...(252); "there is properly not simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different" (253). Hence "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I can never catch myself ' . . . without a perception. . . . When my perceptions are remov'd for...

...bundle of perceptions enters most intimately into what it calls itself, the bundle always stumbles on some particular perception or other, of heat or...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. The bundle never can catch itself at any time without perception and never can observe anything but...

...self. Hume famously denied that any such thing as a self was manifest in our experience: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... 1 never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the...

...most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.31 However, like Dennett, Hume was not a complete skeptic about the self. He conceded that...

...Körpers dereinst - im Tod - sogar vollkommen vernichtet sein wird: „When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remove'd by death, and cou'd I neither think,...

...se//-consciousness? To this last question Hume gave the emphatic answer 'no!' He said 'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other ... I never catch myself at anytime without a perception, and never can observe...

...from perceptions. But selves are not epistemically available or observable in the above manner — "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception" (T 252). Hence, selves are not genuine metaphysical entities. Hume writes...

...Hume's. Just as Hume denied that there is any distinct impression of the self, claiming instead that "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular impression. ... I can never catch myself At any time without an impression, and...

...VI. Of Personal Identity, vol. I (of the first English edition, London 1739)' P- 438f-: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not...

...which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference«, findet aber: »For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...perception, and never can observe anything but the perception«5. Selbst oder Person ist »nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions«6....