.... . . which it seems to me beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to remove." And he adds, " if we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." "The truth is, we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton...

...feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling." He concedes that in adhering to this definition "we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypotfiesit is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." In reBpect to the belief...

...crowned by the paradox which Hume never would have ventured to assert, viz. : that the mind is only " a series of feelings, which is aware of itself as past and future," although he confesses in the same breath that this brings us into contact with that " final inexplicability...

...crowned by the paradox which Hume never would have ventured to assert, viz.: that the mind is only " a series of feelings, which is aware of itself as past and future," although he confesses in the same breath that this brings us into contact with that " final inexplicability...

...which the remembrance or expecta' tion of those sensations is the part now present. If, ' therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, ' we...future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of be' lieving that the mind, or Ego, is something different ' from any series of feelings, or possibilities...

...which the remembrance or the expectation of those sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it n series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and weaare reduced to the alternative...

...я series of feelings, wo ar« obliged to complete the statement by calling it a srrits of /flings which is aware of ITSELF as past and future ; and we are reduced to tho alternative of believing that the mind or Ego is something different from any scries of feelings...

...one well-known passage) most honestly and clearly stated by Mr Mill : " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any...

...of which the remembrance or expectation of these sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are...is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which « hypothesi is but a...

...difficulty in resolving matter into "the per-' manent possibility of sensations," he admits that, " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are...or of accepting the paradox, that something which is ex hypothesi but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."2 He adds: "The theory...