

...are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...about them. This perceiving, active being is what I caj.1 MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing...

...perhaps unconsciously, he says the ego is something besides these, as a different thing from them. "But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...there is likewise something which knows or perceives, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, or remembering about them. This perceiving,...

...unconsciously, he says the ego is something besides these, as a different thing from them. "But, besidei all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge,...there is likewise something which knows or perceives, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, or remembering about them. This perceiving,...

...proceeds, like Locke, dogmatically to assert that a thinking subject exists : — ' But besides all the endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge,...perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, CHAP. VII. or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct...

...from the mind. " This perceiving, active being," says Berkeley (Principles of Knowledge, in initio), " is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which...my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them." Hume (Understanding, IV. vi.) denied the reality of spiritual substance, contending that there is nothing...

...besagt, wodurch sie percipirt werden; denn die Existenz einer Idee besteht im Percipirtwerden.' (,But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...them. This perceiving, active being is what I call miiul, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I clo not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely...

...are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. / 2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects...knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or per[ing, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active ) ceives them, and exercises divers operations,...

..."the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of," For, "besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge there is likewise something that knows or perceives them.'" This perceiving, active being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or...