...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.22 The argument...

...he has a different notion of himself, I must confess that I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...though I am certain there is no such principle in me.11 Perhaps it is the constancy of his perception, rather than the constancy of the self, that gives...

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise on Human Nature, I, IV, sec. 6). References Hawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. San...

...inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (T.252). Conclusion: Hume wrote that one "may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me" (T: 252). Frondizi comments, "Why should one suppose that the self is immutable? Why cannot we accept...

...what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other. . . . [Another person] may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me." The Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796) made the following points as a way of refuting his...

...thinks he has a different notion of bimself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...that we are essentially different in this particular" (252). Hume's introspective experiment raises a second question. In using the phrase "when I enter...

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. But setting...

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this 1 T., 1, 4, 5, p. 250. ' T., 1, 4, 6. pp. 251-2. particular. He may perhaps perceive something simple...

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind," - that is, who feel and believe, that they have a soul, - "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind,...

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.378 Vor dem Hintergrund...