...some philosophers, who imagine we arc every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self ' i that we feel its existence and its continuance in...existence ; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a Of the demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simpliKeptical and . . . . other city. The strongest...

...nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely as before. SECTION VI. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every...demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view,...

...addition of Leibnitz, ' except the Intellect itself,' for he granted mental existence. HUME denied ' that we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self, and maintained that we are only ' a bundle of perceptions.' — Treatise on Human Nature (1739), 1....

...but that every thing remains precisely as be- the soul*. fore. SECT. VI. — Of Personal Identity. There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every...demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view,...

...but that every thing remains precisely as be-i the soul. fore. SECT. VI. — Of Personal Identity . There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every...demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, , the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this...

...addition of Leibnitz, ' except the Intellect itself,' for he granted mental existence. HUME denied ' that we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our Self, and maintained that we are only ' a bundle of perceptions.' — Treatise on Human Nature (1739), i....

...other as insufficient and inconclusive. It was argumentation of this sort which led Hume to say : " There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call ourself. Undeniably, all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded...

...personal identity, of the unity of consciousness, and the simplicity and immateriality of the soul. " There are some philosophers who imagine we are every...moment intimately conscious of what we call our self (in German philosophy, ' das Ich ') ; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence,...

...Berkeley occupied. ' There are,' argued Hume, ' some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its...to that very experience, which is pleaded for them. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular...

...Berkeley occupied. ' There are,' argued Hume, ' some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment conscious of what we call our SELF ; that we feel...demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. . . . TJuluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded...