...thinks he has a different notior of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. . . . He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me."(5) "Something simple and continued!" Here is brought out precisely that temporal permanence which...

...of sensory experience to be found. of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. ... He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me."(5> "Something simple and continued!" Here is brought out precisely that temporal permanence which...

...I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. But setting...

...I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. . . . The mind...

...I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may perhaps, perceive something simple and countinu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise:...

...I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.22 The argument...

...I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular....though I am certain there is no such principle in me.11 Perhaps it is the constancy of his perception, rather than the constancy of the self, that gives...

...I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular....though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise on Human Nature, I, IV, sec. 6). References Hawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. San...

...inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (T.252). Conclusion: Hume wrote that one "may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me" (T: 252). Frondizi comments, "Why should one suppose that the self is immutable? Why cannot we accept...

...what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other. . . . [Another person] may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me." The Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796) made the following points as a way of refuting his...