On my visit to the Air and Space Museum "annex" in Dulles Airport, I bought this survey book to brush up my limited knowledge about air warfare and the history of flight which recently celebrated its 100th anniversary.

The book is divided into four parts: 1900-1918 (120 p.), 1919-1939 (100 p.), 1939-1945 (120 p.) and 1946-2003 (100 p.). Thus, the Second World War with the fairly well-known cases of the Battle of Britain, Midway and the strategic bombing campaign is overrepresented, while the recent past is underrepresented. The best part is the pioneer phase with men (two women feature in the 17 pages small print double column index, one an estranged wife, the other a think tank author) grappling with technology and bureaucracy. Interestingly, the inventions always conquered the public's imagination while the military turf battles between and within the services blocked progress. The book makes a good case for the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing from WWI to Vietnam (although the book's rosy assessment of Gulf War I and II precision bombing is, according to recent reports, not merited.). I also learned about the high casualty rate among the WWII bomber-crews, in hindsight a costly and ineffective sacrifice.

Which brings me to the major weakness of the book: Instead of Air Power it should have been labelled US Air Power. The book is extremely US centric (with the Brits as honorary Americans) to the point of misleading readers. French, German and Soviet contributions are, if at all, only noted en passant. The book situates itself in the "US über alles" literature of recent years which directly led to catastrophe of Iraq. Apart from the neglect of foreign contributions, the author does hardly mention airborne troops, anti-aircraft guns, rockets and unmanned flight. The importance of signals, communications and information warfare innovations for air power is noted but not highlighted. This is a book about brave men flying machines (a soon outdated concept).

The book fails to even mention the role of planes in lesser conflicts (with the exception of the 1982 Israeli Bekaa Valley attack). US interventions in South America (where the air force plays an important role in the futile war on drugs) or the raids on Iran and Libya are never referred to. Thus, the book ends on US air power triumphant against the Soviets and Saddam Hussein in 2003 (without mentioning less successful events such as the accidental 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade). The book also does not discuss social changes in the US air force (apart from the change of the men-in-charge from bombers to fighters) transforming it from an elite to a mass organization which gradually opened up to women.

Overall, I have mixed feelings about this book. It is well written, although the glorious praise heaped on it by the reviewers' blurb is not merited. Read the first (and with reservations, the second and third) part, always be aware that the author does not present the complete story, a severe failure in a history book. ( )