...form of the problem in modern Western philosophy, Bermudez cites a well-known passage from David Hume: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception" (Hume...

...some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception....

...capable of happiness or misery. . . ."" Whereas in "The Treatise of Human Nature" Hume asserts that "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure."14 For Locke the self is "that conscious thinking thing" which disciplines sensation; reason...

...picture of the self. Hume famously denied that any such thing as a self was manifest in our experience: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... 1 never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the...

...(252); "there is properly not simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different" (253). Hence "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I can never catch myself ' . . . without a perception. . . . When my perceptions are remov'd for...

...bundle of perceptions enters most intimately into what it calls itself, the bundle always stumbles on some particular perception or other, of heat or...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. The bundle never can catch itself at any time without perception and never can observe anything but...

...most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.31 However, like Dennett, Hume was not a complete skeptic about the self. He conceded that...

...immediately aware of in se//-consciousness? To this last question Hume gave the emphatic answer 'no!' He said 'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other ... I never catch myself at anytime without a perception, and never can observe...

...from perceptions. But selves are not epistemically available or observable in the above manner — "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception" (T 252). Hence, selves are not genuine metaphysical entities. Hume writes...

...Hume's. Just as Hume denied that there is any distinct impression of the self, claiming instead that "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular impression. ... I can never catch myself At any time without an impression, and...