...ego which now recalls it? This truth has been extensively overlooked or denied. Thus Hume says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception."...

...or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ;...

...impresses, and we are at once in the region of existences, internal and external. " I never," he says, " catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception." His very language contradicts itself. He talks of catching himself....

...question. A complementary inconsistency will be found in Hume and the Associationists. When Hume says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the...

...we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self (in German philosophy,' das ich'); that we feel its existence and its continuance in...and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself,...

...we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self (in German philosophy,' das Ich'); that we feel its existence and its continuance in...shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can cateh myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When...

...are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self (in German philosophy, ' das Ich ') ; that we feel its existence and its continuance in...I call myself, I always stumble on some particular percepVOL. II. L tion or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure....

...or from any other, that the idea of self is derived ; and consequently there is no such idea . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can...

...or from any other that the idea of self is derived, and consequently there is no such idea. Again : When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as...

...substratum. Hume's criticism of the doctrine of personal identity was very acute. " For my part," he says, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hate, pain or pleasure....