[ عذرًا، محتوى هذه الصفحة مقيَّد ]

[ عذرًا، محتوى هذه الصفحة مقيَّد ]

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.22 The argument...

[ عذرًا، محتوى هذه الصفحة مقيَّد ]

...he has a different notion of himself, I must confess that I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...though I am certain there is no such principle in me.11 Perhaps it is the constancy of his perception, rather than the constancy of the self, that gives...

[ عذرًا، محتوى هذه الصفحة مقيَّد ]

...thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well...though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise on Human Nature, I, IV, sec. 6). References Hawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. San...

[ عذرًا، محتوى هذه الصفحة مقيَّد ]

[ عذرًا، محتوى هذه الصفحة مقيَّد ]

...inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (T.252). Conclusion: Hume wrote that one "may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...though I am certain there is no such principle in me" (T: 252). Frondizi comments, "Why should one suppose that the self is immutable? Why cannot we accept...