...as a copying-machine, let me only point to its contradiction to his famous assertion that the mind is "nothing but a heap or collection of different...relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity." He might as well say that a locomotive was nothing but a succession...

...as a copying-machine, let me only point to its contradiction to his famous assertion that the mind is ''nothing but a heap or collection of different...perceptions united together by certain relations, and "Jpposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity." He might as well say...

...But to. Hume, who expressly excludes such a subject—with whom 'it exists ' = 'it is felt'—such an answer is inadmissible. He can, in fact, only meet...detached from this ' heap ' of other perceptions, which, on Hume's principle that whatever is distinguishable is separable, is no more impossible than to distinguish...

...exist, and to continue, independently of our perception of them ; but he adds that " what we call mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions...be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." Then, in reference to the external objects of perception, he says that " an interrupted appearance...

...phenomena of matter, no more is it needed for the phenomena of mind. " What we call a mind" he says, " is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions,...be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." * This reads like a parody of Berkeley, who says: "A cherry is nothing but a congeries of sensible...

...meaningless. (2.) He questioned the substantial existence of mind. " What we call mind," he says, " is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions,...certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endued with a perfect simplicity and identity." The category of substance is no less out of place in...

...distinct existences." " What we call mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different impressions united together by certain relations, and supposed,...be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." He gives the same account of what we call matter. He shows that having nothing but impressions we can...

...Extension, 5 3). § 4. A perception can very well be separate from the mind, since the mind is only ' a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations,' 207 ; our resembling impressions are not really identical nor their existence continued, 210; 'all...

...materialists in the practical denial of personality. The sceptic Hume had said, "What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions,...endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity."" In similar language his modern follower, the agnostic Spencer, declares that the mind is " composed...

...relations can only exist in the unity of self-consciousness." * Hume asserted, that " what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions,...certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endued with a perfect simplicity and identity." Of this definition or affirmation Professor Diman says...