...metaphysicians whom he waives aside. The metaphysician, being a metaphysician, " may perhaps," Hume says, " perceive something simple and continued, which he...though I am certain there is no such principle in me." Of course, if there is no " me," there can be no such principle in me. But if there is no such principle...

...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued...though I am certain there is no such principle in me. I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of...

...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something , simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me.1 As has been pointed out by many critics of Hume, he uses in ; the above passage the pronouns I,...

...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me.1 As has been pointed out by many critics of Hume, he uses in the above passage the pronouns /,...

...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to af&rm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions,...

...unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notior of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. . . . He may, perhaps, perceive something...though I am certain there is no such principle in me."(5) "Something simple and continued!" Here is brought out precisely that temporal permanence which...

...closest scrutiny of sensory experience to be found. of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. ... He may, perhaps, perceive something...though I am certain there is no such principle in me."(5> "Something simple and continued!" Here is brought out precisely that temporal permanence which...

...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me.11 Perhaps it is the constancy of his perception, rather than the constancy of the self, that gives...

...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise on Human Nature, I, IV, sec. 6). References Hawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. San...

...inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (T.252). Conclusion: Hume wrote that one "may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me" (T: 252). Frondizi comments, "Why should one suppose that the self is immutable? Why cannot we accept...