...question. A complementary inconsistency will be found in Hume and the Associationists. When Hume says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the...

...which is pleaded for them; nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into' what...shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can cateh myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When...

...which is pleaded for them ; nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...I call myself, I always stumble on some particular percepVOL. II. L tion or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure....

...or from any other, that the idea of self is derived ; and consequently there is no such idea . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can...

...or from any other that the idea of self is derived, and consequently there is no such idea. Again : When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as...

...substratum. Hume's criticism of the doctrine of personal identity was very acute. " For my part," he says, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hate, pain or pleasure....

...substance is not cognisable ? Kant also finds, as the result of his profound introspective research, that " when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...always stumble on some particular perception or other". When I eliminate all attributes, that which I deem substantial remains unknown. Our reason is discursive,...

...to different faculties. Theories relating to the ego. — They are the following: Hume's theory. " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself, at any time, without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."...

...is nothing to give us the impression of a perennial and invariable self. ' When I enter,' he says, ' most intimately into what I call myself, I always...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.' Mind is nothing but a bundle of conceptions, in a perpetual flux and movement. He goes on to explain...

...or from nny other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on soim1 perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never...