...which the remembrance or expecta' tion of those sensations is the part now present. If, ' therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, ' we...of accepting the paradox, that something which ex ' hypoihesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of ' itself as a series. ' The truth is, that...

...clearly shown its insufficiency, that I prefer to quote his words on the subject : " If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future [present?]; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something...

...mind into a " series of sensations," is obliged to pass on from stage to stage, till it is necessary to complete the statement by calling it a series of...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future. "Itself?" Yes; that is what he calls the "final inexplicability.1' This final inexplicability, which...

...is (in one wellknown passage) most honestly and clearly stated by him. " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself, as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any...

...conceiving it, is nothing but the succes" sion of my feelings." On p. 261, he adds, " If therefore, " we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are...calling it a series of feelings " which is aware of ilsdf as past or future." But how any series can be " aware of itself," he does not tell us. Herbert...

..." Natural Philosophy," vol. ip 31 1 : Thomson and Tait. to be ourselves. If we say — the Mind is a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future. Thus we are brought to the alternative of saying — the Mind is something different from any series...

...to be correct in so far as it exTRUTH AND INTELLECTUAL CONSENSUS. 361 presses the fact that mind is "a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." In short, these "illusory intuitions," by the showing of those who affirm them to be illusory, are...

...past ; and expectation involves the belief that a sensation will exist in the future. If, moreover, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are...series of feelings which is aware of itself as past or present. Did ever the hypostatization of abstractions go farther than when a series of feelings...

...the dawn of consciousness to my last breath I do not part with myself. " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we 2 are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from...

...therefore, under the necessity of amending or supplementing his definition of mind by adding that it is a series of feelings " which is aware of itself as past and future." But, how can a series of feelings be conscious of itself as "past and future" ? Consciousness is only...